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Missouri Law Review
Volume XVIII NOVEMBER, 1953 Number 4
THE WORK OF THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE YEAR 1952
STATISTICAL SURVEY
DONALD G. STUBBs*
The statistical survey for 1952 is derived from 291 majority opinions
written by the judges and commissioners of the Supreme Court of Missouri
during that year.' This sum represents an increase of 32 opinions from the
preceding year. There were 9 opinions concurring in result, and 11 such
concurrences without opinion. There were 11 dissenting opinions, and 11
dissents without opinion. During the year, Court of Appeal Judges Walter
E. Bennick, James W. Broaddus, and William L. Vandevanter served as
Special Judges for brief periods.
TABLE I
NUMBER OF OPINIONS WRITrEN BY EACH DIVISION
Em Banc ........................................................--------------------------------------- 41
Division Number One ........................................................................ 137
Division Number Two ...................................................................... 113
Total ............................................................................................. 291
Table II represents a classification of the opinions according to their
dominant issue. The selection of the most important issue was somewhat
arbitrary, since nearly every case contained several issues.
TABLE II
TOPICAL ANALYSIS OF DECISIONS
Administrative Law ............................................................................ 1
Adoption of Children ..................................... ................................ 1
Adverse Possession ....................................................................... . 6
Appeal and Error ................................................................................ 21
Attorney and Client ......................................................................... 2
*Chairman, Board of Student Editors.
1. Total majority opinions for the preceding seven years is as follows: 1945,
197; 1946, 181; 1947, 244; 1948, 254; 1949, 244; 1950, 265; 1951, 259.
(331)
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Prohibition ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 4




Schools and School Districts ---------------------------------------------------------- 8
Specific Performance .......................................................................... 8
States ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1
Statute of Frauds ............................................................................... 2
Statutes ------------------------------..........................---------------------------------------- 2
Street Railroads .................................................................................. 4
T axation ................................................................................................ 10
Trial ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 3
Trusts .................................................................................................... 2
Vendor and Purchaser ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 1
W ater and W ater Courses .................................................................. 2
W eapons ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1
W ills ...................................................................................................... 11
W itnesses .............................................................................................. 2
Workmen's Compensation .............................. : .......------------------------- 7
T otal ............................................................................................ 291
Table III indicates the disposition of the cases. Generally, the particu-
lar phrasing is that of the judges and commissioners. In addition to the
following, there was one original proceeding disposed of by the Court.
TABLE III
DISPOSITION OF LITIGATION
Alternative Writ of Mandamus Made Peremptory ...................... 1
Appeal Dismissed -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2
Appeal Set Aside and Cause Remanded with Directions ------------- 2
Cause Remanded with Directions .................................................... 1
Cause Transferred to Court of Appeals -------------------------------------- 12
Decree Affirmed ---------------------- .........................- -------- --- -------- ----------- 2
Decree Modified and Affirmed as Modified ------------------------------------ 1
Judgment Affirmed ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 139
Judgment Affirmed on Condition of Remittitur ----------------------- 10
Judgment Affirmed in Part and Reversed and Remanded in Part 1
Judgment of Court of Appeals Reversed and Judgment of
Circuit Court Affirmed ---------------------------------------------------------- 1
Judgment and Decree Affirmed -------------------------------------------------------- 5
Judgment and Decree Reversed and Cause Remanded
with Directions ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1
3
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Judgment Modified and Affirmed as Modified ............................ 5
Judgment Reversed ......................................................................... 7
Judgment Reversed and Award Affirmed ...................................... 1
Judgment Reversed and Cause Remanded ................................ 43
Judgment Reversed and Cause Remanded with Directions ........ 30
Judgment and Orders Reversed and Causes Remanded ............ 1
Judgment Reversed in Part and Affirmed in Part ........................ 1
Opinion of Court of Appeals Quashed and Judgment of
Circuit Court Affirmed .............................................................. 1
Order of Distribution, Decree, and Judgment Modified
and Affirm ed ................................................................................ 1
Order Granting New Trial Affirmed and Cause Remanded .... 10
Order Granting New Trial Reversed on Condition of
R em ittitur .................................................................................... 1
Orders Reversed and Cause Remanded with Directions ............ 3
Peremptory Writs Issued ............................................................... I
Preliminary Rule in Prohibition Discharged .............................. 2
Provisional Rule in Prohibition Made Absolute .......................... 1
W rit Quashed ................................................................................... 4
Total ............................................................................................. 290
Table IV represents disposition of motions made subsequent to the
decision, to the extent that such disposition can be determined from the
reported opinions. Cases wherein rehearings were granted or which were
transferred to the court en bane are necessarily not included. However, there
were 16 cases wherein rehearings or transfers were granted.
TABLE IV
MOTIONS SUBSEQUENT TO DEcIsioN
Motion for Rehearing Denied ..................................................... 34
Motion for Rehearing Denied and Opinion Modified on
Court's Own M otion .................................................................. 1
Motion for Rehearing or to Modify Opinion Denied ................ 1
Motion for Rehearing or to Modify or to Transfer to
Court en bane denied ............................................................ 3
Motion for Rehearing or to Transfer to Court en bane Denied .... 58
Motion for Rehearing or to Transfer to Court en bane Denied
and Opinion Modified on Court's Own Motion .................. 4
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APPELLATE PRACTICE
CHARLES V. GARNETT*
THE JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT
Questions relating to the jurisdiction of the supreme court have again
proved troublesome. During the year under review no less than twelve cases
were transferred to the appropriate court of appeals for lack of jurisdiction,
as against only two such transfers the previous year.,
Two cases were transferred because title to real estate was aot involved.
In Oehler v. Philpott2 the suit was to enjoin a threatened sale of real estate
under power of sale in a deed of trust. The pleadings, however, did not
join issue as to plaintiff's ownership of the fee, and the ultimate issue for
trial was the mere enforceability or non-enforceability of the lien of the
deed of trust. The court merely followed well established rules in holding
that these facts do not present an issue involving the title to real estate
in the Constitutional sense. In the second case, Thacker v. Flotinann,3 plain-
tiff claimed title to certain mineral deposits under a written instrument in
the nature of a mining lease and option, the instrument giving plaintiffs
the right of ingress and egress for the purpose of mining and providing that
if within a given time for prospecting the lessees were of the opinion that
the deposit justified the taking of the lease, it should become a binding lease
for a term of three years. The relief sought was a judgment determining
that the plaintiffs are the owners of the minerals with the right to remove
same and that defendant has no right, title or interest in or to the minerals
on the land. The court defines plaintiffs' rights, as created by this instru-
ment, as in the nature of an incorporeal hereditament which is generally
regarded as real property, but pointed to the fact that the interest of plain-
tiff therein was only an estate for years and that, therefore, the right con-
tended for is a mere "chattel real" not unlike any lessee's right to use real
property on which the lessee holds a lease. Under such circumstances, the
case was held to be one where no question involving the title to real estate
was involved in the Constitutional sense and the cause was transferred to
the appropriate court of appeals.
In five cases supreme court jurisdiction was sought to be supported upon
*Attorney, Kansas City. LL.B., Kansas City School of Law, 1912.
1. 17 Mo. L. REv. 374 (Nov. 1952).
2. 253 S.W. 2d 179 (Mo. 1952).
3. 244 S.W. 2d 1020 (Mo. 1952). 5
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the ground that a constitutional question was presented. All five cases were
transferred. In Miltenberger v. Central West Enterprises4 the appeal was
taken from a default judgment. The suit was first filed against two defend-
ants who made default. Later an amended petition was filed naming a third
defendant. All defendants then defaulted and a default judgment was
rendered against all three. After an unsuccessful motion to set the default
judgment aside all three defendants joined in an appeal and it was contended
that the amended petition constituted a statement of a new cause of action
requiring the issuance of a new summons and that the default judgment re-
sulted in a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment in that due process was
not afforded. The court, however, pointed to the fact that there was no
contention that any statute involved is unconstitutional and that the only
issue to be determined was whether or not the trial court had correctly con-
strued the petition and the amended petition and that such issue did not
raise any Constitutional question. Accordingly the case was transferred.
In Stribling v. Jolley5 the trustees of a county hospital brought a declar-
atory action to determine the validity of a rule which it had passed whereby
osteopaths were excluded from practicing in that hospital. The defendants
named were the medical physicians of that county and the State Medical
Association, and the osteopathic physicians of that county and the Mis-
souri Osteopathic Association. The trial court found that the rule passed
by the board was illegal and both the board and the defendant medical
physicians appealed. Both appellants contended that the statute under
which the hospital was organized constitutes an unlawful delegation of leg-
islative power and that the trustees had the right to exclude the osteopaths.
The court first determines that the medical doctors were not directly affected
either by the statute claimed to be unconstitutional or by any rulings made
by the hospital and are not in a position to raise the question of constitu-
tionality of the statute. As to the appellant trustees, the court points out
that the osteopathic doctors did not appeal from the ruling of the trial
court and since they, and they only, would be in a position to question the
constitutionality of the statute, the constitutional question raised by the
osteopaths in the trial court does not vest the supreme court with jurisdic-
tion. Consequently no constitutional question was presented and the cause
was transferred.
4. 245 S.W. 2d 855 (Mo. 1952).
5. 245 S.W. 2d 885 (Mo. 1952).
[Vol. 18
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Similarly, in Communications Workers of America v. Browi 6 the plain-
tiff was a labor union, a voluntary unincorporated association, seeking to
recover a fine which it had assessed against one of its members. The lower
court had held that plaintiff was not a corporation or suable entity and
could not maintain the suit. The supreme court points out that while the
question of the corporate character of the union might be determined by
the application of the Constitution, the question presented did not involve
a construction of the Constitution and that the essence of the union's claim
is based upon principles of estoppel to deny corporate existence where no
constitutional question could be involved at all. Accordingly, the case was
transferred.
In State v. St. Louis Union Trust Company the suit was instituted by
the Attorney General of the State of California against a Trustee and the
Administratrix of an estate for the amount of California Inheritance tax left
underpaid after the California probate of an estate had been exhausted. The
defendant Trust Company was subjected to judgment for the amount of the
unpaid tax and appealed claiming that the case involves construction of
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United
States. Pointing to the fact that the appellate presentation merely chal-
lenged the California judgment as not being binding upon the defendant in
Missouri and as having been entered without due process of law and con-
tending that its use as a basis for the Missouri judgment had the effect of
depriving defendants of their property without due process of law was
wholly insufficient to raise a constitutional question because it did not point
to the sections of the Constitution relied upon and was a mere legal conclu-
sion, the court held that the reply brief of appellants which undertook to
demonstrate the constitutional question did not constitute presentation of
that question at the first opportunity; and referring to the record, the court
found no express reference to the Constitution and no section or article of
any constitution relied upon and that the averments in the answer that the
California judgment was without due process of law was a mere legal con-
clusion. The court held, therefore, that it did not have jurisdiction of the
appeal and transferred the cause to the appropriate court of appeals.
In Cotton v. Iowa Mutual Liability Insurance Company," two jurisdic-
tional questions are presented. The suit was a declaratory judgment action
6. 247 S.W. 2d 815 (Mo. 1952).
7. 248 S.W. 2d 592 (Mo. 1952).
8. 251 S.W. 2d 246 (Mo. 1952).
7
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on an automobile liability insurance policy. Plaintiff had sustained damages
as the result of an automobile collision with a defendant who was insured by
the Insurance Company defendant and who was a member of the reserve
military force of the Missouri National Guard. The accident occurred while
he was returning to his home in an automobile, the property of the Missouri
State Guard, from maneuvers. One defense to the claim was based upon a
statute which exempted members of the military force from liability for civil
action for death, injury, or property damage as the result of action taken by
a member of the military force while engaged in and pursuant to the per-
formance of lawfully ordered duties. It was contended that this statute,
if construed to exempt the insured from liability in any event was uncon-
stitutional and if military action made it necessary for defendant to operate
his motor vehicle on the wrong side of the highway as the result of military
orders the statute would be unconstitutional. The court, however, pointed
to the fact that it was never contended that the statute was inherently and
wholly unconstitutional and that, in order to confer appellate jurisdiction in
the supreme court the attack must be that the statute under any all con-
structions of which it is susceptible is unconstitutional. On the second issue,
the amount involved, the court points to the fact that plaintiff may never
secure any judgment at all in his damage suit and that the jurisdictional
amount does not conclusively and affirmatively appear from the record. The
court, in the course of the opinion, states:
"'We are not to indulge in speculation and conjecture as to the
amount involved for the purpose of assuming appellate jurisdiction."
The case was, accordingly, transferred to the appropriate court of appeals.
In a similar case, M. F. A. Mutual Insurance Company v. Quinn,9 jurisdic-
tion was also denied on the ground that the declaratory action on such an
insurance policy did not definitely and affirmatively disclose the amount
actually involved because it was not disclosed by the pleadings the money
amounts of the claims made under the policy. That case, too, was trans-
ferred.
In Jenkins v. Jenkins0 the action was one to modify a divorce decree.
It was pointed out that the modification sought amounted to $400.00 per
month and that while the relief sought, if granted, might in subsequent years
be of money value much in excess of $7500.00 it is apparent that, if the wife
should remarry or the husband should die before the requisite amount was
9. 251 S.W. 2d 633 (Mo. 1952).
10. 251 S.W. 2d 243 (Mo. 1952).
[Vol. 18
8
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 4 [1953], Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol18/iss4/1
1953] WORK OF MISSOURI SUPREME COURT FOR 1952 339
reached, the jurisdictional amount would not be involved. In othei words,
the amount involved was contingent. Accordingly, the case was transferred.
So, also, in Gillespie v. American Bus Lines," a compensation case, while the
compensation claim filed included a claim for total permanent disability which
would be in excess of $7500.00, the whole record disclosed that his appeal
from an order denying the claim in toto was only one contending that he
had a compensable claim, not that his injury was both total and permanent.
Thus the requisite jurisdictional amount was not affirmatively shown and the
cause was transferred. Again, in Goodrich v. Rhodes' 2 an action to declare
a vendor's lien on a stock of merchandise and foreclose it, the action was
based upon a claim that defendant's had permitted the stock of merchandise
to become depleted so that the value thereof was below the amount of a
$10,000.00 note, for the payment of which the vendor's lien was sought; but
the record did not show the extent to which the stock had been depleted and,
since there was no affirmative showing in the record that the amount in
controversy was in excess of $7500.00 the cause was transferred. In State
ex rel Kirks v. Allen'8 it was again held that a prosecuting attorney is not a
State officer within the meaning of the constitutional provisions as to the
jurisdiction of the supreme court, and that cause, also, was transferred.
THE RIGHT OF APPEAL
In Carver v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R. R.,14 plaintiff had a verdict in a
negligence action upon which the trial court ordered a remittitur. Although
excepting to the order, plaintiff accepted the remittitur, and judgment was
entered on the verdict as so reduced. Both plaintiff and defendant appealed.
Plaintiff's appeal was on the ground that the remittitur was under the com-
pulsion of a final order and was not voluntary. The court, however, points
out that an order of remittitur is, in effect, an order granting defendant a
new trial with privilege in plaintiff of filing a remittitur and defeating defend-
ants new trial and that plaintiff is given the privilege of an election to
accept or refuse the remittitur. The court holds that by accepting the remit-
titur plaintiff obtains a judgment he would not otherwise hold, deprives the
defendant of a new trial, and puts the expense of the appeal upon defendant;
and that such acceptance is based upon plaintiff's voluntary consent and
11. 246 S.W. 2d 797 (Mo. 1952).
12. 251 S.W. 2d 652 (Mo. 1952).
13. 250 S.W. 2d 348 (Mo. 1952).
14. 245 S.W. 2d 96 (Mo. 1952).
9
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he may not question the validity of the order after accepting it. Accordingly,
plaintiff's appeal was dismissed.
In Heinrich v. Soutk Side National Bank,", plaintiff sued defendant
bank to collect a deposit held by the bank which had originally been made
in the bank in the name of plaintiff and her mother, who died before the
action was brought. Defendant filed an answer and an interpleader asking
that the administratrix of the mother's estate be made a party. The trial
court entered an order finding that defendant's bill is a proper bill of inter-
pleader and sustaining it, and ordering that summons issue against the
adverse claimants to the fund. The order did not include any direction to
pay the money into court, nor to discharge defendant. Plaintiff filed a
motion for new trial, and on the overruling of that motion, appealed. Not-
withstanding the provisions of the civil code with respect to interpleaders
which have the effect of broadening the former equitable remedy of inter-
pleader, the court holds that "there can still be no final judgment at the
interpleader stage of the case unless the interpleader as a stakeholder pays
the money into court and is discharged from the case leaving the interpleaders
to litigate for it between themselves." Because of the fact that the trial
court's order did not require defendant to pay the money into court nor
discharge defendant, plaintiff's appeal was dismissed.
An interesting situation with respect to the right of appeal was consid-
ered by the court in Stith. v. St. Louis Public Service Company." That was
an action for damage for personal injuries. Plaintiff had a verdict and judg-
ment for $25,000.00. Defendant filed its alternative motion for judgment
or a new trial. The trial court ordered a $7500.00 remittitur, overruled de-
fendent's motion for judgment, overruled defendant's motion for new trial
in all respects, and, alternatively if plaintiff failed to remit, sustained defend-
ant's motion for new trial on the ground that the verdict was excessive. On
plaintiff's refusal to remit, the court ordered a new trial on the damages issue
only. Both parties appealed. Pointing to the rule that for the purposes of
an appeal a judgment must be a final judgment and must ordinarily dispose
of all parties and all issues, and to the fact that there was no final judgment
against defendant from which it could appeal, the court declares that a trial
court may by an appropriate order make the judgment final as to any party
as to whom, or on any issue on which, no new trial is ordered and that any
15. 250 S.W. 2d 345 (Mo. 1952).
16. Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 362.360 and 507.060 (1949).
17. 251 S.W. 2d 693 (Mo. 1952). 10
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party aggrieved by such a final judgment is entitled to appeal; but where,
as in the case being considered, the trial court does not enter such an order
and grants a new trial as to less than all parties or on less than all issues,
the judgment previously entered, and partially set aside, cannot become final.
The order first overruled defendant's after trial motion to set aside the ver-
dict and judgment and the court holds that the overruling of such an after
trial motion is not appealable. However, in discussing the language of the
trial court's order, it is pointed out that the order was the overruling of de-
fendant's motion in its entirety and an order on the court's own motion of
a new trial on a single issue. The new trial ordered was one for which de-
fendant had not asked in its new trial motion and one which plaintiff did
not seek. The court construes the language of the order and of the statute
which provides for an appeal by an aggrieved party from any order granting
a new trial-$ as an order for a new trial as to the issue of damages only and
holds that both plaintiff and defendant as aggrieved parties by such order
were entitled to appeal. It must be noted that the opinion is by Judge Lozier
and that in the concurring opinion of Judge Hyde, in which two other judges
concurred, making the Hyde opinion the majorty opinion of the court, the
view is expressed that defendant's right of appeal shuold not be limited to the
circumstances of the court ordering a new trial of its own initiative and
reaches the conclusion that defendant was aggrieved by the order of the trial
court granting it a new trial on damages only and would be entitled to appeal
even if the order were made more than thirty days after the entry of the
judgment. Judge Hyde states: "a defendant does not get what he asks for
by such an order and if he is entitled to a new trial on the issue of liability
because of error committed against him the order does not give him all to
which he is legally entitled."
RECORDS AND BRIEFS
While the court continues to be lenient in dealing with infractions of its
rules with respect to the content of briefs, the appeal in Clark v. Empire
Trust Company's was dismissed because the brief contained no assignments
of error and the points and authorities merely stated certain abstract pro-
positions of law without in any way showing their applicability to the case to
be considered and does not specify the allegations of error as required by
Rule 1.08. The court states: "We are left without sufficient information on
18. Mo. REv. STAT. § 510.330 (1949).
19. 248 S.W. 2d 603 (Mo. 1952).
11
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which to proceed. There is no question before us for review." However, in
Wipfler v. Basler- the court overruled respondent's motion to dismiss for
failure to comply with Rule 1.08, although the statement does not cover the
facts favorable to the respondent and upon which the jury returned the
verdict, and many of the points and authorities were abstract in nature re-
quiring the court to speculate as to the specific matter constituting the al-
leged error, and references to pages of the transcript are not found in the
argument or in many of the points and authorities. The court states: "The
rules involved are not only to aid the court in its work but also to guard
against the disturbance of judgments except upon a full and fair presenta-
tion of the whole record necessary to a determination of properly presented
errors. Our study of contestant's brief and the record indicates that some
of the issues are sufficiently developed to call for a ruling." The court then
reviews the case upon its merits and confirms the judgment. Also, in Carver
v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R. R.,21 appellant's statement of facts omitted es-
sential facts and the points and authorities were subject to criticism and
attack, but respondent supplied a statement giving its view of the case so
that the court was not required to search out for itself to discover what was




The Supreme Court of Missouri considered forty-eight criminal appeals
during the year 1952. The trial court was affirmed in thirty-six and reversed
in nine. In one case the appeal was set aside and the cause remanded with
directions. In one case judgment was reversed and the defendant discharged.
In one case the cause was set aside and remanded with directions. One case
was reversed and remanded though defendant was not represented by
counsel in the appellate court and had filed no brief."
Most of the cases presented were disposed of upon well settled princi-
pIes of law. However, there were several novel and interesting developments
in this field. Those cases, along with a number of cases which present mat-
20. 250 S.W. 2d 982 (Mo. 1952).
21. 245 S.W. 2d 96 (Mo. 1952).
*Prosecuting Attorney, Clinton, Mo. B.S., University of Missouri, 1948,
LL.B., 1951.
1. State v. Kinard, 245 S.W. 2d 890 (Mo. 1952).
[Vol. 18
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ters of special interest to those actively engaged in the trial of criminal
cases, are here considered.
I. PROCEDURES BEFORE TRIAL
The greater portion of 1952 cases concerning procedure before trial were
confined to the question of sufficiency of informations, but there were several
other interesting points. Under the peculiar facts of one case it was held
that a delay of twenty years between the time when one charged with mur-
der was originally arrested and the beginning of his second trial for the
same offense did not constitute denial of his constitutional right to a
speedy trial.2
The court again indicated that an application for continuance made
by a defendant under Section 545.720, Missouri Revised Statutes of 1949,
must comply strictly with the requirements of that section. In the case of
State v. Brockman,3 it was held that the application must not only state that
diligence was used but must state "what" diligence was used and must also
state the probability and time of procuring the testimony.
For the first time the supreme court ruled on the question of the liability
of the putative father of a child born out of wedlock to the penal provisions
of Section 559.350, Missouri Revised Statutes of 1949, which defines as a
misdemeanor the failure of a man to support his child, "born in or out of
wedlock, .. ." The court held that the correct interpretation of the statute
was that the statute did not apply to the illegitimate child of a man unless
he had the "care or custody" of the child. Defendant was discharged by the
court.4 It would appear though that the new found liberty of the errant
father was short lived. The court in its opinion in the Wlite case suggested
that the legislature might offer a remedy which would help the plight of the
illegitimate child. The legislature accepted the suggestion and plugged the
hole out of which White slipped in the above case. The clause, "and it shall
be no defense to such charge that the father does not have the care and
custody of the child or children . . ." was added by House Bill No. 309,
effective August 29, 1953.
An information charging the defendant with contributing to the de-
linquency of a minor was held sufficient in one case 5 and an information
charging defendant with molestation of a minor was held sufficient.6
2. State v. Hadley, 249 S.W. 2d 857 (Mo. 1952).
3. State v. Bockman, 251 S.W. 2d 607 (Mo. 1952).
4. State v. White, 248 S.W. 2d 841 (Mo. 1952).
5. State v. Bolte, 247 S.W. 2d 863 (Mo. App. 1952).
6. State v. Frazer, 248 S.W. 2d 645 (Mo. 1952). 13
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II. TRIAL
A. Selection of the jury.
Warning has been given by the supreme court in one case that a prac-
tice generally prevalent with reference to the excusing of jurors will have
to be discontinued. Most attorneys in active practice will probably agree
that it is not uncommon for some person other than the judge to excuse
a venireman. Sometimes this is done by the sheriff and on some occasions by
the circuit clerk. On other occasions it is done by one of these two or
some other person at the direction and with the approval of the judge.
In the case of State v. Thursby,T sixty-five veniremerl were excused. Of
this number the judge had talked with thirty-three and had listed them to
be excused. The other thirty-two veniremen were excused by a deputy
sheriff who was told by the judge to excuse as many as thirty-two veniremen
in addition to the thirty-three the judge had talked with and to pick those
who "wanted to get off." There was no evidence tending to show that the
deputy sheriff did anything in connection with excusing the thirty-two
veniremen which was actuated by an improper motive. On these facts the
court held that the fundamental legal status of the trial jury ultimately
selected had been destroyed by the action of the judge and deputy sheriff
and that the trial jury was not a legally constituted instrumentality for the
trial. The case was reversed and remanded on this point.
B. Evidence
1. Confessions and Admissions
Defendant's counsel in one case asserted that there is a distinction be-
tween the test of defendant's mental capacity to make a confession to a
crime and his mental capacity to commit the crime itself. It was argued that
the former is the same as in the execution of a will or contract, whereas the
latter is the ability to distinguish between right and wrong. This contention
was overruled by the court, and it was held that the issue on the sanity
of an accused and the issue of capacity on a confession he has made must
be measured by the same test."
In another case, notes written by the defendant to another offering to
pay money in consideration of the other's being a witness for the defendant
at the trial of the case were held to have been properly admitted under the
7. State v. Thursby, 245 S. W. 2d 859 (Mo. 1952).
8. State v. Rose, 249 S.W. 2d 324 (Mo. 1952).
[Vol. 18
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rule that an attempt to fabricate evidence is admission of a defendant's
guilt of the main facts charged.9
2. Burden of Proof-Insanity as a Defense
Under the peculiar facts of the case considered, the court held in one
case that an instruction in the usual form concerning the burden of proving
insanity was prejudicial error. The facts were that the probate judge of the
county had issued a lunatic warrant for the defendant on the same day
the defendant had shot the deputy sheriff. Defendant had shot the deputy
sheriff in resisting the arrest. The court stated that the evidence in the
record showed that the defendant's insanity was chronic and continuing. It
was held that under these circumstances defendant's continued insanity
should be presumed and the burden of establishing sanity at the time of the
shooting would be upon the state.'0
3. Proof of Prior Conviction Under Habitual Criminal Act
In one case prosecuted under the habitual criminal statute the defen-
dant asserted on the appeal that he had previously been tried under that
statute in this state and that the jury had found that he had not been
convicted of prior felonies and so that question was now res judicata and
could not be tried by the State again. The court did not rule on the question
but avoided it on the procedural point that the record itself did not show
the previous trial and acquittal under the Habitual Criminal Act.": The
question is apparently an open one in this state and should be kept in mind
by counsel for the defense and the State.
In State v. Davis,"2 the court ruled that it was not prejudicial error for
the State's attorney in a case being prosecuted under the Habitual Criminal
Act to refer in voir dire and opening statement to the specific felonies,
naming them, of which defendant had previously been convicted. The court
stated that prejudice there was, but that it is inherent when the habitual
criminal issue is presented.
C. Istrvwtions
An instruction placing the burden of proof on the defendant to "estab-
lish" the fact that he had reasonable cause of fear in a second degree murder
9. State v. Christian, 245 S.W. 2d 895 (Mo. 1952).
10. State v. Elsea, 251 S.W. 2d 650 (Mo. 1952).
11. State v. O'Brien, 249 S.W. 2d 433 (Mo. 1952).
12. State v. Davis, 251 S.W. 2d 610 (Mo. 1952). 15
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case was held to be prejudicial error because of the use of the word "estab-
lished."13
In a manslaughter case one of the defenses was that of "accident." The
trial court gave an instruction on accident which appeared to be in the
usual form and which had as the first clause the following: "The Court
instructs the jury that the defense in this case is that Earnest B. Hyde came
to his death by accident, . . .". The defendant on the appeal asserted that
though accident was one of his defenses, under his plea of not guilty and
the evidence it was remotely possible that the jury could have found that
the deceased did not come to his death by accident or at the hand of de-
fendant but by the act of some third person. It was then reasoned that the
court's instruction telling the jury that "the defense" was accident elimin-
ated one of defendant's defenses.
The supreme court accepted the defendant's reasoning and held that
a defendant is entitled to have any theory of innocence submitted to a jury,
however improbable that theory may seem, so long as the most favorable
construction of the evidence supports it. The court further stated that an
instruction which eliminates a theory of innocence or a defense is prejudicially
erroneous.
14
In the case of State v. Higgins15 an assault instruction which stated
that the mere placing of hands by defendant on prosecutrix would constitute
a common assault and which did not state that, to make it an unlawful
assault, the act must have been against the will of the prosecutrix, inten-
tionally done in such rude, insolent, or lustful manner as likely to cause her
injury by offending against her sense of personal dignity, was reversibly
erroneous.
D. Conduct of Jury
Permitting jurors during trial of a forcible rape prosecution to have
contact with persons other than the sheriff and his sworn deputies by per-
mitting some jurors to have a doctor give them hypodermic injections of
vaccine while the jurors were in a residence in which the jury was quarter-
ed before termination of the trial, and to be separated by permitting some
jurors to retire to a rest room in the judge's chambers while other jurors
remained in the hallway, was held to be not prejudicial error.'0
13. State v. Forsythe, 251 S.W. 2d 17 (Mo. 1952).
14. State v. Kinard, 245 S.W. 2d 890 (Mo. 1952).
15. State v. Higgins, 252 S.W. 2d 641 (Mo. App. 1952).
16. State v. Rose, 249 S.W. 2d 324 (Mo. 1952).
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In a murder case two female jurors left the rest of the jury of men and
went to the women's rest room and while there were in the presence of the
sheriff's wife and another woman. The judge upon learning of the incident
interrogated the women jurors and the sheriff's wife and then ordered that
the trial be continued and the jury be not discharged. The supreme court
held this action was a proper exercise of the trial court's discretion.1 7
E. Argument of Counsel
In a prosecution for child molestation the state's attorney argued that
"there has been a wave of sex crimes." There was timely objection and the
trial court sustained the objection and admonished counsel to stay within
the record. The supreme court held that the argument did not constitute
prejudicial error under that state of the record.18
In the case of State v. Johnson,'" a murder case, the prosecutor in argu-
ing the distinction between first and second degree murder stated that the
difference was in the defendant's state of mind. He then asked the jury,
"What evidence do you have of the condition of his mind?" Defendant's
counsel objected on the ground that this was a comment on defendant's
failure to testify in violation of the statutory prohibition of such argument.20
The opinion of the court written by Judge Ellison, as amplified by the excel-
lent concurring opinion of Judge Leedy, held that the argument was not
error. The appellate court interpreted the argument as being merely a per-
missible argument by the prosecutor that the defendant should be convicted
of first degree murder and not second degree murder because there was no
evidence, considering the case as a whole, that defendant did not have the
specific intent to kill the deceased. There was a dissenting opinion by Judge
Conkling to the effect that the argument was in clear violation of the statu-
tory prohibition against comment on failure of the accused to testify.
Allowing the prosecutor to argue that he knew of facts indicating defen-
dant's guilt which could not be introduced in evidence because of the hear-
say rule was held to be prejudicial error in the case of State v. Montgomery."
This case is a clear holding that an argument made by the State's attorney
so as to intimate or infer to the jury that he possesses or knows of facts
tending to establish the guilt of the defendant on trial, and which are not
17. State v. Emrich, 252 S.W. 2d 310 (Mo. 1952).
18. State v. Randall, 248 S.W. 2d 860 (Mo. 1952).
19. 245 S.W. 2d 43 (Mo. 1951).
20. Mo. REv. STAT. § 546.270 (1949).
21. 251 S.W. 2d 654 (Mo. 1952).
17
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in evidence, or which for some reason could not be introduced in evidence
will be prejudicial error.
III. SPECIFIC OFFENSES
A. Burglary
In a prosecution for burglary in the first degree an allegation and finding
that the method of gaining entry was by bursting or breaking is essential.22
This is not true of the prosecution for burglary in the second degree.23 In a
burglary case distinguishing the two offenses the court held that where the
evidence showed that entry was by raising a window this was sufficient
breaking for the offense of second degree burglary.24
An information that charged that the persons whose premises were
burglarized were co-partners doing business as named motor company was
held to be sufficient notwithstanding the fact that it was not charged that
the motor company was or was not a corporation, partnership or individual.25
B. Rape
The value of the use of demonstrative evidence in presenting the State's
case in a rape prosecution is illustrated in one case where the State's attorney
was allowed to introduce the pants worn by the prosecutrix at the time of
the offense along with other evidence. 20
C. Homicide
The defendant in a prosecution for murder in the first degree testified
that, "All I know, I got socked from the back of the head and from the front.
And the next thing I knew I was on the floor. And the gun went off." De-
fendant also 'testified that he had no recollection of shooting anyone inten-
tionally or unintentionally. The counsel for the defendant offered an in-
struction on homicide by accident at the close of the evidence, which in-
struction was refused by the trial court. Defendant asserted this to be error.
It was pointed out that if there was any evidence upon the whole record,
however improbable, in support of the theory of accidental homicideP7
the court must instruct on that point.28 However, on these facts the court
22. Mo. REv. STAT. § 560.040 (1949).
23. Id. § 560.070.
24. State v. O'Brien, 249 S.W. 2d 433 (Mo. 1952).
25. State v. Stubblefield, 248 S.W. 2& 665 (Mo. 1952).
26. State v. Wilson, 248 S.W. 2d 857 (Mo. 1952).
27. Mo. REV. STAT. §559.050 (1949).
28. State v. O'Kelley, 213 S.W. 2d 963 (Mo. 1948).
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ruled that there was no evidence from which an inference could be drawn
that the death was a result of accident.
IV. APP ALs
The motion for new trial in a criminal case must set forth in detail and
with particularity the error committed.29 This requirement seems simple
enough but a consideration of the cases decided in 1952 indicate that the
failure to comply with this statute as it is interpreted by the court had a
marked effect on the result reached in numerous cases. Defense counsel
should consider the recent cases under this statute before attempting to
prepare the motion for new trial along the customary lines. If this is not
done it is quite likely that an error preserved properly by timely objection
and thought to have been preserved by mention in the motion for new trial
may be lost.30 It appears that the motion must not only state what was
done and that the particular action was error but the motion must state
specifically the reason why the particular action is error.31
In tine case of State v. Tebbe,3 2 the prosecution was for permitting
gambling devices on the premises of the defendant. The defendant's motion
for new trial stated as follows:
"1. That the court erred in overruling and denying the motion to
quash search warrant, sheriff's return thereon and to suppress
evidence secured thereunder filed herein on May 17, 1951.
2. That the court erred in admitting evidence of state witnesses
procured under the execution of the aforesaid search warrant
all of which was prejudicially and erroneously admitted."
On the appeal the defendant's only point was that there was error in
failing to quash the search warrant and in admitting the evidence. The court
held that the above assignment of error was too general to preserve the
question for review of the appellate court.
A divided court held, in the case of State v. Charlton,3" that the statu-
tory proviso,: 4 that the "court" shall order transcript of court reporter's
notes of evidence in a criminal case to be furnished at public expense to an
indigent defendant taking an appeal or obtaining a writ of error, refers only
to the trial court and does not authorize the supreme court to order the
transcript but only gives such authority to the trial court.
29. Mo. REv. STAT. § 547.030 (1949).
30. State v. Tebbe, 249 S.W. 2d 172 (Mo. App. 1952).
31. State v. Tebbe, 249 S.W. 2d 172 (Mo. App. 1952).
32. 249 S.W. 2d 172 (Mo. App. 1952).
33. 251 S.W. 2d 82 (Mo. 1952).
34. Mo. REv. STAT. § 485.100 (1949).
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During the year 1952, the Supreme Court of Missouri in thirty-four
cases touched upon questions of evidence which the writer deems worthy
of note. All of the decisions are generally within well established rules.
JumiciAL NoTicE
The question of judicial notice was mentioned by the court in eight
different cases.
In accordance with the well established rule, the court in Twielaus v.
Rosner took judicial notice of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942
and the Housing and Rent Act of 1947, along with the regulations issued
thereunder. Likewise, in Burton v. Moulder,2 the court took judicial notice
of the records in the supreme court regarding prior cases decided by it, and
in McCain v. Sieloff Packing Company3 the court took judicial notice of
the statutes and decisions of Illinois.
In the case of Collector of Revenue of Jackson County v. Parcels of
Land Encumbered with. Delinquent Taxes,4 the court took judicial notice
of the assessed valuation in Jackson County, as such valuation is shown in
the Journal of the State Board of Equalization.
Other instances of judicial notice include Melton v. St. Louis Public
Service Company5 in which the court took judicial notice that street cars,
trains, and all locomotives are wider than the tracks upon which they oper-
ate, but the court refused to take notice of the extent of such overhang.
In Carter v. Skelly Oil Company,6 the court took judicial notice of the
volatility and explosive qualities of gasoline and the need for careful guard-
ing against flame or spark around such gasoline. The court also stated that
it was a matter of common knowledge that an adult pedestrian will walk
from 2.9 to 4.4 feet per second, and that the court would so consider it in
the absence of other evidence.7 However, in Winston v. Kansas City Public
Service Company,s the court refused to hold that it was a matter of common
*Attorney, Mexico. B.S., University of Missouri, 1940, LL.B., 1944.
1. 245 S.W. 2d 107 (Mo. 1952).
2. 245 S.W. 2d 844 (Mo. 1952).
3. 246 S.W. 2d 736 (Mo. 1952).
4. 247 S.W. 2d 83 (Mo. 1952).
5. 251 S.W. 2d 663 (Mo. 1952).
6. 252 S.W. 2d 306 (Mo. 1952).
7. Wofford v. St. Louis Public Service Company, 252 S.W. 2d 529 (Mo. 1952).
8. 249 S.W. 2d 377 (Mo. 1952).
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knowledge that the exit doors of modern transit vehicles open and Close
automatically, when passengers step on and off the steps.
RELEVANCY, MATERIALITY AND COMPETENCY
A. Competency in General
In the case of Carver v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R. R.,9 an action under
the Federal Employer's Liability Act, the court sustained the action of a
trial judge in allowing the use of a model of a portion of a railroad bridge.
The court stated that, since there was testimony that the model was one-
sixth of the size of the original and that it was a fair representation of the
original, it would be competent evidence.
B. Cross Examination
In Lonnecker v. Borriso the court held an attempted cross examination
of the plaintiff to have been properly excluded by the trial court on the
ground that cross examination is not proper which is argumentative; which
calls for conclusions; or which assumes facts which are not proven. The
court relied upon the case of State v. Carroll.1'
In the case of Wipfler v. Basler,12 Section 491.030, Missouri Revised
Statutes (1949), relating to the cross examination of an adverse party was
brought before the court. This was an action to contest a will. The widow
of the testator was made a party defendant by the plaintiffs, but she was
not a beneficiary under the will. The court held that the statutory right
under the above section is not absolute, but rests in the sound discretion of
the trial court, and that such "adverse party" must be actual and that the
plaintiffs could not make the widow an adverse party merely by joining her
as a party defendant.
In a criminal case, State v. Christian,-8 the court held that where the
defendant testified under the statute he could be cross examined as to things
he testified to on direct examination, and could be impeached by prior incon-
sistent statements which were relative to the matters testified to in the
testimony in chief and which were in writing.
9. 245 S.W. 2d 96 (Mo. 1952).
10. 245 S.W. 2d 53 (Mo. 1951).
11. 188 S.W. 2d 22, l.c. 24 (Mo. 1945).
12. 250 S.W. 2d 982 (Mo. 1952).
13. 245 S.W. 2d 895 (Mo. 1952).
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C. Hypothetical Questions
The court only indirectly touched upon hypothetical questions in
evidence in two cases, the first being Pinter v. Gulf, Mobile & Ohio R. R.,14
in which the court held it proper to allow a hypothetical question containing
an assumption of fact not yet in evidence, upon a promise of the asking
party to connect up by later testimony as to such fact, provided such testi-
mony is thereafter actually produced. In Curtis v. Frun-Colnon Contract-
ing Company,'5 it was held that an expert witness might base a competent
opinion upon not only a hypothetical question, but upon such matters as
are within his own personal knowledge or observation.
WITNESSES
Concerning the credibility of witnesses and their testimony, the court
states in Roush v. Alkire Truck Lines8 that in an action where there is a
conflict between the physical facts and a witness's testimony, such conflict
can be considered by the jury in determining the weight to be given to the
conflicting testimony, but that it is within the sound discretion of the trial
court as to whether or not an instruction on credibility should be given.
Also, the court held in State v. Thursby,'7 that the testimony of a prostitute
and her procuror was sufficient substantive evidence to justify conviction
of the defendant even though the procuror had been convicted of felonies
and was living in adultery, the court again stating that such testimony went
to the credibility of the witnesses and not to their competency to testify.
In Baker v. Norris,' an action for damages arising from the collision
of an automobile and a truck, the plaintiff was the driver of the car. He
testified as to certain times, speeds and distances. The defendant attempted
to show by computation that the testimony of the plaintiff was contrary to
known physical facts, and therefore it had no probative value. The court
states that in this particular case the defendant overlooked the fact that the
testimony was of speed and location of vehicles, and was only estimates
of the plaintiff; that the plaintiff testified he was applying his brakes at
the time and that the computations of the defendant did not consider the
reduction of speed, and that also in the computations made by the plaintiff,
14. 245 S.W. 2d 88 (Mo. 1952).
15. 253 S.W. 2d 158 (Mo. 1952).
16. 245 S.W. 2d 8 (Mo. 1952).
17. 245 S.W. 2d 859 (Mo. 1952).
18. 248 S.W. 2d 870(Mo. App. 1952).
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the plaintiff had not considered reaction time. In so holding, the court held
the testimony to be relevant and for consideration of the jury.
An interesting example of rehabilitation of a witness was given in State
v. Emrich.1 Upon cross examination of one McQuinn, he admitted prior
inconsistent statements. Upon re-direct, the state introduced prior consistent
statements to support his testimony. These prior consistent statements
would otherwise have been purely hearsay evidence, but the court held them
competent for the purpose of rehabilitation.
INFERENCES
Russell v. St. Louis Public Service" Company20 was a personal injury
action in which it was shown that four doctors saw and examined the plain-
tiff. The plaintiff called only two doctors, and the defendant's attorney
in argument to the jury commented upon the failure to call the other two
doctors, inferring that their testimony would be unfavorable to the plaintiff.
The plaintiff's attorney replied in closing argument that the defendant could
have called these doctors, to which objection was made by the defendant.
The court held that no error existed, since the evidence showed that the
regular doctor of the plaintiff had been called, and that he and the other
doctor who did testify testified fully regarding the injuries. The court states
that with regard to the rule of unfavorable inferences from failure to call
witnesses, such rule is limited in situations where the testimony would only
be cumulative, and where there is no showing or indication that the witness
not produced had superior evidence to that which had been introduced.
ADMISSIONS AND DECLARATIONS AGAINST INTEREST
Two interesting evidence problems were presented in the case of Osborne
v. Purdome,21 which was a habeas corpus case arising from a conviction of
criminal contempt. Evidence had been introduced in the criminal contempt
proceedings of an attempt on the part of petitioner to fabricate evidence, to
procure false evidence, or to destroy evidence. The court held that such
facts were in the nature of an admission of guilt, and were evidence of the
main facts charged.
In the same proceedings, a transcript of the testimony of a deceased
witness, which testimony had been given in a contempt prosecution of that
19. 250 S.W. 2d 718 (Mo. 1952).
20. 251 S.W. 2d 595 (Mo. 1952).
21. 250 S.W. 2d 159 (Mo. 1952).
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witness, was admissible against the petitioner in a separate contempt
proceeding, as being a declaration against the interest of the deceased wit-
ness. In so holding the court followed the ruling of Sltter v. Easterly.22
The court states that the fact that the petitioner had no opportunity to
cross examine was no bar to the admissibility, since it was admitted as an
exception to the hearsay rule. This is a good illustration of the difference
between admissions and declarations against interest.
PRESUMPTIONS
The court in Boyer v. Guidicy Marble, Terrazzo & Tile Company,28
refused to conclusively presume that a seventeen year old boy has any
exact amount of knowledge, capacity or experience, or that he has reached
any particular status of maturity as to any given situation or subject. The
court very wisely stated that the capacity, knowledge, experience and dis-
cretion of any particular individual appears to be an evidentiary circum-
stance as to which the party may adduce evidence.
The status of presumptions was considered in two cases. In Hendrix v.
Metropolitan Life Insurance Cornpany,24 the court considered the sufficiency
of the evidence to submit a case of accidental death in an action on a double
indemnity life insurance policy. The court points out that the presumption
against suicide is so strong that unless the evidence negatives every reason-
able inference of death by accident, the presumption would justify the find-
ing of death by accident. However, upon showing of clear evidence of sui-
cide, the presumption disappears. A like holding was made in Michler v.
Krey Packing Company,25 which was a Workmen's Compensation death
case. The issue presented was whether the claimant and the employee were
married. The Industrial Commission had found that the claimant failed to
prove such marriage. On appeal, the claimant relied upon the presumption
of valid marriage arising from cohabitation, general repute and declara-
tions and conduct of the parties. The employer relied upon the presumption
that the relationship having begun on an unmarried status, such status
would continue unless otherwise proven. The court held that there was
evidence contrary to both presumptions, and stated that when substantive
evidence was introduced by a party against whom a presumption operates
controverting the presumed fact, its existence or non-existence is to be
22. 189 S.W. 2d 284 (Mo. 1945); see Note, 162 A.L.R. 446 (1946).
23. 246 S.W. Ed 742 (Mo. 1952).
24. 250 S.W. 2d .18 (Mo. 1952).
25. 253 S.W. 2d 136 (Mo. 1952).
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determined from the evidence, exactly as if no presumption had ever been
operative in the case. In considering the two cases, the opinions would ap-
pear to be in conflict. However, the courts have at various times found a
difference in strength of presumptions, as pointed out in the Hendrix case.
EXPERT AND OPINION EVIDENCE
The question of qualification of experts and the use of their opinion
testimony, along with the opinion testimony of non-expert witnesses again
produced a number of cases. In Wright v. Stevens,28 a will contest case, the
court considered the requirements for lay witnesses to testify as to their
opinion of sanity. The court stated the well recognized rule that lay wit-
nesses are not competent to testify as to such witness's opinion of the sanity
of the testator without first relating the facts upon which such opinion is
based, and, unless such facts are inconsistent with such person's sanity, the
witness's opinion would not be admissible in evidence. The court goes fur-
ther and defines some of such facts, stating that evidence of sickness, old
age, peculiarities, eccentricities in dress or oddities of habit, forgetfulness,
inability to recognize friends, feebleness resulting from illness, and other
facts and circumstances not inconsistent with their ability to understand the
ordinary affairs of life, or to comprehend the nature and extent of one's prop-
erty and the natural objects of his bounty, and which are not inconsistent
with sanity, cannot be used as a basis for opinion testimony of a lay witness
that the testator was of unsound mind.
In considering expert medical evidence, on the other hand, the court in
Pinter v. Gulf, Mobile & Ohio R. R.,2 r allowed a doctor to testify regarding
x-rays taken about two years after the accident, even though the doctor did
not know the condition of the injured party prior to the time the x-rays
were taken. The court said that the time lapse was to be considered by the
jury in evaluating the testimony of the doctor. The difference between
opinion evidence by lay witnesses and by experts, and the qualifications of
an expert were well illustrated in State v. Rose.28 This case presented the
question'of the qualification of a fifty-nine year old Methodist minister, who
had studied for the ministry in designated reputable universities in this
country and abroad; had studied construction engineering; had taken post-
graduate work in philosophy, especially psychology; had done war relief
26. 246 S.W. 2d 817 (Mo. 1952).
27. 245 S.W. 2d 88 (Mo. 1952).
28. 249 S.W. 2d 324 (Mo. 1952). 25
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work abroad; had been psychological consultant to the judge of a criminal
court in Baltimore, and also to the medical staff of Fort Henry, a govern-
ment hospital for plastic surgery. In a criminal rape case, the trial court had
ruled the witness to not be qualified as an expert on insanity. This ruling
was upheld by the supreme court. Quoting various precedents and authors,
the court states that the authorities generally agree that there is no absolute
standard as to qualifications for an expert, and that it is ordinarily in the
sound discretion of the trial court, whose decision would be upheld and not
reviewed except in extreme cases where a serious mistake had been made.
The court stated the guiding principles in the case of Wipfler v. Basler,20 in
stating that an expert, to qualify, must show that he has had, and utilized,
means superior to those available to the jurors or to men in general for
forming an intelligent opinion of the matters upon which he is asked to
testify. The same rules were applied, in the case of Carver v. Missouri-
Kansas-Texas R. R.,30 to hold the qualifications of an expert sufficient and
to admit the expert's testimony on proper methods to be used in moving
a "bent" (a temporary support under a railroad bridge), stating that an
expert's testimony in such matters might be an aid to a jury of laymen to
help them pass upon the ultimate fact at issue, to-wit: A question of negli-
gence in the method of moving a "bent," alleged to have caused injuries to
the plaintiff.
HEARSAY
In the opinion of the writer, the most interesting evidence questions pre-
sented were those regarding the hearsay rule. In Wilson v. St. Louis-San
Francisco Ry.,31 the court stated the general rule that unsworn statements,
not reports or letters required to be made or kept, that were not so-called
"res gestae" statements, were hearsay and not admissible. However, in the
case of Moss v. Stevens,32 evidence which would otherwise fall clearly within
the above general rule was admitted. A careful reading of the opinion indi-
cates that the court approved the admission of such testimony by the trial
court only for the purpose of reflecting upon the credibility of the witness.
However, some wording of the court's opinion bears consideration. This was
an action by parents for the death of their infant daughter. The infant
daughter had been run over by a truck. The trial court admitted, after
29. 250 S.W. 2d 982 (Mo. 1952).
30. 245 S.W. 2d 96 (Mo. 1952).
31. 247 S.W. 2d 644 (Mo. 1952).
32. 247 S.W. 2d 782 (Mo. 1952).
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denial of statements by the grandmother, the testimony of the coroner re-
garding statements which the grandmother had made to him to the effect
that the truck had stopped just prior to the accident to avoid hitting some
dogs. The court states: "However, if defendant stopped his truck as Mr.
Schafer (the coroner) testified Mrs. Mastin (the grandmother) said he
had, this fact had some probative value and tended to corroborate the de-
fendant's testimony that he was driving in third gear and at a slow rate of
speed as he passed the Mastins, approximately one hundred feet north of
the stop. When Mrs. Mastin denied making the statement, proof that she
had made it would go to her credibility, her recollection of the facts, veracity
and bias." It appears to this writer that had a request been made for an
instruction limiting the use of such hearsay statements, such limitation
would have been proper. However, it again points out the practical fact
that once evidence is introduced, for whatever purpose it may be admissi-
ble, such evidence is treated by the ordinary jury as evidence of the truth
of the facts stated.
In Lewis v. Lowe & Campbell Athletic Goods Company,33 a question
was presented regarding statements made by a deceased several hours prior
to the time of the accident which caused his death. This was an action for
such death, and the question was whether or not the deceased, at the time
of the accident, was working, and therefore that the accident arose out of
and in the course of his employment. The evidence showed a prior plan of
the deceased to go from his home in St. Louis to Potosi. He left his home
about 3:30 A. M. He was alone in his car when fatally injured in the
collision in question. The appellant had objected to declarations of the
deceased made to his wife on the evening before that he was going to Potosi
on business; to statements made to other people that he would be in Potosi
on the day the accident occurred, and to his conversation with another
party regarding plans for the entertainment of some business acquaintances
in Potosi. The appellant objected on the grounds that such statements were
self serving declarations, and that they could not be used to prove that the
deceased was in the course of his employment.
The court held such evidence admissible as a part of the res gestae. In
so doing, the court quotes at length from Wigmore on Evidence,3 4 Corpus
Juris Secunduwm"5 and a number of Missouri cases, to the effect that such
33. 247 S.W. 2d 800 (Mo. 1952).
34. Vol. 6, 3rd Edition, Paragraph 1725, page 79.
35. 13 C.J.S., Evidence, § 256, page 1009. 27
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declarations which indicate a present intention to do a particular act in the
immediate future, under circumstances indicating apparent good faith, and
not for self serving purposes, are admissible to prove that the act was in
fact performed. The court points out that it is necessary to show that the
statements must be statements of a present existing state of mind, and
that all of the circumstances would indicate that such state of mind con-
tinued. The facts in the instant case, viewed in the light of this rule, were
held to be such declarations which could be introduced to be considered
by the jury.
Another little used exception to the hearsay rule was relied upon by
the court in Miller v. Brunson Construction Company."6 This was an action
by A, an employee of B, against C, a contractor doing work on B's building,
for injuries received by A. C offered proof by W that X made a statement
to a group of B's employees relative to staying out of the area in which C's
employees were working, and that C's employees also heard such state-
ment. There was no showing that A was present or heard the statement.
This evidence was offered on the issue as to whether C's employees had
reason to expect B's employees in the area. Upon objection that such
testimony was hearsay, the evidence was excluded. The court did not defi-
nitely rule on the matter, stating that if it was admissible, it was not ma-
terial error under the facts of this case, but indicated that it should have
been admitted as an "independently relevant fact." The court said that even
though it was hearsay as to A, the fact that such statement was made,
whether true or not, would be relevant and material. The court cites text
authorities and Missouri cases. 3 7
Another exception was indicated in Melton v. St. Louis Public Service
Company,a in which a portion of the hospital records were introduced. In
the admittance notes were shown purported statements of the plaintiff which
the plaintiff alleged as error upon introduction. The court held that the
hospital records were admissible under the Uniform Business Records as
Evidence Law,"" and that any portions of the hospital records which were
relevant and helpful to or of aid in diagnosing and treatment of the injury
were admissible under the act.
36. 250 S.W. 2d 958 (Mo. 1952).
37. Scott v. Missouri Insurance Company, 233 S.W. 2d 660 (Mo. 1950); Ger-
man Evangelical Bethel Church v. Reith, 327 Mo. 1098, 39 S.W. 2d 1057 (Mo.
1931), 76 A.L.R. 604 (1932); VI WIGMopx, EvIDENCE § 1789 (1940); 31 C.J.S.,
Evidence, § 239, page 988.
38. 251 S.W. 2d 663 (Mo. 1952).
39. Mo. REv. STAT. § 490.660 (1949).
[Vol. 18
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BEST EvmENCE RULE
In Schroer v. Schroer,40 which was an action for the dissolution of a
partnership, "duplicate" deposit slips were introduced in evidence without
explanation of the reason for the failure to produce the originals. The court
held that such introduction was not error, that a "duplicate" in legal concep-
tion as "an original instrument repeated, a document the same as another in
essential particulars, differing from a copy in being valid as an original."4'
DEAD MAN'S STATUTE
The dead man's statute was considered in three cases. In Been v. Jol-
ley/2 the statute was held to apply. This was an action by the heirs of a
grantor after the grantors death to set aside the deed and bills of sale convey-
ing real and personal property. The court held the grantees in the deed and
bills of sale to be incompetent to testify under the dead man's statute.
The application of the statute, however, was limited by the court in
Lehr v. Moll43 in accordance with established rules. This was an action to
set aside a trust deed and note brought by the widow on the grounds that
the husband had procured the widow's signature by fraud. The husband be-
ing dead, the defendants objected to the testimony of the widow. It was
shown, however, that the defendants had served interrogatories on the
widow. The court held that the serving of interrogatories waived her in-
competency as a witness in the same manner that the taking of her depo-
sition would waive the incompetency, relying upon State ex rel. Williams v.
Buzard44 which holds that interrogatories have the same scope as depo-
sitions.
Going one step further in the case of Baker v. Baker,45 the court held
that the taking of the deposition of one witness by the defendant would
waive the incompetency of all of such witnesses. This was an action to
determine title brought by the sons and daughter of the grantor against
the widow of their brother, grantee. The defendant had taken the deposition
of one of the brothers, and the court relied upon the analogy of the waiver
as to all doctors of the physician-patient privilege by the testimony of one
40. 248 S.W. 2d 617 (Mo. 1952).
41. 28 C.J.S., Duplicate, page 590; 13 WoRws & PNaAsEs, Duplicate, pages 632-
635.
42. 247 S.W. 2d 840 (Mo. 1952).
43. 247 S.W. 2d 686 (Mo. 1952).
44. 354 Mo. 719, 190 S.W. 2d 907, 1.c. 910 (Mo. 1945).
45. 251 S.W. 2d 31 (Mo. 1952). 29
Stubbs: Stubbs: Work of the Supreme Court 1952
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1953
360 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 18
doctor, holding that the defendant's waiver of this statutory disqualifica-
tion as to one witness waived it as to all witnesses.
THE HUMANITARIAN DOCTRINE
WILLIAM H. BECKER, JR.
[Editor's Note. Mr. Becker has already reviewed the 1952 cases in this
field in the January issue of the Review (18 Missouri Law Review 20).




In 1952, the Supreme Court handed down twelve decisions dealing
mainly with insurance questions, more than twice the usual number. Graf-
ton v. McGuire' involves a coverage question on an automobile liability
policy issued to a garage repair partnership. Mickelberry's Food Products v.
Haeusserm4n*2 follows the 1951 decision of Butterwortlh v. Mississippi Val-
ley Trust Co.,3 concerning validity of an assignment of life insurance under
certain circumstances despite lack of insurable interest in the assignee.
Mutual Bank & Trust Co. v. Shaffner4 upholds a group insurance plan in-
volving bank depositors. City of New York Ins. Co. v. Stephens' holds that
despite the standard policy provisions on subrogation that the insurer, where
the policy is written in the name of the trustee in a deed of trust "as his
interest may appear" is not subrogated to the rights of the mortgagee against
the owner to the extent of its loss. Mercer v. Miers' Mutual Fire Insurance
Assn.6 turns on questions of fact resolved by the jury in favor of the insured.
Monsanto Chemical Co. v. American Bitumuls7 holds that where the owner
agrees to carry "adequate" insurance that there is no recovery against the
bailee for negligence resulting in destruction of the goods insured. Kansas
City Stock Yards Co. v. A. Reich & Sons8 is in accord, holding that where
the tenant paid an increase in rent to cover insurance to be taken out by the
*Attorney, Joplin, Missouri. LL.B. University of Missouri, 1935.
1. 362 Mo. 882, 245 S.W. 2d 69 (1952).
2. 247 S.W. 2d 731 (Mo. 1952).
3. 362 Mo. 133, 240 S.W. 2d 676 (1951); 17 Mo. L. REV. 396 (1952).
4. 248 S.W. 2d 585 (Mo. 1952).
5. 248 S.W. 2d 648 (Mo. 1952).
6. 249 S.W. 2d 402 (Mo. 1952).
7. 249 S.W. 2d 428 (Mo. 1952).
8. 250 S.W. 2d 692 (Mo. 1952). 30
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landlord with the understanding that the tenant would not be responsible
for damage by fire that such agreement was a defense to an action against
the tenant for damages for negligence. Richardson v. Kuhlmyer9 holds that
a description of a named individual as the "husband" of the insured is-mere-
ly descriptive and does not prevent recovery, even though the parties were
never married. Hendrix v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.10 involves the remand
of a double indemnity case where the court declares as a matter of law
there was no evidence to justify submission on accidental injury, although
there was evidence of suicide while insane. Leggett v. General Indemnity
Exchange' deals mostly with the procedure of dissolution'of insurance com-
panies. Boyle v. GrimmI 2 is a case where the court goes behind the terms of
absolute assignments of life policies, holding the assignment was merely for
the purpose of securing various payments made by the assignee. Saracino v.
St. Louis Union Trust Co.13 holds that a widow is not entitled to one third
of the insurance proceeds as well as one third of the rentals, where the insur-
ance money was used by the testamentary trustees to restore the building
to its former condition. A more detailed review of the above cases follows.
Grafton v. McGuire4 involved a denial of coverage by the garnishee, a
liability insurance company, on the ground that since the title to the auto-
mobile involved in the accident was in the name of one of the partners
individually the liability policy issued to the partnership engaged in the re-
pair of automobiles did not cover the automobile. The automobile was being
used for pleasure purposes at the time of the accident by said partner. The
policy was issued in the name of the two partners and excluded "ownership,
maintenance or use for pleasure purposes of any automobile not owned by
or in charge of the Named Insured for use principally in such operations."
However, the policy clause defining the operations covered contained the
words "also for pleasure use." The court held that despite the title being
in the name of one partner the automobile was in fact owned by the part-
nership and that the insurance agent (having the authority of a general
agent) who wrote and delivered the policy knew this. Therefore, the insur-
ance company was estopped to deny liability.
Mickelberry's Food Products Co. v. Haeussermann.'5 was a contest
9. 250 S.W. 2d 355 (Mo. 1952).
10. 25O S.W. 2d 518 (Mo. 1952).
11. 250 S.W. 2d 710 (Mo. 1952).
12. 253 S.W. 2d 149 (Mo. 1952).
13. 254 S.W. 2d 600 (Mo. 1952).
14. Supra, n. 1.
15. Supra, n. 2. 31
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between the purchasers of the capital stock and the former stockholders over
the cash surrender proceeds of certain insurance policies on the lives of two
former officers of the corporation. Much of the decision is concerned with
the proper meaning of the life insurance trust agreement and the contract
of purchase between the respective groups of shareholders. On the subject
of insurance law, the contention was advanced that the purchasers had no
insurable interest in the lives of the insured. The court disposed of this
contention by referring to Butterworth v. Mississippi Valley Trust Co.,6
where the court adopted the rule that an insurable interest in the insured
by the assignee is not essential to the validity of the assignment, if the party
to whom the policy was issued in good faith had an insurable interest and
if the assignment was in good faith and not made to cover up a gambling
transaction. The court also points out that the issue of insurable interest is
not actually involved, because the real issue before the court was the right
of the plaintiff to the cash surrender values.
Mutual Bank & Trust Co. V. Shaffner, 7 involved a declaratory judgment
action as to the legality of a proposal whereby an insurance company would
insure under a group policy the lives of the bank's depositors making de-
posits of a certain type. The case deals mostly with the powers of banks
to enter into such arrangements. On insurance matters, the court upholds
the validity of such group insurance, saying that there is privity of contract
between the insurer and the depositor (although also stating that such
privity is not necessary), that it is not necessary that the bank have any
insurable interest, and that there is no statutory prohibition against such
a group policy.
City of New York Its. Co. v. Stephens"s is an interesting case. It was
for a combination declaratory judgment and reformation where the insur-
ance companies sought to have declared certain subrogation rights against
the mortgagor, or else that the policies be reformed so that they covered only
the interest of the mortgagee. The insurance totalled $59,500 on a large
building and was in the name of "Thomas F. Stephens, Trustee, as his inter-
est may appear." Stephens was the trustee in a $75,000 deed of trust. Graff
was the mortgagor and paid the premiums on the insurance. Iaconetti was
the owner of the notes and deed of trust. The loss, by fire, exceeded the
amount of the insurance. At the time of the fire the unpaid notes exceeded
16. Spra, n. 3.
17. Supra, n. 4.
18. Supra, n. S.
[Vol. 18
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$68,000. The insurance companies contended that the policies were intended
to secure only the interest of Iaconetti as mortgagee, not the interest of
Graff as owner and that the companies were entitled to be subrogated to the
rights of the mortgagee against the owner to the extent of their losses. The
policies contained the standard provisions on subrogation, as follows:
"If this Company shall claim that no liability existed as to the
mortgagor or owner, it shall, to the extent of payment of loss to
the mortgagee, be subrogated to all the mortgagee's rights of re-
covery, but without impairing the mortgagee's right to sue; or it
may pay off the mortgage debt and require an assignment thereof
and of the mortgage."
"Subrogation. This Company may require from the insured
an assignment of all right of recovery against any party for loss to
the extent that payment therefor is made by this Company."
The court first holds that the insurance companies did not make out a
case for reformation, as the evidence failed to show the policies did not
express the mutual intention of the parties.
The court then holds that the insurance companies were not entitled
to subrogation against the owner: First, the owner, Graff, had an interest
in the insurance. The words "Stephens, Trustee, as his interest may appear"
means that the proceeds of the insurance, the same as the property, were
held by the trustee for the benefit of both parties to the deed of trust. Fur-
ther, the owner, in the deed of trust, stipulated that he would keep the
premises insured against fire losses, which means for his benefit as well as
that of the mortgagee.
Second, the insurance companies conceded that by subrogation they could
recover pro tanto against the owner subject to the mortgagee's primary full
coverage under the policies. The coverage was only $59,000, whereas the
outstanding notes totalled over $68,000, so there had been no excess or
double recovery by anyone concerned; hence, no subrogation.
The court also holds that since there was evidence of vexatious delay,
the defendants could counterclaim for the statutory penalties, despite the
fact that the litigation was commenced by the insurance companies by de-
claratory judgment.
The court also discusses the contention that a certain insurance agent
referred to in the evidence was the general agent of the owner. The court
rejects this, saying the evidence showed this person was not an agent, but a
broker, hence a middleman, owing duties both to insured and insurer, and
his acts would not be binding on the owner.
33
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Mercer v. Millers' Mutual Fire Insurance Assn.19 was an action to
collect the fire insurance on a partial loss of a stock of merchandise. The
insurer failed in the trial court in its defense of arson, and the only question
before the Supreme Court was the extent of plaintiff's recovery. The jury
had awarded the plaintiff less than she claimed, but more than defendant
claimed the loss to be, and the court holds there was no prejudicial error in
the trial in respect to proof of damages.
Monsanto Chemical Co. v. American Bitumuls Co.2 0 was an action by
the owner of a certain stock of chemical materials against the bailee to
recover for the alleged negligence of the bailee resulting in the destruction
of the chemicals. A clause in the contract between the two stated that the
owner agreed to carry adequate insurance to cover all stocks of materials
so held. The owner collected approximately $18,000 in insurance prior to
bringing suit against the bailee. The court holds that to the extent of the
owner's stipulation to insure against loss by fire, the insurance stipulated had
the effect of satisfying the owner's claim against the bailee for negligence.
Since the owner was obligated to carry "adequate" insurance, the claim for
negligence was fully satisfied.
Kansas City Stock Yards Co. v. A. Reich & Sons21 is in accord with the
general theory of the above Monsanto Chemical case. The Kansas City
Stock Yards case was an action by the landlord against the tenant for
damages to rented premises by fire allegedly caused by the tenant's negli-
gence. One defense was that the rent had been raised to cover the cost of
insurance, which was to be taken out by the landlord with the understanding
the defendant would not be responsible for any damage by fire. The court
held that such an agreement is not contrary to public policy and that the
defense was supported by the evidence.
Richardson v. Kuhrlmyer2 2 was a partition action, where defendants
counterclaimed for proceeds of a certain insurance policy taken out by the
deceased in which she named Richardson as beneficiary, describing him as
her husband. They were not married at the time, nor later. The court holds
that Richardson was nevertheless entitled to the proceeds, the characteriza-
tion as husband being only descriptive and not controlling over the specific
designation of him as beneficiary.
19. Supra, n. 6.
20. Supra, n. 7.
21. Supra, n. 8.
22. Supra, n. 9.
[Vol. 18
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Hendrix v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.28 was an action to collect double
indemnity under a life policy. The case was submitted to the jury under
two theories: That the gunshot wound was self-inflicted while insane, and,
second, that the wound was accidental. The court analyzes the evidence and
concludes there was no evidence to warrant submission of accidental injury,
and hence the case must be remanded, even though there was evidencejusti-
fying submission on the first theory.
In Leggett v. General Indemvnity Exchange24 the superintendent of in-
surance brought suit to dissolve certain insurance entities by reason of cessa-
tion of business for a period of one year. The pleadings filed by the various
defendants admitted the allegations of the petition, but sought to set up
new matter as to the ownership of the stock of one of the companies in-
volved, a certain proposed method of dissolution, ownership of various assest
and for delay in dissolution. The trial court refused to hear evidence, sus-
tained plaintiff's motion for judgment on the pleadings and ordered dissolu-
tion. On appeal the court held that since it was conceded that the companies
did not intend to resume business, the trial court could not properly have
refused to dissolve the corporations and properly refused to determine
matters of claims and ownership before ordering dissolution.
Boyle v. Crinmzw 28 was a declaratory judgment action over the proceeds
of six life policies on which absolute assignments had been made by the
insured and beneficiary. The assignee was the brother of the insured. Prior
to the assignments, the insured's brother had paid the annual premiums on
two occasions and also had paid interest on the insured's policy loan. After
the assignment, the assignee paid all the premiums. After the death of the
insured and assignee, the present action was commenced by the beneficiaries
under the policies against the executor of the assignee, each side claiming
the entire proceeds. Despite the absolute assignments, the court considered
parol evidence as-to the purpose of the assignments and concluded that
same were for the purpose of securing the assignee's subsequent payments
and that the executor must account to the plaintiffs for the proceeds in
excess of the debt secured.
In Saracino v. St. Louis Union Trust Co.28 plaintiff, the widow, brought
suit against the testamentary trustees for one third of a fire loss paid by the
23. Supra, n. 10.
24. Supra, n. 11.
25. Supra, n. 12.26. Supra, n. 13.
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insurer to the trustees. Deceased died intestate as to his wife. The trustees
used the insurance proceeds, plus rental income from the property, to restore
the premises to tenantable condition. The trustees made regular payments to
the widow of her third of the rent. Plaintiff claimed that the repairs were
permanent improvements, and since dower had not been assigned, that she
was entitled to one third of the insurance money as well as one third of the
rentals. The court approved the conclusion of the trial court that the work
done after the fire was not a permanent improvement, but merely constituted
a restoration of the bulding by repairs to its former condition and that
plaintiff could not claim both dower rights in the insurance money and also
one third of the rent.
PROPERTY
WILLARD L. ECKHARDT*
EFFEcTIvE DATE OF LAWS
The writer has in preparation a comprehensive study of the effective
date of laws in Missouri, but one phase of the problem will be noticed
briefly here in connection with a very important 1952 case. The problem
of the effective date of a law may be a matter of concern to a title lawyer
many years after the particular law has become effective, because the
effectiveness of a title transaction may depend on whether the transaction
occurred before or after the effective date of a particular law, and the issue
may be raised many years later in the course of a title examination. Whether
an official is entitled to salary from and after a certain date, whether a de-
fendant's conduct on a certain date was a crime, and similar problems the
solution of which depends on the effective date of a law, may come in issue
for a few years but within a reasonable period of time such issues become
moot.
State ex. rel. Moore v. Toberman, decided several important issues as
to the effective date of laws under Article 3, §§ 29, 52, Missouri Con-
stitution of 1945. The first issue was as to the effective date of Senate Bill
No. 267, Sixty-Sixth General Assembly (the bill dividing the state into
eleven new congressional districts), the chronology of which was as follows:
final passage, January 21, 1952;
*Professor of Law, University of Missouri, B.S., University of Illinois, 1935,
LL.B., 1937; Sterling Fellow, Yale University, 1937-1938.
1. 250 S.W. 2d 701 (Mo. 1952). 36
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recess, January 22, 1952;
approval by Governor, March 5, 1952;
ninety days after recess, April 22 [212], 1952;
final adjournment, April 30, 1952; and
ninety days after adjournment, July 29, 1952.
The majority of the court (opinion by Hollingsworth, J.; Conkling, Tipton,
and Dalton, JJ., concurring) took the view that the bill became effective
ninety days after recess, April 22, 1952, rather than ninety days after final
adjournment, July 29, 1952. The second issue was whether the bill, having
become effective April 22, 1952, was subject to referendum until July 29,
1952, ninety days after final adjournment. The majority held it was not.
Ellison, C.J:, and Hyde and Leedy, JJ., dissented in opinions written by
Ellison, CJ., and Hyde, J.
The three opinions so ably and completely analyze the issues that fur-
ther analysis would be useless. The majority arrived at a workable solution
of the impossible situation created by a plain reading of the Missouri Con-
stitution (1945), Art. 3, § 29, on the effective date of laws, and Art. 3, § 52,
on the referendum.
The problem thus finally presented to the court in 1952 had been
apparent since 1943 upon the adoption of an amendment to the Constitution
of 1875, Art. 4, § 36, purporting to make laws effective ninety days after
passage and approval, which was in patent conflict with the Constitution of
1875, Art. 4, § 57, on the referendum, which had been adopted in 1908.
This amendment had the worthy objective of making it possible to get laws
into effect within a reasonable period of time in spite of the very long
sessions of the General Assembly.
A different technique designed to reach the same result was submitted
by the Constitutional Convention of Missouri, 1943-1944, viz., that laws
could be made effective ninety days after a recess for thirty days or more:
Mo. Const. 1945, Art. 3, § 29. But this was in obvious conflict with the Con-
stitution of 1945, Art. 3, § 52, on the referendum.
2. The date should have been April 21, 1952, not April 22, 1952. By applying
the usual rule of excluding the first day (day of recess) and including the last,
April 22 is the ninety-first day. It is apparent that someone overlooked the fact
that in 1952, February had an extra day, it being leap year.
The writer would not hazard an opinion as to which is the effective date.
Senate Concurrent Resolution No. 13, Mo. Laws 1951, p. 892, provided for recess
beginning January 22, 1952, and expressly mentioned April 22, 1952, as the date
on which laws previously passed should take effect.
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In March, 1951, I did limited research to try to discover why the Con-
stitutional Convention of Missouri, 1943-1944, submitted an instrument with
such a patent conflict between Art. 3, § 29, and Art. 3, § 52. I made a fairly
comprehensive, though not exhaustive, study of the Convention's Journals,
its Files No. 1-21, and its Proposals No. 1-377. It nowhere appeared that
any consideration was given to the relationship between the two sections.
Section 29 on the effective date of laws was handled by Committee No. 3,
Committee on the Legislative Department, File No. 17. Section 52 on the
referendum was handled by Committee No. 21, Committee on Initiative and
Referendum, Revisions and Amendments, File No. 4. Only one man served
on both committees. It is small wonder that two sections, drafted independ-
ently without any view of the other, and continuing the same basic error
that existed in the Constitution of 1875 as amended in 1943, did not fit
when brought together in one complete instrument.
UNLAWFUL PRACTICE OF LAW IN REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS
Hidse v. Criger3 settles to a considerable extent a problem as to which
lawyers were not in complete accord, viz., how far a real estate broker can
go in preparing contracts for the sale of real estate, warranty deeds, quit-
claim deeds, deeds of trust, notes, chattel mortgages and short term leases,
without being guilty of unlawful practice of law. Many lawyers had been
of the opinion that the preparation by a real estate broker of deeds, notes
and deeds of trust was unlawful practice of law and that effective action
could and should be taken to stop such practice; many lawyers also had
been of the opinion that the preparation by a real estate broker of contracts
for the sale of real estate was unlawful practice of law, but were not in
complete accord as to whether effective action could and should be taken
to stop such practice.
The court in Hulse v. Criger announced six conclusions as to the per-
missible sphere of action in this field by a real estate broker. The case has
been so little noticed by lawyers and real estate brokers that it seems worth
while to reprint these conclusions, as follows:
"First: A real estate broker, in transactions in which he is
acting as a broker, may use a standardized contract in a form pre-
pared or approved by counsel and may complete it by filling in the
blank spaces to show the parties and the transaction which he has
procured.
3. 247 S.W. 2d 855, 861, 862 (Mo. 1952).
(Vol. 18
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"Second: A real estate broker, in transactions in which he is
acting as a broker, may use standardized forms of warranty deeds,
quit claim deeds, trust deeds, notes, chattel mortgages and short
term leases, prepared or approved by counsel and may complete
them by filling in the blank spaces to show the parties, descriptions
and terms necessary to close the transaction he has procured.
"Third: A real estate broker may not make a separate charge
for completing any standardized forms, and he may not prepare
such forms for persons in transactions, in which he is not acting
as a broker, unless he is himself one of the parties to the contract
or instrument.
"Fourth: The required approval by counsel of standardized
forms to be used in real estate transactions properly may be made
either by lawyers selected by real estate brokers individually or
selected by real estate boards of which they are members.
"Fifth: Even in transactions in which he is acting as a
broker, a real estate broker may not give advice or opinions as
to the legal rights of the parties, as to the legal effect of instruments
to accomplish specific purposes or as to the validity of title to real
estate; and he may not prepare reservations or provisions to create
estates for life or in remainder or any limited or conditional estates
or any other form of conveyance than a direct present conveyance
between the parties, as provided for in standardized approved
forms, to be.effective upon delivery.
"Sixth: A real estate broker in conferring with parties to ob-
tain facts and information about their personal and property status,
other than is necessary to fill in the blank spaces in standardized
forms necessary to complete and close transactions in which he is
acting as a broker, for the purpose of advising them of their rights
and the action to be taken concerning them, is engaging in the
practice of law."
In reaching these conclusions the court examined the pertinent con-
stitutional provisions, statutes, cases, and attitude of the American Bar
Association, but seemed to base its decision largely on so-called practical
reasons:
"However, this [broker's financial stake in the transaction] is
also a practical reason why the completion of the contract is a
part of the business of the real estate broker in the transaction;
and it is usually to the interest of the seller he represents, as well
as his own, to get a binding agreement completed promptly while
the parties are together on its terms. Such agreements may be
complicated and one or both of the parties may or should realize
the need for a lawyer to prepare the contract rather than to use a
standardized form; but more often they are simple enough so that
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such a form will suffice and the parties-will wish to avoid further
delay or expense by using them. So much real estate business is
done in this way, without harmful results, that we do not think the
public interest requires it to be changed ...
"Likewise, general warranty deed and trust deed forms are so
standardized that to complete them for usual transactions requires
only ordinary intelligence rather than legal training. They are in fact
less complicated than contracts for sale of real estate. We know that
these forms are furnished to the public at the officers of Recorders
of Deeds through the state. .. ."
The observations of the present writer which follow are not intended
as an adverse criticism of the opinion and decision in Hidse v. Criger, an
opinion the writer probably would adopt as his own if he were required to
decide the question. The writer's observations are intended only to em-
phasize the point that every vendor and every purchaser as a matter of
practice should be represented by competent counsel throughout every
real estate transaction.
The key to a real estate transaction which can be closed smoothly and
to the satisfaction of both vendor and purchaser is the contract of sale which
embodies the agreement reached by prior negotiations and which covers the
pertinent points overlooked in prior negotiations. The services of compe-
tent counsel are much more essential at this stage of the transaction than
at closing, and both the vendor and the purchaser should be represented
by counsel.
It is true, as the court observes in Hulse v. Criger, that much real
estate business is done with printed form instruments filled in by real
estate brokers without harmful results.4 But it also is true that many real
4. I have examined the 1953 copyrighted special form of real estate sale
contract approved by legal counsel for the Real Estate Board of Kansas City, Mo.,
for use by active members of said Real Estate Board.
I am glad to say that it is one of the best printed form contracts I have seen,
the form being reasonably complete and being reasonably fair to the purchaser
as well as to the vendor. In most cases vendor and purchaser would run into no
difficulty in using the form.
However, if I were representing a purchaser, I would recommend that he not
sign the contract until it is amended in several respects. For example, the pur-
chaser takes blindly under Clause 3 which provides: "Subject, however, to any
recorded restrictions, easements, party wall agreements and community con-
tract.. ." Suppose there is a recorded easement in favor of the city for a trunk
line sewer down the middle of the lot which would prevent the purchaser from
excavating from a basement; the exception as to recorded easements should be
limited to recorded easements which will not materially interfere with the ordinary
use and development of the property. Suppose there is a recorded restriction 40
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estate transactions are closed satisfactorily even though there is no written
contract at all. It is the exceptional oral agreement which causes trouble;
in fact, in some communities the vendor and purchaser ordinarily do not
execute a written contract of sale in the usual transaction, but close on the
basis of an oral agreement previously reached.
It seems to this writer that counsel should be retained to make the basic
decision as to whether a standardized form is sufficient for the particular
transaction. Once it is determined by a person competent to make the de-
cision that all that is needed is to fill in simple blanks in a standard-
ized form, it requires only ordinary intelligence rather than legal training
to fill in the blanks.
With reference to contracts of sale, the court permits a real estate
broker to fill "in the blank spaces to show the parties and the transaction
which he has procured." Certainly the court had in mind simple blanks
which can be filled in with a name, an address, a date, an amount, etc.
Quaere whether the court means to include the filling in of a long blank as
to exceptions to good and marketable title, or a long blank in the purchase
price clause where the parties have agreed on a note and purchase money
deed of trust; the proper description in the contract of an installment note is
a fairly complicated matter and requires a high degree of skill. It would
seem to be clear that the real estate broker could not add any special con-
ditions or other special clauses to the standardized form contract.
CONTRACTS FOR SALE OF REAL ESTATE-JOINDER OF SPOUSE OF
VENDOR OR PURCHASER
In Bobst v. Sonss a husband alone entered into a contract to convey
certain land which was owned by husband and wife by entireties. The wife
refused to join in the deed. The court held that the purchaser could recover
damages from the vendor-husband for breach of contract, and that purchaser
unique as to one lot limiting its use; the exception as to recorded restrictions
should be limited to usual and ordinary subdivision restrictions.
The several difficulties noted above can be handled by a special clause which
describes the purchaser's intended use of the property and which provides that
the purchaser at his election may avoid the contract if any recorded restriction,
easement, zoning law, etc., will prevent or would materially affect the intended use.
Clause 5 makes general provision for a purchase money note and deed of
trust. The difficulties with reference to the contract provision on such a note and
deed of trust are noted in the text infra.
5. 252 S.W. 2d 303 (Mo. 1952).
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need not show fraud or collusion between vendor-husband and his spouse.
The court followed Robinson v. Pattee.6
From the points of view of both vendor and purchaser, before a contract
for the sale of real estate is executed, the vendor's marital status should be
ascertained. If the vendor is a man, the purchaser should not execute the
contract unless the vendor's wife joins in the contract. Her joinder is im-
portant not only to make available to the purchaser the remedy of specific
performance, but also to improve the chances of the purchaser being able
to satisfy a judgment for breach of contract. As the cases above indicate, it
is also in the vendor's interest that his wife join in the contract. If vendor
and purchaser do execute a contract without joinder of the vendor's wife,
the contract should make express provision as to whether the vendor shall
be liable to the purchaser if the vendor's wife refuses to join in the deed.
If the purchaser makes an adequate down payment to cover liquidated
damages, the joinder of the purchaser's wife is not necessary, except where
the vendor is taking an unsecured note, or a note secured by a purchase
money deed of trust, to cover part of the purchase price.
The contract itself should make provision for the other situations where
the vendor is unable to comply with his obligation to convey a title good in
fact and marketable in fact (or of record). In the typical case it would be
fair to provide that the vendor who is in actual good faith shall not be
liable to purchaser in the event there are title defects which cannot be cured.
If the contract does not so provide, the only absolutely safe course for the
vendor is to have his own title examined before he executes a contract to
convey and then to contract to convey only such title as the examination
shows him to have.
REsTICrIoNs ON LAND USE-ZONING LAWS
Section 89.020, Revised Statutes of Missouri (1949), is the basic statu-
tory authority for municipal corporations with a population of 10,000 or
more to zone property "for the purpose of promoting health, safety, morals,
or the general welfare of the community." Flora Realty & Investment Co.
v. City of Ladue is a case of great significance not only for Missouri but for
other states, in indicating how far a municipal corporation can go in plan-
ned land utilization where the restrictions would seem to most persons to be
only remotely related, if related at all, to health, safety and morals.
6. 359 Mo. 584, 222 S.W. 2d 786 (1949).
7. 246 S.W. 2d 771 (Mo. 1952).
[Vol. l9
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In a comprehensive zoning plan of the City of Ladue, District A, which
included plaintiff's tract of 104 acres, was restricted to residential purposes
with a minimum of'three acres per family [e.g., a lot approximately 200' x
650']; the minimum area per family in District B was 1.8 acres [e.g., a lot
approximately 200' x 390']; and so on through District E with a minimum
of 10,000 square feet per family [e.g., a lot 60' x 167'], with even less string-
ent requirements in District F where a family could dwell on the second
floor of any commercial building fronting twenty-five feet or more on a
street.
In upholding the validity of the zoning ordinance as applied to Dis-
trict A (minimum of three acres per family), the court took into considera-
tion the peculiar location and needs of Ladue. The court found the statutory
requirements were met in that the comprehensive zoning plan was designed
to lessen congestion in the streets, to secure safety from fire and other dan-
gers, to promote health and the general welfare, to provide adequate light
and air, and to facilitate adequate provision for transportation and other
public requirements. The court rejected the contention that the zoning
ordinance was an attempt to segregate economic classes. The court did not
find it necessary to determine the validity of certain provisions respecting
institutional uses.
The key sentence in the opinion is the following (emphasis added):
"Further, the police power, as evidenced by the zoning ordinance, is not
limited to the mere suppression of offensfive] uses of property, but may
act constructively for the promotion of the general welfare."
RESTRICTIONS ON LAND UsE-BY PRIVATE INSTRUMENT-BUILDING LINES
The case noted above went far in upholding restrictions on land use by
way of zoning laws, but in marked contrast is another 1952 case on restric-
tions on land use by way of private instrument. In Chiles v. Fuchs" the
court applied the doctrine that restrictions upon the free use of real property
are not favored and are strictly construed, and doubts in respect thereto are
resolved in favor of the free use of the property. A subdivision was platted
in March, 1925, and on the recorded plat was a certain broken line twenty
scale feet back of the street line marked "20' Building Line." Following the
leading case of Zinn v. Sidler,9 the court held that this broken line and the
legend were not sufficient to create an effective restriction.
8. 249 S.W. 2d 454 (Mo. 19$2).
9. 268 Mo. 680, 187 S.W. 1172, L.R.A. 1917A 455 (1916). 43
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The contention in favor of an effective restriction also was based on a
recorded instrument of restrictions in October, 1925, which provided in part
as follows: "1. No building or other structure shall be erected nearer in
the street upon which it fronts, than the building lines as shown on the
plat of said subdivision . . . 3. Lots fronting . . . Hampton [the lots in
question] shall be unrestricted . . . [Certain other lots] may be used for
commercial purposes subject to the building line as shown on the plat. . ... '
Clause 1 would seem to restrict the lots in question, but the first part of
Clause 3 would seem to leave them unrestricted. The court resolved the
conflict in favor of unrestricted use. The court did not rely on the latter
part of Clause 3, which to this writer seems to strongly support the court's
holding; when Clause 3 states that the lots in question shall be unrestricted
as to their use and then goes on to say that certain other lots may be used
for commercial purposes subject to the building line as shown on the plat,
the inference is strong that the lots in question are not subject to a build-
ing line.
TRANSACTIONS RESERVING LIFE ESTATE AND POWER OVER FEE
Where a grantor wants to make a non-testamentary disposition of
property during his lifetime, retaining an estate for his own life and certain
powers of disposition over the fee, the transaction is not easy to effect. As
a rule the person to take the fee is the natural object of the owner's bounty,
and the owner expects that the reserved life estate will be sufficient for his
needs, but he hedges against inflation or unexpected needs by making some
provision for revocation or power to dispose of the fee. There also is the
possibility that the natural object of the owner's bounty will predecease the
owner and that under this circumstance the owner would prefer a different
disposition of the fee.
Trust. If the property is of enough value to make a trust worth while,
the trust technique would seem to be the most satisfactory method of
handling the problem, not only from the point of view of substantive
validity10 but also from the point of view of avoiding litigation for the
construction of the instrument.
Legal Life Estate, Legal Remainder, with Power over Fee. A delivered
deed where the grantor reserves a life estate and a limited power of dispo-
10. See Sims v. Brown, 252 Mo. 58, 158 S.W. 624 (1913); Note, Validity of
Trust Created by Nontestamentary Instrment reserving Benefit for Settlor for
Life with Power of Revocation, 73 A.L.R. 209 (1931).
[Vol. 18
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sition has been discussed previously by the present writer in his note on
Goins v. Melton.1 That case indicated that even a limited power of dispo-
sition included in an instrument in the form of a deed made the instrument
testamentary in character.
In a recent case of great importance, St. Louis County Nat. Bank v.
Fielder,12 the court in an able opinion by Hyde, J., overruled Gains v. Melton
insofar as that indicated that a limited power of disposition in the grantor
made the instrument testamentary in character. The court upheld the
validity as a deed of an instrument in the form of a deed which contained
the provision, "The said party of the first part hereby reserves a Life Estate
in and to said property, with power to sell, rent, lease, mortgage or otherwise
dispose of said property during his natural lifetime," and where the grantor
did not attempt to exercise any of the powers. The present writer thorough-
ly approves of the decision in this case.
The "deed" in the Goins case had an additional provision indicating its
testamentary character: "At his death the title to all, or whatever part
thereof remains unsold, to pass to and vest in the grantee together with all
his personal property and belongings." The Gains case is not overruled insofar
as the decision is based on this language indicating an intention to postpone
until death the vesting of the fee.
Any lawyer who is drafting an instrument reserving a life estate and
limited powers of disposition in the life tenant should thoroughly study the
opinion in St. Louis County Nat. Bank v. Fielder. The case is the subject
of a recent case note now being written by one of the Student Editors of
the Missouri Law Review which will be published in a subsequent number.
The present writer suggests that consideration be given to an alterna-
tive technique, viz., the owner grants in fee to a straw, who in turn reconveys
to the former owner for life, with powers over the fee, and a remainder in
default of the exercise of the power.13
Escrow Deed with Grantee's Name Blank, to be Filled in by Escrow
Holder. An ingenius but abortive technique designed to accomplish the
11. 343 Mo. 413, 121 S.W. 2d 821 (1938); Eckhardt, Work of Missouri
Supreme Court for 1938-Property, 4 Mo. LAw REv. 419 (1939). See also a
more extended discussion of the case in Note, Deeds-Creation of Future Interests
-Reservation of Power of Sae, 23 MINN. LAw Rzv. 683 (1939).
12. 260 S.W. 2d 483 (Mo. 1953).
13. See Eckhardt & Peterson, Possessory Estates, Future Interests and Con-
veyances in Missouri, 23 VERNON's ANN. Mo. STAT. p. 54, § 59. In addition to the
authorities therein cited, see Moore, Comment, 17 Mo. LAw REv. 177 (1952).
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same end, and new insofar as the present writer is concerned, 4 is to put a
deed in escrow with the grantee's name left blank, with instructions to the
escrow holder to insert such grantee's name as the grantor might designate
during his lifetime, but if he died without designating a grantee, to insert the
name of a particular person, the natural object of the grantor's bounty; the
escrow holder of course is to deliver the instrument after inserting the name.
This appears to be what was attempted in Ridenour v. Duncan,5 although
the testimony as to what actually was intended and happened was somewhat
confusing. The court recognized the rule that a deed executed in blank
may be filled in in conformity with grantor's parol authority, but held
that the death of the grantor terminated the authority of her agent, and
that there was no completed gift of the land to the grantor's son whose
name was filled in after the grantor's death.
The holding of the case would seem to be sound under the particular
facts where a gift was attempted. Quaere what the court would hold in a
case where there is a written contract to convey for valuable consideration
and pursuant thereto a deed is placed in escrow with the grantee's name
left blank, the object being to have the escrow holder insert the name of the
purchaser or the name of the purchaser's assignee when the sale is closed.
Would the death of the vendor revoke the escrow holder's authority in
such a case?
DETERMINABLE FEES AND POSSIBILITIES OF REVERTER
School consolidations and the cessation of user of small country school
sites is resulting in a substantial number of cases involving determinable fees
and possibilities of reverter, and several such cases reached the Missouri
Supreme Court in 1952.
Determinable Fee or Fee Simple Absolute. Chouteau v. City of St.
Louis,16 concerned with the old court house site in St. Louis, is a leading case
in the United States as to whether a deed creates a determinable fee, a de-
14. This technique is new to me, but I can match it with another equally
ingenious but abortive scheme for avoiding the administration of a decedent's
estate that came to my attention about ten years ago. One layman advised each
of his "clients" to execute a power of attorney which provided that it was to
become effective at the death of the grantor of the power, the object being for
the attorney-in-fact to close the decedent's estate without bothering with the pro-
bate court. If he had known about them, this layman no doubt would have dressed
up the instrument with a power coupled with an interest, but without any greater
likelihood of success.
15. 246 S.W. 2d 765 (Mo. 1952).
16. 331 Mo. 781, 55 S.W. 2d 299 (1932).
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feasible fee, or a fee simple absolute. That case was followed in Fucks v.
Reorgaized School Dist. No. 2, Gasconade Co'unty, Mo.' 7 One Fuchs in
1892, "for and in consideration of the sum of One and no/100 Dollars"
granted "unto the said School District on which to Keep and Maintain a
Public School-House" a certain described acre, "To Have And to Hold . . .
for the above purpose, forever." The heirs of the grantor brought an action
to quiet title against the school district after abandonment of the acre for
school purposes, on the theory the deed created a determinable fee with
a possibility of reverter. Judgment for the plaintiff was reversed, the court
holding that the school district had a fee simple absolute, the language in
the deed not expressing a special limitation, but rather expressing the pur-
pose or motivation of the grantor in conveying to the school district a fee
simple absolute. Whether the plaintiffs owned the balance of the original
tract does not appear in the statement of the case.
Occurrence of the Stated Event. Most special limitations as to school
purposes were not drafted with precision. Often it is difficult to ascertain
whether the event specified in the special limitation has occurred. In Board
v. Nevada School District,8 the court considered the following special limi-
tation: "It is expressly understood by this conveyance that the grantors
herein convey the above for a school house site and whenever it is aban-
doned by the directors and ceased to be used for that purpose the title shall
immediately revert to the grantors herein." The court after a careful evalua-
tion of the evidence held that the stated event had not occurred even
though there had been a consolidation and the school house in question had
not been used for classroom teaching for over a year.
Improvements, Who Entitled. A problem on which there is very little
authority is who is entitled to the improvements where there is a special
limitation as to school purposes. Board v. Nevada School District' is a case
of first impression in Missouri on this problem. The improvements in ques-
tion were the typical country school improvements, a school house, a coal
shed, two toilets and a pump. The court laid down two prinicples: 1. prior
to the occurrence of the stated event, the school district as the owner of a
fee simple determinable has the rights of the owner of a fee simple and may
17. 2$1 S.W. 2d 677 (Mo. 1952).
18. 251 S.W. 2d 20 (Mo. 1952).
19. 251 S.W. 2d 20 (Mo. 1952). See also In re Matter of Copps Chapel
Methodist Episcopal Church, 120 Ohio St. 309, 166 N.E. 218 (1929), a case in
which the school district was given not only the buildings which it asked for but
also the land which it did not ask for, in a very extraordinary opinion. 47
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remove at will the improvements it has made, and is not chargeable with
waste; and 2. after the occurrence of the stated event, the school district
continues to own the improvements it has made, only the land in its unim-
proved condition reverting to the owner of the possibility of reverter. The
court points out that there was no evidence that removal of the improve-
ments would injure the freehold estate, and does not decide whether re-
moval would be privileged if it would cause such injury.
Alienability of Possiblity of Reverter. The problem of the alienability
of possibilities of reverter in Missouri has been exhaustively treated by
Murry L. Randall in the Missouri Law Review.20 At common law the inter-
est in the grantor descended to his heirs, but could not be alienated to a
stranger (although it could be released to the owner of the determinable
fee). Whether a possibility of reverter can be alienated to a stranger has
not yet been decided in Missouri.
In the school cases, as a rule the person most concerned with the school
parcel is the person who owns the balance of the farm out of which the school
parcel was carved. Unless the original grantor or his heirs still own the
balance of the tract, they usually have little or no interest in the school
parcel. This writer is of the opinion that the possibility of reverter should
be alienable at least in the case where it is conveyed along with the larger
tract and is incidental thereto.
In Board v. Nevada School District,21 decided by Division No. 1, the
plaintiff was one of the heirs of the original grantor and was grantee under
a warranty deed from the other heirs. The court did not need to decide
whether the possibility of reverter was alienable, and in fact did not mention
the problem. In Smith v. School Dist. No. 6 of Jefferson County,22 another
case decided by Division No. 1 on the same day, the court expressly re-
served the question of the alienability of a possibility of reverter.
Even if the court should hold that possibilities of reverter are alienable,
there often will be a difficult problem as to whether the owner of the possi-
bility of reverter in fact did convey it. In Smith v. School Dist. No. 6 of
Jefferson County, where the court expressly reserved the question of alien-
ability, the court found the original grantor did not intend to convey the
possibility of reverter in the school parcel when he conveyed the balance
of the tract. In that case the school parcel was carved out of a 290 acre
20. Comment, 13 Mo. LAw Ray. 76 (1948).
21. 251 S.W. 2d 20 (1952).
22. Z50 S.W. 2d 795 (Mo. 1952).
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tract. He later conveyed the 290 acres by warranty deed in which the school
parcel was specifically "reserved." The court reached the same conclusion
with reference to a subsequent conveyance where the school parcel was
"excepted." When the owner of the possibility of reverter conveys the
tract which he owns in fee, the proper method would seem to be for him
to convey the entire tract "subject to" the rights in the school district.
TAX TITLES-JONES-MUNGER
In Journey v. Miler2s plaintiff claimed certain lots under a city collec-
tor's deed for lands sold in November, 1941, for delinquent taxes at third
sale; this deed was dated and acknowledged November, 1941, but was not
recorded until April, 1946, four and one-half years later. The trial court
apparently decided against the plaintiff on the theory that he had no title
because he failed to record the tax deed within four years from the date of
sale, relying on Section 140.410, Missouri Revised Statutes (1949), and
Shaw v. Armstrong.24
Section 140.410 is the section which might seem to require the deed
to be recorded within four years from the date of sale, and provides (empha-
sis added): "In all cases where lands have been or may hereafter be sold
for delinquent taxes, penalty, interest and costs and a certificate of purchase
has been or may hereafter be issued it is hereby made the duty of such
purchaser, his heirs or assigns, to cause a deed to be executed and placed on
record in the proper county within four years from the date of said sale;
provided, that on failure of said purchaser, his heirs or assigns so to do, then
and in that case the amount due such purchaser shall cease to be a lien
on said lands so purchased as herein provided." In Shaw v. Armstrong the
court itself noticed this section and applied it, as an alternative ground for
its decision, to a 1943 third sale where the collector's deed was not executed
until 1948.25
In the principal case, Journey v. Miler, Hyde, J., points out that Section
140.250, as amended in 1939, no longer provides for a certificate of sale on
a third sale, but rather provides for a collector's deed. Section 140.410,
quoted above, which might seem to require the collector's deed to be record-
ed within four years of the date of the sale, is no longer applicable to a
23. 250 S.W. 2d 164 (Mo. 1952).
24. 361 Mo. 648, 235 S.W. 2d 851, 857-8 (1951).
25. Eckhardt, Work of Missouri Supreme Court for 1950-Property, 16 Mo.
LAw Ray. 372, 382 (1951). 49
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third sale because no certificate of purchase is issued in such a case, and
Section 140.410 by its terms applies only where a certificate of purchase is
issued. Shaw v. Armstrong is overruled as to the applicability of Section
140.410 to a third sale.
The policy behind Section 140.410 is sound, and it would seem desirable
that the General Assembly amend that section to cover the problem raised
in the principal case.
TAX TITLES-LAND TAX COLLECTION LAW (Jackson County)
The marketability of tax titles under the Land Tax Collection Law,
Sections 141.210-141.810, Revised Statutes of Missouri (1949), has been
discussed in the Missouri Law Review21 and in the University of Kansas
City Law Review.2 7 Bennett v. Cutler 8 is another step toward increasing
marketability. The plaintiff, claiming under a deed from the Land Trust of
Jackson County, brought a suit to quiet title. The defendant, the prior
owner, asserted that the judgment of foreclosure in the suit under the Land
Tax Collection Law was illegal and void because certain city taxes were
illegally assessed in that the valuation for city purposes was higher than
the valuation for state and county purposes.2 9 The court held that this was
a matter of defense that could have been raised in the tax suit, but that it
was not a ground for a collateral attack on the tax proceedings in the subse-
quent suit to quiet title.
ADVERSE POSSESSION-MISTAKEN BOUNDARY LINE
Probably the most difficult problem in adverse possession cases is in
connection with mistaken boundary lines, a problem frequently considered
by the Missouri Supreme Court.30 In Sanderson v. McManus8 the defend-
ant claimed by adverse possession the south five feet of an adjoining lot on
the north. The defendant's possession had its inception in an erroneous sur-
vey; part of the defendant's house encroached a foot on the plaintiff's lot
and the eaves encroached more than two feet. The court affirmed a judg-
26. Eckhardt, Work of Missouri Supreme Court for 1949-Property, 15 Mo.
LAW REV. 376, 377-379 (1950).
27. Scott, Marketability of Tax Titles in Missouri, 20 U. OF KAN. CITY LAW
REV. 153 (1952).
28. 245 S.W. 2d 900 (Mo. 1952).
29. MO. CONsT. Art. 10, § 11 (1875); Mo. CoNsT. Art. 10, § 11 (a) (1945).
30. For discussions of the problem in Missouri, see the materials cited in
Eckhardt & Peterson, Possessory Estates, Future Interests and Conveyances in
Missouri, 23 VERNON'S ANN. Mo. STAT. p. 81, § 97, n. 33 (1952).
31. 252 S.W. 2d 351 (Mo. 1952).
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ment that the defendant had acquired title by adverse possession. The court
distinguished Courtner v. Putmom32 on the ground that in that case "defend-
ant regarded the fence to be the true line, but intended to claim only to the
true line wherever that might be regardless of where the fence was," while
in the principal case defendant "claimed to the fence and its prolongation to
the street regardless of the true boundary line." The court then goes on to
say: "It is the intent to possess and not an intent to take from the true
owner something the possessor knows belongs to another that governs." An
important factor would seem to be the physical encroachment of buildings
on the disputed strip. It is hoped that at some future date the court will
abandon the distinction it makes between qualified and unqualified intent
in the mistaken boundary line cases.
MINING LEASES
There are very few Missouri cases on the nature of interests under
mining "leases." The problem was involved in one 1952 case considered by
the Missouri Supreme Court and by the St. Louis Court of Appeals on
transfer, Thacker v. Flottman.83 In a recent number of the Missouri Law
Review Robert F. Pyatt has thoroughly considered the problems raised.34
WATERCOURSES-RIGHTS OF RIPARIAN OWNERS
Rights of riparian landowners with respect to watercourses is a prob-
lem of increasing importance in Missouri, particularly in view of expanding
industral needs and increasing irrigation of agricultural land. Missouri has
practically no reported cases on the problem. In a recent number of the
Missouri Law Review, Paul A. Hanna has analyzed the Missouri authority
on the problem, 35 in connection with his discussion of Happy v. Kenton.36
Rights of upper and lower riparian owners with respect to irrigation
was the case argued by the Junior Case Club finalists on Law Day in 1952
at the University of Missouri School of Law. Two of the finalists, Don E.
Burrell and Donald G. Stubbs, who also are Student Editors of the Missouri
Law Review, are preparing a comment on the problem for publication in
a subsequent number of the Review.
32. 325 Mo. 924, 30 S.W. 2d 126 (1930).
33. 244 S.W. 2d 1020 (Mo. 1952); on transfer, 250 S.W. 2d 810 (Mo. App.
1952).
34. Note, 18 Mo. LAW REV. 61 (1953).
35. Note, 18 Mo. LAW REv. 67 (1953).
36. 247 S.W. 2d 698 (Mo. 1952). 51
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TAXATION
ROBERT S. EASTIN*
The following is a summary, by subject matter, of the decisions of the
Supreme Court of Missouri during 1952 in the field of taxation and related
matters. While, as usual, not too numerous, several quite significant
opinions were handed down during the year-more than in many recent
years.
I. SUBJECTS AND INCIDENCE OF TAXATION
A. Excise Taxes
Monies received by a public utility from its customers as part of its
charges for service, but "impounded" to await the outcome of rate litigation,
are not "gross receipts" within the terms of the St. Louis tax on utilities, at
least if later refunded.' However, if the tax was paid on total receipts, in-
cluding "impounded" funds, during the years actually received, the utility
is not entitled to deduct amounts later refunded from receipts for the year
of refund, since each year must be treated separately for purposes of the
tax and the refunds have no relation to receipts for the year of refund. The
court left undecided the matter of obtaining a refund of taxes paid during
the years of receipt.
The rule of American Bridge Company v. Smith,2 that the Missouri
Sales Tax does not apply to transactions involving the interstate delivery
of goods, was reaffirmed in Curtis Publishing Company v. Bates.3 This
result is based upon the language of the Missouri Act and not the Federal
Constitution, so the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States
permitting a local sales tax on certain transactions involving interstate
shipments are not controlling; and, while there have been certain amend-
ments to the Sales Tax Act since Ame'rican Bridge, they indicate no intent
to change the rule.
Under Sections 3, 4 and 6 of Article X of the Constitution of 1945, the
gross premiums tax levied upon life insurance companies, an excise tax, can-
not be levied in lieu of the intangible personal property tax, a property tax.
As a result, Section 148.370,4 which purports to accomplish this result, is
*Attorney, Kansas City. LL.B., 1931, University of Missouri.
1. Laclede Gas Co. v. City of St. Louis, 253 S.W. 2d 832 (Mo. 1952) (en
banc).
2. 252 Mo. 616, 179 S.W. 2d 12 (1944).
3. 250 S.W. 2d 521 (Mo. 1952).
4. Mo. REv. STAT. (1949). 52
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unconstitutional.5 A property tax is entirely different in nature from an
excise tax and the one is in no legal sense the equivalent of the other. As a
result, the statute in question is deemed to establish an exemption of the
intangible personal property of life insurance companies from property taxa-
tion, a result prohibited by the Constitution.
B. Intangible Personal Property Taxes
In General American Life Insurance Co. v. Bates,6 discussed just above,
it was held that Section 146.010(4), Missouri Revised Statutes (1949),
which provides that in determining the "yield" from intangibles owned by life
insurance companies upon which the tax is based, there should be deducted
that portion required by law to be credited to reserves, was valid, since the
reserves of a life insurance company are in the nature of a trust fund for
the benefit of its policyholders and are properly deductible in determining
the value of its property for tax purposes.
7
In re Armistead" decided (1) that since the Intangible Tax Act9 did
not become effective until July 1, 1946, the 1947 assessment, based upon the
yield for the full year 1946, was unconstitutional, as retrospective legislation
in violation of Section 13, Article I of The Constitution of 194510 and (2)
that the proceeds of life insurance policies held on deposit by the issuing
company, to pay interest thereon to A for life, and the principal to B upon
A's death, are "moneys on deposit" and taxable, as intangibles, to the life
tenant, even though no part of the principal is withdrawable until the life
tenant's death and though the settlement option in question was elected by
the insured and no beneficiary had any election with respect thereto.
C. Real Estate Taxes
The ownership of real property by a city automatically renders it ex-
empt from property taxes under Section 6, Article X of the 1945 Constitution
(which is self executing), irrespective of its use. Thus, where the City of
St. Louis acquired a large aircraft manufacturing plant at Lambert-St.
Louis Airport, it was exempt from all taxes so long as that status continued,
.. General American Life Insurance Co. v. Bates, 249 S.W. 2d 458 (Mo.
1952) (en bane). See also under Part 1-B, infra.
6. Supra, note 5.
7. Cf. State ex rel. Missouri State Life Insurance Co. v. Gehner, 320 Mo.
691, 8 S.W. 2d 1068 (1928) (en bane).
8. 245 S.W. 2d 145 (Mo. 1952).
9. Chapter 146, Mo. REv. STAT. (1949).
10. Following First National Bank v. Buchanan County, 356 Mo. 1204, 205
S.W. 2d 726 (1947). 53
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notwithstanding the fact that it was leased to an aircraft manufacturing
company and used in commercial pursuits." Ownership and not use is the
sole criterion.
II. LEVY AND ASSESSMENT OF GENERAL PROPERTY TAXES
Ulan v. Evans12 is a type of case rather rare on the reports of this state
-a direct review of a real estate tax assessment. It came up through the State
Tax Commission and the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis to the Mis-
souri Supreme Court. The latter court held that (1) the general rule of re-
view of the decisions of administrative tribunals, such as the Industrial
Commission, is applicable to the review of orders of the State Tax Com-
mission passing on assessments; 13 (2) the formulas used by the assessor of
the City of St. Louis, including one basing the value of real estate upon the
square foot rental value of the first floor space in the building on the
premises, were not unlawful in the absence of proof of systematic discrimi-
nation or an intentional overvaluation, or the equivalent and (3) the
proof offered by the taxpayer was insufficient to show either systematic
discrimination, intentional overvaluation or something legally the equiva-
lent. A taxpayer who proposes to make a direct attack upon a real property
assessment would do well to study this case with more care, especially in
considering how much evidence he will need.
III. TAx SALES AND TITLES
Shaw v. Armstrong,14 decided in 1951, was overruled to the extent that
it held that a purchaser's tax deed issued on the third sale of real property
under the Jones-Munger Law (e.g. Section 140.250, Missouri Revised Stat-
utes (1949)) must be recorded within four years from the date of sale or
be invalid.1 The rule now established is that Section 140.410, which con-
tains the four year filing requirement, is applicable only to sales at first
and second offerings, where certificates of purchase are issued, and not to
third offering sales where a deed passes at once. In the same decision, Jour-
ney v. Miller,6 the court considered what is necessary to give a purchaser of
land notice of an unrecorded tax deed issued under the Jones-Munger Law.
Since the instant sale was for city taxes and since the city ordinances with
11. School District of Berkeley v. Evans, 250 S.W. 2d 499 (Mo. 1952).
12. 247 S.W. 2d 693 (Mo. 1952).
13. Chapter 536, Mo. REV. STAT. (1949).
14. 361 Mo. 648, 235 S.W. 2d 8.51 (1951).
15. Journey v. Miller, 250 S.W. 2d 164 (Mo. 1952) (en bano).
16. Supra, note 15.
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respect to delinquent taxes and the records thereof were not in evidence, the
,court reversed the case for further proof, but announced that in general
it would follow the rule of Fleckenstein v. Baxter,7 decided under the law
providing for the judicial foreclosure of state and county tax liens. What
the eventual test will be under the Jones-Munger Law is therefore in some
,doubt but it certainly seems that very little showing other than a public
record showing delinquent taxes and bearing notations as to tax sales should
be required to place a subsequent purchaser on notice of the tax title.
In Byrnes v. Scaggs,'8 A held record title to a tract and B claimed a
portion of it by virtue of adverse possession. A sued B in ejectment, but the
suit dragged along and, pending the suit, the property was sold for taxes
under the Jones-Munger Law, where it was purchased by C. More than
three years after the issuance of a tax deed to C, B had C made a party to
the ejectment suit and sought to attack C's title on the ground of grossly
inadequate consideration. Following the 1951 decision of Granger v. Bar-
ber,1' it was held that Section 140.590, Missouri Revised Statutes (1949),
prohibited an attack on a Jones-Munger tax deed for inadequacy of con-
sideration more than three years after its issuance and that the pendency
,of the ejectment suit did not toll the statute, as the purchaser at the tax
sale was, in effect, hostile to both parties to the ejectment suit.
The familiar rule that property in custodia legis, such as property
held by a receiver, may not be sold for taxes without the consent of the
court, was reaffirmed in Davison v. Arne.20 This case was aggravated by
the fact that one of the parties in the receivership proceeding was trying
to benefit by the tax deed. His effort was, needless to say, unsuccessful.
As has been the case for several years, the Jackson County Land Tax
Collection Act 2' was before the court in several respects. In one case02 it
was held that the Act was not unconstitutional as special legislation under
either Section 40(21) of Article III or Section 8 of Article VI of the 1945
Constitution, since the Land Trust, created by the Act, was not a county
or county officer or agency, and since the Act did not have reference to the
"organization and powers" of counties.2 3 The same case also held that the
17. 114 Mo. 493, 21 S.W. 852 (1893).
18. 247 S.W. 2d 826 (Mo. 1952).
19. 361 Mo. 716, 236 S.W. 2d 293 (1951).
20. 248 S.W. 2d 582 (Mo. 1952).
21. Mo. REV. StAr. §§ 141.210-141.810 (1949).
22. Collector of Revenue v. Parcels of Land etc., 247 S.W. 2d 83 (Mo.
1952) (en bane).
23. See also Inter City Fire Protection District v. Gambrel, 360 Mo. 924, 231
S.W. 2d 193 (1950). 55
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provisions of the Act for the redemption of land from the tax lien were
exclusive after an action had been brought thereunder and that the pro-
visions of Section 140.12024 were inapplicable in such a case. In Bennett v.
Cutler5 it was held that (a) the holder of the record title to land who was
made a party to an action under the Act and served by publication, but
who defaulted, could not later attack the tax foreclosure on the ground
that certain of the taxes in question were illegally levied and (b) entry of
a judgment of foreclosure does not so exhaust the powers of the circuit
court that it might not, more than thirty days thereafter, enter an order
re-setting the date of the sale thereunder.
IV. TAxING DIsmIcTS
A. Organization and Regulation
School Districts. The 1947 School Reorganization Law20 continues to
create litigation. Spiking School District No. 71 v. "Purported Enlarged
School District R-II, DeKalb County," 27 in particular, caused a great deal
of trouble to the court. The case was argued and submitted three times,
once in division and twice en baoc. It was finally held that a school district
which had been included in a reorganized district under a reorganization
plan might maintain a declaratory judgment suit to determine the validity
of the reorganization proceeding, but that individual taxpayers could not,
since a suit by the latter is but a collateral attack on the creation of the
reorganized district. However, under the peculiar facts in this case, it was
held that there was no school district in existence qualified to bring the suit,
so it failed for want of a proper party plaintiff. As a result, the only remedy
available was to induce the Attorney General to bring quo warranto.
The 1947 Reorganization Law2 8 contained a very definite time schedule
within which reorganization proposals were to be submitted and re-sub-
mitted to the voters. Notwithstanding, it was held (one judge dissenting)
that these provisions were but directory and not mandatory and that reor-
ganization proposals submitted to and adopted by the voters a short time
after the lapse of the time specified in the law were validly adopted and the
24. Mo. REv. STAT. (1949).
25. 245 S.W. 2d 900 (Mo. 1952).
26. Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 165.657 to 165.707 inclusive (1949).
27. 245 S.W. 2d 13 (Mo. 1952).
28. Supra, note 26, especially §§ 165.673 (2) and 165.693.
[Vol. 18
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reorganized school districts created thereby were duly and legally or-
ganized.29
A township treasurer may not refuse to turn over funds in his hands
belonging to common school districts to a successor reorganized school dis-
trict by reason of claimed defects in the establishment of the reorganized
district, as this is but a prohibited collateral attack 0
The provisions of Section 165.070, Missouri Revised Statutes (1949),
relating to the arbitration of boundary and annexation disputes between
school districts will be liberally construed and the provisions therein with
respect to the time of taking action will be held directory only, at least
where the delay was the result of litigation induced by the conduct of the
party now relying on the delay.3
Other Taxing Districts. A drainage district is a public corporation
which is at all times subject to regulation by the Legislature. Thus, though
at the time of its organization such a district might be required by law to
maintain bridges over its ditches and works, the Legislature may amend the
law to relieve the district from this obligation, even though the amendment
became effective after a suit had been brought to enforce the obligation.32
B. Debt and Finnces
The rule of State ex rel. City of Dexter v. Gordon,33 decided in 1913, to
the effect that in calculating the debt limit of a taxing district, the debt is
"incurred" on the date the voters authorize the issuance of bonds, rather
than the date upon which the bonds were issued, was followed in State ex rel.
Consolidated School District C4 of Caldwell County v. Holmes," not-
withstanding the interim adoption of the 1945 Constitution and the differ-
ences in language between Section 12, Article X of the 1875 Constitution,
under which the Dexter case was decided and Section 26 (b) of Article VI
of the new Constitution.
Voting booths are not a necessity in bond elections, at least if the
ballot-is short and the voter may easily conceal his ballot from others and if
someplace apart from the judges and clerks is given him to mark it, and
29. State ex rel. Rogersville Reorganized School District R-4 of Webster
County v. Holmes, 253 S.W. 2d 402 (Mo. 1952) (en banc).
30. State ex rel. Bums v. Johnston, 249 S.W. 2d 357 (Mo. 1952).
31. State ex rel. Acorn v. Hamlet, 250 S.W. 2d 495 (Mo. 1952).32. Swisher Inv. Co. v. Brimson Drainage District of Grundy and Harrison
Counties, 245 S.W. 2d 75 (Mo. 1952).
33. 251 Mo. 303, 158 S.W. 683 (1913) (en banc).
34. 245 S.W. 2d 882 (Mo. 1952) (en ban/c) 57
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the posting of notices of a bond election on power and light poles in rural
areas may in a proper case be posting in a "public place" as required by
the statute, 5 as what is a "public place" is relative and a question of fact
in each case.36
Cities may issue revenue bonds for the purpose of building extensions
to their sewer systems and, in order to obtain funds with which to meet
such bonds, may levy a charge for the use of the sewer system, though a
part of the system may have theretofore been built out of the proceeds of
general taxation.3 7 The latter fact gives no person an absolute right to use
the sewers without charge.
The contract of a county for the construction of a bridge is not void be-
cause of the fact that the county court adopted its budget for the coming
year, in which provision was made for the bridge, prior to the date fixed
therefor in the statutes, 3  even though the contract was executed before
the statutory date for the adoption of the budget. 9
V. MISCELLANEOUS
Kleban v. Morris40 points up the need for a general tax refund statute
in Missouri. It happens that there is a provision for the refund of sales and
use taxes improperly collected/ 1 which is more than can be said in many
cases. Kleban involves the aftermath of a decision by the court in 1949
that the 1947 automobile use tax42 was unconstitutional. 3 Thereafter, the
plaintiffs here, who had not filed claims for refund within one year of pay-
ment as required by the refund provisions supra, sued a galaxy of state
officials, the State Treasurer, State Auditor, Director of Revenue, and Comp-
troller, as well as a depositary bank, seeking to impress a trust upon the
funds collected under the unconstitutional law for the benefit of the per-
sons who paid them. It was held that this was a suit against the state and
that plaintiffs must be remitted to the Legislature for relief. While the
35. Mo. REv. STAT. § 165.040 (1949).
36. Lake v. Riutcel, 249 S.W. 2d 450 (Mo. 1952), following, as to the necessity
of voting booths, State ex rel. Wahl v. Speer, 284 Mo. 45, 223 S.W. 655 (1920) (en
bans) and Breuninger v. Hill, 277 Mo. 239, 210 S.W. 67 (1918) (en bans).
37. City of Maryville v. Cushman, 249 S.W. 2d 347 (Mo. 1952) (en banc)
and City of Sikeston v. Sisson, 249 S.W. 2d 345 (Mo. 1952) (en bans).
38. Mo. REv. STAT. H 50.670 and 50.740 (1949).
39. Adair County v. Urban, 250 S.W. 2d 493 (Mo. 1952).
40. 247 S.W. 2d 832 (Mo. 1952).
41. Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 144.190, 144.200 and 144.260 (1949).
42. 2 Mo. Laws, 1947, p. 431.
43. State ex rel. Transport Manufacturing and Equipment Co. v. Bates,
359 Mo. 1002, 224 S.W. 2d 996 (1949).
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Missouri Legislature has, in the past, been very fair about tax refunds, as
a matter of principle there should be a general statute authorizing adminis-
trative claims for refund of all taxes unlawfully or improperly collected and
permitting an action in court upon denial, similar to the Federal Statute.
The present procedure is far too slow and cumbersome.
TORTS
GLENN A. MCCLEARY*
The decisions during the year under review did not involve many new
types of situations in which liability was claimed, but there was considerable
clarification of various points of tort law in a number of instructive opinions.
Special effort seemed to be made to make clear just what the law is in
certain areas, making a number of the decisions worth careful study by the
bar. Again, special emphasis has been given to the cases predicated on the
humanitarian doctrine elsewhere in this issue of the Review.t
I. NEGLIGENCE
A. Duties of Persons in Certain Relations
1. Possessors of Land
In a well written opinion, in Boyer v. Guidicy Marble, Terrazzo & Tile
Co.,1 another exception is recognized to the general rule that a possessor owes
no duty to trespassers for injuries caused by dangers on his premises. This
was an appeal from a final judgment dismissing plaintiff's amended petition
for personal injuries sustained by a 17 year old boy, as a result of an explo-
sion of an apparently abandoned dynamite cap. The place where the cap
was found, near the quarry in an apparently abandoned and "thrown away"
condition, was open, unguarded, easily accessible to and frequented by chil-
dren. It was further alleged that neither the plaintiff nor his 13 year old
companion knew what they had found or that the caps were dangerous; that
each believed the caps had been thrown away and abandoned; and that the
caps were exploded two days later at the plaintiff's home. The court recog-
nized that the plaintiff was not attempting to bring his case within the
attractive nuisance doctrine, as there was no averment that the plaintiff was
caused to trespass because he was attracted by an inherently dangerous
*Professor of Law and Dean of the Law School, University of Missouri.
tBy William E. Becker.
1. 246 S.W. 2d 742 (Mo. 1952). 59
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condition or instrumentality. An essential prerequisite to the attractive
nuisance doctrine in Missouri is that the attractive nuisance caused the
original trespass. The court placed its ruling on another exception to the
general rule of nonliability of possessors to trespassers for injuries resulting
from dangerous conditions on the premises, namely, that one handling
extremely dangerous explosives owes a duty especially to children and those
of immature judgment, irrespective of the fact that the status of the person
may be that of a trespasser. "This recognition of a landowner's liability
to a trespasser is not an extension of the 'attractive nuisance' doctrine," said
the court, although "it may involve some of the basic consideration which
prompted the 'attractive nuisance' doctrine, but it is, nevertheless, a rule
independent of the 'attractive nuisance' doctrine." It was also held that the
act of the 17 year old trespasser in removing the abandoned dynamite cap
from the defendant's property, and his probing the cap with a nail, was not
as a matter of law an intervening cause to break the chain of causation be-
tween the defendant's negligence and the plaintiff's injury.2
2. Carriers
Only occasionally does the court have the opportunity to consider a
group of cases together which develop a legal problem in a way that is
especially helpful to the profession. In each of the four cases, Rohde v. St.
Louis Public Service Co.,2 McDonnell v. St. Louis Public Service Co.,4 Grace
v. St. Louis Public Service Co.5 and Lukitsck, v. St. Louis Public Service
Co.," the plaintiff was a passenger on the defendant's busses. In each case
2. Other cases involving the liability of a possessor of premises for dangerous
conditions thereon to business visitors: Baker v. Kansas City Terminal Ry., 250
S.W. 2d 999 (Mo. 1952) (an action was against the railroad by an employee of
an express company for injuries received when the right front wheel of a wagon,
which the employee was pulling on a platform of the railroad station struck a
board of a temporary bridge before the left wheel, causing the wagon tongue tojerk and throw the employee against a barricade. Evidence was held sufficient to
make a jury issue as to whether the failure of the railroad to bevel the board suffi-
ciently made the use of the platform unsafe for the purpose intended and
constituted a failure on the part of the railroad to exercise ordinary care to keep it
in a reasonably safe condition for use by the plaintiff); Miller v. Brunson Con-
struction Co., 250 S.W. 2d 958 (Mo. 1952) (an action by the employee of the
principal employer against the contractor for injuries sustained when he fell through
a plasterboard ceiling as alleged result of contractor's failure to take precautionary
measures of maintaining barricade or constructing gangplank across the space
from which the floor had been removed. The evidence was held sufficient to make
a submissible case on the issue of negligence).
3. 249 S.W. 2d 417 (Mo. 1952).
4. 249 S.W. 2d 412 (Mo. 1952).
5. 249 S.W. 2d 409 (Mo. 1952).
6. 246 S.W. 2d 749 (Mo. 1952) (en banc).
[Vol. 18
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the plaintiff predicated her action on the res ipes loquitur doctrine for
injuries received when the defendant's bus suddenly stopped, or jolted, or
gave an unusual and terrific jerk, causing the plaintiff to fall. In each of the
four cases the defendant relied on the emergency doctrine as its defense and in
each case the verdict was for the defendant. The emergency in each case
was the result of an automobile driven into the path of the defendant's bus.
Since an integral part of the emergency doctrine, and a prerequisite to
its application, is that the emergency shall not have been caused or con-
tributed to by the tortious conduct of the person asserting the emergency
as a factor to be considered in determining the reasonable character of the
defendant's action, an instruction which allows the jury to consider the rea-
sonableness of the driver's action in light of the emergency is prejudicially
erroneous if it fails to preclude the possibility that the driver's negligence
had caused or contributed to the emergency situation hypothesized in the
instruction.
However, the court said in the Rohde case it is not necessary in a res ipsa
loquitur case that the instruction "specifically negative all conceivable negli-
gence of the defendant prior to the emergency; that freedom from any
negligence in bringing about the emergency may be hypothesized generally.
But whatever language may be used, general or specific, it must reasonably
mean that the jury may not consider the emergency unless they find de-
fendant free of any negligence in creating it." The court further held in
that case that the phrase of the instruction requiring the finding "that the de-
fendant was not negligent as charged in other instructions submitted to you
herein" did not effectively require the jury to find, before applying the prin-
ciple of the emergency doctrine, that defendant's negligence did not cause
or contribute to cause the emergency. "This for the reason that . . . the
jury has been specifically instructed in effect that they could consider the
emergency situation in determining whether defendant exercised the highest
degree of care after it arose without any inclusion in the hypothesis of the
essential element of freedom from negligence in creating the emergency
without which the emergency doctrine has no application. Having chosen to
direct the jury's attention to a specific set of facts, defendant may not elimi-
nate one essential fact and then attempt to supply it by a 'catch-all' phrase.
This, at best, confuses and misleads."
In the Lukits1 case, the facts in and of themselves excluded any rea-
sonable inference of negligence on the part of the bus operator in bringing
about the emergency, since he could not reasonably anticipate the car would
61
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suddenly swerve immediately in front of the bus. Therefore, "there was no
necessity for including in an instruction the hypothesis that no negligence of
the defendant caused or contributed to cause the emergency, and 'emergency'
instruction omitting such a requirement is not erroneous."
How special circumstances may create an illusion of safety to render
a railroad crossing peculiarly hazardous to an occupant of an automobile
which collided with a motionless oil tank car at a grade crossing at night,
were considered in Albertson v. Wabash R. R.7 The detailed facts showed a
standing oil tank car, black in color, a slightly curving downgrade highway,
no warning signals of any kind, and a cloudy night, if not misty and foggy.
But there were additional circumstances creative of the illusion of safety.
Here the Wabash crossing is at the southernmost edge of the town of Hen-
rietta. It is in fact the "city limits" of the town and the beginning of open
country. The motorist in traveling Highway 13, the highway also being the
principal street of the town, "crosses the streets and passes the houses and
business buildings of the village, and then the four or five tracks of the
Santa Fe Railroad. Three hundred and sixty-one feet beyond the Santa Fe
tracks, unexpected to the uninitiated, is the single, unlighted, unguarded
Wabash crossing where even a careful driver might reasonably expect open
country and an open road." The court held that reasonable minds could
differ as to whether these special circumstances created an illusion of safety,
and thus rendered the occupied crossing peculiarly hazardous to the plain-
tiff, who was an occupant of the automobile involved in the collision, so as
to require precaution on the part of the railroad in addition to the mere
presence of the standing train.,
7. 253 S.W. 2d 184 (Mo. 1952).
8. Other cases involving the liability of carriers which may be noted: In
Girratono v. Kansas City Public Service Co., 251 S.W. 2d 59 (Mo. 1952), the
action was for injuries received when defendant's bus skidded into the plaintiff
after plaintiff had stepped from it. The negligence submitted to the jury by the
instruction was whether "the operator negligently started the bus forward in such
manner as to cause it to skid upon the pavement and to strike and injure the
plaintiff." This was held to be a submission of general negligence whereas plaintiff's
petition contained charges of specific negligence. Furthermore, the mere skidding
of an automobile or motor bus does not give rise to an inference of negligence.
In Wood v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 246 S.W. 2d 807 (Mo. 1952) (en
banc), evidence was held sufficient to go to the jury on defendant's negligence and
plaintiff's contributory negligence, where the injuries to plaintiff motorist were
received in a collision with defendant's streetcar, as a result of the rear wheels
of the automobile being caught in the troughs or depressions in the street existing
by reason of the rails of the track being depressed some 3" or 4" below the adjacent
pavement, by ridges formed by ice at the respective edges of the pavement ad-jacent to the rails, and by the condition of the pavement adjacent to the rails. As
plaintiff drove to the left into the space occupied by defendant's westbound track
[Vol. 18
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In cases predicated on the Federal Employers' Liability Act in state
courts, carried through the state supreme court, and appealed to the United
States Supreme Court, it is of more than passing interest to observe the
attitude of the latter court as to the competence of the state judiciary in
determining whether the plaintiff made a submissible case for the jury. In
Stone v. New York, C. & St. L. R. R.9 the action was for injuries to plain-
tiff's back sustained when working as a member of a railroad section crew
engaged in pulling ties while trimming the track. A judgment for $50,000
was given in the trial court for the employee. The Missouri Supreme Court
held the evidence insufficient as to whether the boss of the section crew
could reasonably be charged with a duty of anticipating that plaintiff might
be injured in any way by complying with the order to pull harder in ex-
tracting the railroad tie. Likewise, the evidence was held insufficient on the
issue as to whether the number of men furnished was sufficient to enable
for the purpose of passing an automobile which was proceeding in front of him, he
observed defendant's streetcar approximately 600' away. When plaintiff attempted
to pull back into his traffic lane the defendant's streetcar was still 300' to 400'
away and moving toward him. The streetcar had continued its approach at a con-
stant speed of from 15 to 25 m.p.h. until it had reached a point about 6' to 8' from
the point of collision, at which time the emergency stopping apparatus was applied.
Negligence was hypothesized on violation of an ordinance requiring the defendant
to keep in repair the space between the rails of its track and the space between
the tracks, and on violation of the St. Louis vigilant watch ordinance.
Warning v. Thompson, 249 S.W. 2d 335 (Mo. 1952), was an action under
the Boiler Inspection Act by an engineer who fell while performing his duty in
going up on the locomotive catwalk and trying to get sanders to function in wet
sand from the sanding mechanism. It was held that the railroad's liability for in-juries resulting from the violation of a safety appliance act follows from the un-
lawful use of prohibited defective equipment, and not from the position the em-
ployee may be in, or work he may be doing at the moment of injury, where there
is direct casual connection between the failure of the sanders to function and the
resulting injuries.
Liability for injuries arising from failure to furnish railroad employees reason-
ably safe places to work was before the court in Curtis v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry.,
2,53 S.W. 2d 789 (Mo. 1952) (action for death of freight conductor when struck by
defendant's train at night in unlighted rail yards, in which evidence justified finding
that combination of darkness and cement obstruction, over which deceased had
apparently tripped after swinging between standing box cars, created an unsafe
place to work); and Hatfield v. Thompson, 252 S.W. 2d 534 (Mo. 1952) (action
by freight train conductor for personal injuries sustained when attempting to board
a moving train, allegedly caused by foot slipping in a hole in defendant's right of
way, but instructions failed to hypothesize a finding of railroad's knowledge, actual
or constructive, of the existence of the hole).
In Cassano v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 247 S.W. 2d 786 (Mo. 1952), the action
under the Federal Safety Appliance Act and the Federal Employers' Liability Act
was for injuries to brakeman's back, allegedly sustained by overexertion in at-
tempting to release the brake on a freight car in the defendant's freight yards.
9. 249 S.W. 2d 442 (Mo. 1952) revs'd. by the United States Supreme Court
in 73 Sup. Ct. Rep. 358 (1953). 63
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workmen to do the work with reasonable safety and on the issue as to
whether the methods used were reasonably safe. On certiorari to the United
States Supreme Court, in an opinion by Mr. Justice Douglas, six of the
judges disagreed with the Missouri appellate judges and held that the
evidence of negligence and proximate cause was sufficient to go to the jury.
Of greater significance is the dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice Frank-
furter, with whom Mr. Justice Reed and. Mr. Justice Jackson joined, in
which it is pointed out that Congress, in seeing fit that actions based on the
Federal Employers' Liability Act be allowed in the state courts and in
entrusting the enforcement of the Act to the state courts, "presupposed, as a
generality, the competence of the judiciaries of the States, their professional
capacity to enforce the Act and their self-critical fairness toward its pur-
poses. When it thus put the enforcement of the law in the keeping of State
courts, the Congress knew that the determination of whether there is
adequate evidence to sustain a claim of negligence is one of the most elusive
determinations that judges are called upon to make. To suggest that Con-
gress knew this, and has known it right along, is not to indulge a fiction.
Congress is composed predominantly of lawyers and this aspect of the law
of negligence is known to the merest tyro. Congress could hardly have as-
sumed when the Federal Employers' Liability Act of 1908 was enacted that
this Court must reverse the State judges merely because we and they differ-
ed, where difference was more than permissible, was inevitable, concerning
whether or not a particular unique set of facts made out a case of negli-
gence." He points out that in assessing the unique circumstances of a case
"right and wrong are not objectively ascertainable, that in fact there is no
right and wrong when two equally competent and equally independent
judges, equally devoid of any bias or possessed of the same bias, could by
the same reasoning process reach opposite conclusions on the facts." Since
he could not say that the Missouri Supreme Court could not hold on the
facts that the plaintiff did not make a submissible case either for negligence
or as to causation, he concluded that he would not substitute himself for
that court in viewing the facts, although he probably would have taken the
other view had he the independent primary responsibility."'
10. The writer of the dissent deplores negligence as the basis of liability
under this Act "because of the injustices and crudities inherent in applying the
common law concepts of negligence to railroading. To fit the hazards of railroad
employment into the requirements of a negligence action is to employ a wholly in-
appropriate procedure-a procedure adequate to the simple situations for which
it was adapted but brutally unfit for the situations to which the Federal Employers'
[Vol. 18
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3. Automobiles
The liability of construction contractors who leave large motor-driven,
earth-moving tractors in a public place at the end of a day's work was pre-
sented on a motion to dismiss plaintiff's petition in Zuber v. Clarkson Con-
struction Co."1 The action was for wrongful death of the plaintiff's father
alleged to have been a result of being run over by a large earth-moving trac-
tor, owned by the defendant, and which had been left in a public place (a
levee or public place adjacent thereto near the densely populated area of a
city) in such condition that the machine could be started and operated by
curious and intermeddling members of the public and where the defendant
was alleged to have knowledge that such persons were making a practice of
operating machines, and had reason to anticipate that among those operators
would be reckless and unskilled persons, and that some injury might result
to others thereby. The trial court had sustained the defendant's motion and
had entered a judgment of dismissal. It was held on appeal that the petition
stated a cause of action in negligence. The court found that although the
machines were of great economic value in public works, the probability and
seriousness of foreseeable injury was so great that the cost of rendering the
vehicle immobile by locks or other precautionary measures were not out of
proportion to the hazard involved. The case is more adequately noted else-
where in the Review.12
The court, in Cantwell v. Zook,13 reaffirmed its position taken in Yates
v. Manckester, 14 where an instruction was held erroneous which submitted
the alleged negligent speed of the driver of an automobile without submitting
fact issues to guide the jury in determining the issue of negligence and with-
out requiring any finding of fact as to speed or existing circumstances. In
the instant case, the action was for injuries resulting from a collision which
allegedly occurred when the defendant's truck, parked on the side of the
road, turned left into the path of the plaintiff's station wagon. The instruc-
tion in the instant case in submitting the issue of contributory negligence in-
Liability Act requires that it be put. The result is a matter of common knowledge.
Under the guise of suits of negligence, the distortions of the Act's application have
turned it more and more into a workmen's compensation act, but with all the
hazards and social undesirabilities of suits for negligence because of the high stakes
by way of occasional heavy damages, realized all too often after years of unedifying
litigation."
11. 251 S.W. 2d 52 (Mo. 1952).
12. Noted by Mr. Hanna in 18 Mo. L. REv. 205 (1953).
13. 250 S.W. 2d 980 (Mo. 1952).
14. 358 Mo. 894, 217 S.W. 2d 541 (1949). 65
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formed the jury that if the plaintiff drove his vehicle, as he approached the
truck operated by the defendant, "at a high, excessive and dangerous rate
of speed under the circumstances, so as to endanger the lives and property
of other persons including the plaintiff's, the plaintiff was negligent." This
was held to be erroneous.
There were other cases growing out of automobile collisions which may
be read with profit when drafting instructions although one of them raises
new points of law. These are cited in the footnotes. 5
4. Supplier of Articles
The liability of a supplier of articles was raised n two cases, one of
which covers a large area of the law on this subject. In Willey v. Fyrogas
15. A helpful case to read in drafting a sole cause instruction is Godfrey v.
Bauer, 252 S.W. 2d 281 (Mo. 1952). To the writer, the position taken in this
case as to the sufficiency of the sole cause instruction indicates a more moderate
attitude on the part of the court from the earlier cases in this field. However, the
basic requirements for a sole cause instruction are no less required.
The court, in Le Grand v. U-Drive-It Co., 247 S.W. 2d 706 (Mo. 1952),
reiterates its rule with regard to the giving of the following cautionary instruction:
"The court instructs the jury that the mere fact of itself that plaintiff was injured
and has brought suit claiming defendants were negligent is no evidence whatever
that the defendants were in fact negligent. Negligence is not in law presumed, but
must be established by proof as explained in other instructions. Neither are you
permitted to base a verdict entirely and exclusively on mere surmise, guesswork
and speculation; and if upon the whole evidence in the case, fairly considered, you
are not able to make a finding that defendants were negligent without resorting
to surmise, guesswork and speculation outside of and beyond the scope of the
evidence, and the reasonable inferences deductible therefrom, then it is your duty
to, and you must, return a verdict for the defendants."
In Young v. Anthony, 248 S.W. 2d 864 (Mo. 1952), plaintiff's instructions
requiring defendant motorist to exercise the highest degree of care while requiring of
plaintiff motorist only due care were held to be prejudicially erroneous as unduly
emphasizing the care required of defendant and minimizing that required by plain-
tiff, and such error was not cured by a definition of due care as used in the instruc-
tions as meaning the highest degree of care or by the defendant's conflicting in-
structions requiring plaintiff to exercise the highest degree of care.
In drafting an instruction by the defendant on the emergency doctrine, facts
must be hypothesized which exclude any negligence of the defendant in creating the
emergency. In Boatright v. Bruening, 251 S.W. 2d 709 (Mo. 1952), an action for
injuries sustained by the plaintiff when the automobile in which he was riding
collided with defendant's on-coming vehicle, an instruction properly submitting
defendant's theory that his act in turning to the left across the white line in the
center of the street, which was the sole act of negligence submitted by the plaintiff as
being negligent, took place after the emergency arose and because of it (the facts
showing the creation of the emergency solely by the acts a third party so suddenly)
and that nothing defendant did or failed to do could have contributed to cause it,
excluded any reasonable inference of negligence on the part of the defendant in
creating the emergency. The case may be quite profitably compared with the dis-
cussion of the emergency doctrine in Rhode v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., note 3,
supra; McDonnell v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., note 4, supra; Grace v. St. Louis Pub.
Serv. Co., note 5, supra; and Lukitsch v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., note 6, supra.
(Vol. is
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Co.,"G the action was for the death of plaintiff's husband in a propane gas
explosion, on the ground that the automatic cut-off valve on the hot water
heater was defective and permitted gas to escape. The explosion of the gas
in the basement of their home occurred when the deceased attempted to
relight the pilot light on the automatic gas water heater. The action was
against the manufacturer of the valve, the manufacturer and assembler of
the heater, the retailer, and the intermediate vendor (Yariously character-
ized in the opinion as a wholesaler or distributor or manufacturer's agent),
which was the only defendant residing in the county where the suit was
brought. The negligence and liability of the manufacturer of the heater and
the retailer were submitted to the jury and a verdict returned for the plain-
tiff. At the close of the evidence the trial court had directed verdicts for
the manufacturer of the valve and the intermediate vendor who effectuated
the sale to the retailer of the plaintiff. The two defendants to the judgment
appealed and the plaintiff appealed from the directed verdicts in favor of
the other two defendants, thus the liability of all four defendants was before
the supreme court. It is not possible within the limits of this survey to
treat fully of the liability of each defendant, as is done in the opinion. The
distributor or wholesaler was not liable because he did not know and had no
reason to know that the valve on the heater was defective, the heater being
still in the original crate and paper bag when it reached the retailer. The
liability of the manufacturer of the heater, which incorporated this com-
ponent part manufactured by another, and the liability of the manufacturer
of the part (the defective valve) were recognized, and it was held to be no
defense to the manufacturer's negligence in constructing the article or in
failing properly to test and inspect it that the retailer was also under a duty
to make tests and had in fact made a 'functional test' of the automatic cutoff
valve. "The failure of the vendee to properly inspect and test is within the
foreseeable risk of the manufacturer." However, because of error in the in-
structions a new trial was granted to the manufacturer of the heater and to
the retailer.
In Spurlock v. Union Finance Co.,17 the action was by a prospective
buyer of a used automobile against the automobile dealer for injuries sus-
tained when the buyer poured gasoline, which had been given to him by
the dealer's agent, into the carburetor of the automobile in which he was
interested while his companion stepped on the starter. Negligence of the
16. 251 S.W. 2d 635 (Mo. 1952).
17. 248 S.W. 2d 578 (Mo. 1952). 67
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agent was predicated on failing to warn of the inherent danger when he
gave the prospective buyer the gasoline and instructed him to pour it into
the carburetor so as to start the automobile. The court also held that the
agent's alleged ignorance in regard to such danger did not excuse his failure
to warn prospective buyers. The judgment entered for the defendant on
its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict for the plaintiff was
set aside, and the cause was remanded to the trial court with directions to
reinstate the verdict of the jury and to enter judgment in favor of the
plaintiff.
5. Imputed negligence
In the two cases before the court in which the plaintiff claimed damages
for personal injuries from the defendant on the doctrine of respondeat sit-
perior, the acts of the employee fell outside the scope of his employment.
In Rotk v. J. N. Rotk & Co.,' 8 the plaintiff was injured when the automobile
in which she was riding crashed into an embankment, as her husband, who
was driving, attempted to avoid a collision with an automobile driven by the
defendant. The action was against the corporation of which plaintiff's hus-
band was president. He was driving his own automobile at the time of the
accident on a business trip for the corporation. The court held that where
the president of a corporation, who was making an automobile trip for the
exclusive business of the corporation, extended an invitation to his wife to
accompany him, not for any purpose of the corporation, but solely for his
own pleasure, the scope of his authority did not include the transportation
of persons as passengers or guests and he had no implied authority to invite
others to ride with him. The judgment in favor of the plaintiff against the
defendant corporation was reversed, the trial court having committed error
in refusing to direct a verdict in favor of the defendant.
In Brown v. Moore,19 the automobile was operated by a salesman in
the general employ of the defendant. While the car was owned by the em-
ployer, the employee was permitted to retain the car in his possession and
to use it for his own private purposes on payment of a fee and reimburse-
ment of gasoline on a mileage basis. The employee had written a letter to his
employer in relation to an order and had taken the letter with him when he
left his home, intending to mail it in Kansas City. He first purchased
stamps in Hickman Mills and then drove south three miles on Highway
18. 253 S.W. 2d 802 (Mo. 1952).
19. 248 S.W. 2d 553 (Mo. 1952). 68
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71 to Grandview to purchase a case of beer for a private party that evening.
After purchasing the beer, he started back north on the same highway to-
ward Hickman Mills, still having the letter with him. He was still going to
Kansas City for the purpose of mailing the letter, and he expected to take
the beer to Kansas City, then return to Hickman Mills. The court held
that the employee had materially deviated from his master's business for
the six mile round-trip on Highway 71 on private business, and that he had
not yet returned to the point of deviation when the collision occurred. "He
was not on a merely circuitous journey to mail the letter .... The deviation
was definite and certain, out and back to the starting point." Therefore, as
a matter of law the employee was not within the scope of his employment
when the collision occurred. The ruling of the trial court in sustaining the
employer's motion to set aside the verdict and judgment for the plaintiff
and to enter judgment for the defendant was affirmed.
B. Negligence under the res ipsa loquitur doctrine
Whether the plaintiff may rely on the doctrine res ipsa loquitur in an
action for personal injuries suffered from an explosion of gasoline on de-
fendant's premises, was the question in Carter v. Skelly Oil Co. 2 0 The peti-
tion alleged that the defendants drove the plaintiff's automobile into their
lubrication room for service and repairs, closed the outer doors thereof,
caused the automobile to be raised upon their hydraulic grease rack, drained
from it approximately ten gallons of gasoline onto the floor of the lubrication
room and pushed the gasoline along the floor with a squeegee, and negligently
allowed the gasoline to explode, injuring the plaintiff who was impliedly pres-
ent in the lubrication room. It was further alleged that the lubrication room
was equipped with a kerosene heating stove and the outdoor temperature
was 43 degrees. The court recognized defendant's contention that the mere
fact of an explosion does not make out a prima facie case of negligence, or
raise the inference of negligence under the res ipsa loquitur theory. However,
if "in addition to the explosion, there are other facts and circumstances from
which the jury reasonably may infer that the explosion was caused by a
flame or spark emanating from an instrumentality under the management
and control of the defendants, then their negligence may be inferred." The
petition was held to have stated a cause of action under the res ipsa loquitur
doctrine.
A number of cases raised the troublesome question of whether plaintiff's
20. 252 S.W. 2d 306 (Mo. 1952). 69
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evidence disclosed specific negligence and thus lost for the plaintiff the
benefit of submitting the case under the doctrine res ipsa loquitur. In
Lukitsch v. St. Louis Public Service Co.,21 the court en banc considered the
case of a passenger against the bus company for injuries sustained in falling
to the floor of the bus when the brakes were suddenly applied. Although
the court en banw has subsequently in the case of McCaffery v. St. Louis
Public Service Co.2 2 limited its holding on the point, the Lukitsck case is
important to an understanding of the cases subsequently discussed herein.
The majority of the court en bane held that the plaintiff debarred herself
from the right to recover under res ipsa loquitur, where she proved by her
own evidence that the jerk of the bus was caused by a sudden application
of the brakes to avoid hitting an automobile which had pulled in front of
the bus. "The facts in the case at bar, in and of themselves," said the court,
"exclude any reasonable inference of negligence on the part of the bus
operator in bringing about the emergency and that he could not reasonably
anticipate the car would suddenly swerve immediately in front of the bus.
.. ." Three of the judges dissented on the point that the case was converted
from a res ipsa loquitur application to specific negligence for the reason that
the plaintiff's proof did not make a jury case on specific negligence. Judge
Hyde, with whom Judge Leedy and Judge Dalton concurred, reasoned that
the "plaintiff's proof must be sufficient to make a jury case on specific negli-
gence before the case can be changed from res ipsa to specific negligence.
The rule is that 'even though the plaintiff's evidence may tend to show the
specific cause of the accident, he will nevertheless not lose the benefit of
the doctrine, nor be deprived of the right to rely upon it in the submission
of his case, if, after his evidence is in, the true cause is still left in doubt
or is not clearly shown. . . .'" It was pointed out that "The reason for the
rule is that 'a plaintiff can neither definitely state nor show that his injury
was caused in a certain way and then allow the jury to speculate on whether
it was caused in some other way.'... Surely a plaintiff has not clearly and
definitely shown the specific act of negligence that caused his injury if his
evidence is not sufficient to make a jury case on the issue." The minority
view did not think that reference in the plaintiff's evidence to a sudden
application of the brakes may be said to have so clearly pointed out and
identified any specific act of negligence on the part of the operator of the
21. 246 S.W. 2d 749 (Mo. 1952) (en banc).
22. 252 S.W. 2d 361 (Mo. 1952) (en banc). 70
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 4 [1953], Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/v l18/iss4/1
1953] WORK OF MISSOURI SUPREME COURT FOR 1952 401
bus as to have constituted a waiver of plaintiff's right to rely upon the doc-
trine res ipsa loquitur.
In McDonnell v. St. .Louis Public Service Co., 23 decided a month later
on almost identical facts, the court in division said "It is unnecessary to de-
termine whether this evidence constituted proof of specific negligence. We
may say by way of dictum that it did not. This for the reason that while
the testimony showed the cause of plaintiff's fall, in the sense that it showed
the fall resulted from the physical act of the operator in making a sudden
application of the brakes, it did not prove the specific negligent cause, if any,
which caused or contributed to cause plaintiff's injuries." (Italics the courts)
The opinion then seeks to exclude this case from the possible broader inter-
pretation of the Lukitsch, case above as follows: "There is language in the
recent majority opinion of the Court en Banc in Lukitsch v. St. Louis Public
Service Company... which indicates that proof that a sudden application
of the brakes may under certain circumstances constitute proof of specific
negligence. This language, however, was, as we shall point out, unnecessary
to the conclusion of the court as to the instruction there involved.... So
viewed, we think the Lukitsch case holds, on the question of proof of specific
negligence, that where the facts of a case have excluded every reasonable
inference of negligence, other than negligence, if any, in the mzner in which
the brakes were applied, proof that a jerk was caused by sudden application
of brakes is proof of specific negligence." In the instant case the court found
that neither plaintiff's evidence nor defendant's evidence nor all the evidence
excluded a reasonable inference of negligence on the part of the bus operator
in causing or contributing to cause the emergency.
The same contentions were made by the parties in McCaffery v. St.
Louis Public Service Co. 24 There the plaintiff as a passenger on defendant's
streetcar was standing and had her hold on the bar on the back of the seat
torn loose, causing her to fall, when the streetcar jolted. The court en banc
clears up any confusion which would arise from an apparent difference in a
holding on this point made on a divisional opinion over an earlier en banc
opinion by adopting the analysis made in the divisional McDonnell case dis-
cussed above. Furthermore, the court in the instant case, after quoting
the language in the Lukitsck case on this point, states that "These expres-
sions, standing alone, do apparently mean that when a passenger-plaintiff
shows by evidence that a sudden stop of a vehicle was caused by the operator
23. 249 S.W. 2d 412 (Mo. 1952).
24. 252 S.W. 2d 361 (Mo. 1952) (en banc). 71
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applying the brakes, then such plaintiff has thereby proved specific negli-
gence. Our opinion in the instant case is in confict with Lukitsch in so far
as that case holds and to that extent the Lukitsch case should be overruled."
A few months later, in Williams v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 2' the
court en banec ruled similarly where the plaintiff sustained injuries while
riding as a passenger on defendant's streetcar, when the operator of the car
was alleged negligently to have caused it to check its speed suddenly and to
receive an unusual jerk which caused the plaintiff to fall. The plaintiff's
testimony indicated that the streetcar was slowed to permit an automobile
to pass across in front of it; that then the streetcar started forward; and
that was when the jerk occurred. However, the court held that the evidence
did not show what caused the jerk. It did not show whether the jerk was
caused by a negligent application of the power or to a negligently maintained
transmission system, even if it be conceded that an inference could be drawn
from the evidence that the jerk was due to the application of power to the
transmission system.
C. Defenses in negligence cases
In the usual negligence case, whether the plaintiff was contributorily
negligent is a jury question. Only in cases where the court has declared the
plaintiff contributorily negligent as a matter of law may special notice be
given in a survey of this nature. In Clark v. Missouri Natural Gas Co.,20 the
court en banc, in reversing a judgment for the plaintiff, held that a pedes-
trian, who had become cognizant earlier in the evening of a gas pipe ob-
structing the sidewalk, and who subsequently on the same evening fell over
such obstruction, was contributorily negligent as a matter of law. In Chisenall
v. Thompson,27 a plaintiff who had lost his right hand when he attempted to
remove cornstalks from between revolving rollers of a corn picker without
first placing the power take-off lever in neutral, and who fully understood
the safe way and the dangerous way to clean a corn picker, yet chose the
dangerous method, was contributorily negligent as a matter of law. A judg-
ment for the plaintiff was reversed in both cases.
In Brandt v. Thompson,28 the court reversed a holding of assumption
of risk by the trial court and ordered the judgment for the plaintiff reinstated,
where the action was for injuries sustained as a result of falling on the stair-
25. 253 S.W. 2d 97 (Mo. 1952) (en banc).
26. 251 S.W. 2d 27 (Mo. 1952) (en banc).
27. 252 S.W. 2d 335 (Mo. 1952).
28. 252 S.W. 2d 339 (Mo. 1952). 72
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way of an office building of the defendant. The plaintiff was employed by
a tenant which occupied the third floor. The evidence showed that the ele-
vators in the office building were always full at five o'clock in the afternoon
and would not stop for those employees on the third floor until about five-
fifteen o'clock. It was therefore customary for those employees to walk
down a poorly lighted stairway which had no handrails. The plaintiff slipped
on a step which had been worn slippery. The court said that "a person may
be declared negligent as a matter of law only if a stairway was so 'glaringly'
dangerous that no reasonable prudent person would use it." But the circum-
stances here were such that a jury could have concluded that the plaintiff
acted reasonably. She had used these steps every day for two or three years
without mishap; when she started down the stairs she did not know the light
was out on the second floor; if she elected to go back up the stairs she would
have had to traverse the same darkened and slippery stairs and would have
had to encounter persons coming down the stairs, rendering her passage
against the stream of traffic confusing and dangerous to herself and to others.
Furthermore, she had little time to deliberate as three persons were coming
along behind her only a step apart.
D. Humanitarian Doctrine
In view of the significance of the humanitarian doctrine in the Missouri
decisions, special emphasis has been given to the cases predicated on this
doctrine in a separate topic to be found elsewhere in this issue of the Review. 29
II. TRESPASS
Beetsclen v. Shell Pipe Line Corporation0° was an action brought by
landowners against the pipe line company to recover damages for trespass
29. Discussed by Mr. Becker. For difference between submitting plaintiff's
case on negligence under the humanitarian doctrine and on a theory of willful,
wanton or reckless misconduct see McClanohan v. St. Louis Service Co., 251
S.W. 2d 704 (Mo. 1952) (en banc) (overruling a number of Missouri decisions
improperly submitted under the humanitarian doctrine as not involving humani-
tarian negligence: "It seems to us the wrongful acts or conduct noted in the re-
spective cases brought plaintiffs into imminent peril, yet the acts or conduct of
the respective defendants either immediately caused the plaintiff's injuries, or the
plaintiffs were injured as the result of the defendants' acts or conduct so near to
the time plaintiffs were in imminent peril that defendants were liable, if at all, not
for negligence under the humanitarian rule but for their primary conduct amounting
to negligence, or amounting to willfulness, wantonness or recklessness."). For an
interesting decision interpreting whether the defendant's conduct constituted a
"wanton negligence" under the Kansas guest statute, see Tillman v. Zumwalt, 250
S.W. 2d 142 (Mo. 1952) (transferred to the court en banc, following an equal split
in division over whether the trial court's direction of verdict for the defendant at
the close of plaintiff's case should be sustained).
30. 253 S.W. 2d 785 (Mo. 1952). 73
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when the company mistakenly fenced part of the company's pipe line right
of way, though the company had only subsurface rights as a result of con-
demnation. The plaintiffs recovered actual and punitive damages over the
defendant's contentions that it possessed the power of eminent domain and
could have condemned the right to fence, and having appropriated that
right without authority the taking or fencing was permanent and, there-
fore, the landowners were bound to seek their entire recovery in one action
for all the damages sustained.
In Curtis v. Fruin-Colmnm Contracting Co.,31 to build a retaining wall
around a lot, defendant without asking plaintiffs' permission dug a ditch
partly on plaintiffs' property as much as 18 inches, which was less than two
feet from the north part of their buildings and about seven feet from the
south part. The north part had an L about 272 feet wide which
extended about six feet farther west than the south part. According to
the plaintiffs' evidence, this ditch was about three feet wide and about
four feet deep and was dug along the west side of plaintiff's building. The
ditch had no outlet and the soil was sandy and porous. There was considera-
ble rain during the spring and summer, and water collected in the ditch and
seeped from it into the ground. This action was in trespass and negligence
for the cracking of the foundation to the plaintiffs' building and the settling
of the building, which was allegedly due to the seepage from water which had
collected. The negligence charged was in leaving the entire ditch open for
about three months, in soil of this type, without an outlet, when water accu-
mulated and seeped under the foundation of plaintiffs' building. On both
issues plaintiffs were held to have made a submissible case. However, a re-
trial on the issue of damages only was granted due to error in instructing
the jury on the measure of damages which permitted the jury to take into
consideration the reasonable value of the repairs necessary to restore the
building in a condition as good as it was in immediately prior to the damage.
"The general rule," held the court, "is that the measure of damages to real
estate is the difference in the value of the land before and after the injury
by trespass or negligence. However, where damaged land or a building there-
on can be restored to its former condition, at a cost less than the diminution
in value, the cost of restoration may be recovered. Thus this restoration rule
of recovery is applicable only to cases where the cost of restoration is less
than the difference in the value of the land before and after the injury and
31. 253 S.W. 2d 158 (Mo. 1952).
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can never apply in any case where the cost of restoration is greater than
the value of the land or building."
III. MALICIOUS PROSECUTION
In an action for malicious prosecution the plaintiff must allege and prove,
as one of the elements of his cause of action, that he was not guilty of the
criminal offense with which he was charged, and that the criminal proceed-
ings terminated in his favor. In Cowan v. Gamble,32 a petition failed to state
a cause of action where it was alleged that the petitioner, who was charged
in Oklahoma with the felony of child stealing and against whom a warrant
of extradition had been procured in Missouri, had been discharged on habeas
corpus, since this was not an allegation of the termination of the criminal
prosecution in his favor in the Oklahoma proceedings. The habeas corpus
proceedings, held the court, challenged only the validity of the petitioner's
detachment under the extradition warrant, and did not challenge the legality
of his original or impending detention in Oklahoma and did not preclude
the possibility of conviction there.
WILLS, TRUSTS AND ADMINISTRATION
GEORGE W. SIMPxiNs*
During the calendar year 1952 the Missouri Supreme Court decided
several cases in the field of Wills, Trusts and Administration of material sig-
nificance to the practicing lawyer, especially certain cases involving hitherto
undecided questions of procedure and cases further developing the law with
respect to the right to attorneys' fees.
I. POWER OF PROBATE COURT AND PROCEEDINGS THEREUNDER
In re Hoermai's Estate' holds that a mother of an insane son converted
to her own use monthly disability payments under his war risk insurance
.policy was liable to repay such amounts. In an attempt to avoid such lia-
bility, it was contended that the probate court might make allowances out
of the ward's estate to support members of his family. The case is of very
considerable importance in this respect since it is the first time that this
question has been before the Supreme Court of Missouri. The court said:
"Appellants particularly rely upon State ex rel. Kemp v. Ar-
nold, 234 Mo. App. 154, 113 S.W. 2d 143, 145. However, it was
recognized in that case that the Probate Court 'is a court of limited
32. 247 S.W. 2d 779 (Mo. 1952).
*Attorney, St. Louis. A.B. Harvard, 1930; J.D., Washington University, 1933.
1. 247 S.W. 2d 762, 764 (Mo. 1952).
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jurisdiction, possessing only those powers which have been con-
ferred upon it by statute, and being wholly without equitable juris-
diction, even though it is permitted, when necessity arises, to apply
mere equitable principles in the exercise of its statutory jurisdic-
tion.' It was held therein that the provision of Sec. 458.140 (statu-
tory references are to R. S. Mo. 1949 and V.A.M.S.) for the Probate
Court to make an order, in the estate of an insane person, 'for the
support and maintenance of his family,' was authority for providing
for the support of the widowed mother of the incompetent out of
his estate. The Court held the word 'family' should be construed to
include 'whomsoever it is the natural or moral duty of the head of
the family to support, or who is dependent upon him for support.'
In that case, the incompetent had for many years maintained his
home with his mother and had regularly contributed to her support
the amount of the allowance sought. Furthermore, in that case the
Court only decided that the Probate Court had authority to make
an allowance and did not pass on the question of what allowance
should be made. It is certainly no authority for making retroactive
allowance for a past period during which allowances were made
from time to time in the light of the facts and conditions then ex-
isting.
"There are conflicting cases, some of which appellants cite, on
the right of courts to make allowances from an incompetent's estate
for persons to whom he is under no legal obligation to support. See
Citizens' State Bank of Trenton v. Shanklin, 174 Mo. App. 639,
161 S.W. 341; In re Heck's Guardianship, 225 Wis. 636, 275 N.W.
520; In re Beilstein, 145 Ohio St. 397, 62 N.E. 2d 205; In re Flagler,
248 N. Y. 415, 162 N.E. 471; Annotations 59 A.L.R. 653, 160
A.L.R. 1435; 25 Am. Jur. 52, Sec. 79; 44 C.J.S., Insane Persons,
§ 90, page 242. Chancery Courts have been less restricted in mak-
ing such allowances than courts acting under statutory authority.
It is stated: 'Great caution should be exercised with respect to
making allowances to persons for whom the ward is not legally
bound to provide; and it has been said that the practice ought rather
to be narrowed than extended.' 44 C.J.S., Insane Persons, § 90,
page 243. Since the only authority for making such an allowance in
this State is Sec. 458.140, we do not think it can reasonably be con-
strued to authorize what was done here. In the first place, the allow-
ance made by the Probate Court includes eight years (1919-1927)
during which Mrs. Hoerman was living with her husband on the
farm (1919-1923) and in Smithton (1923-1927). All the evidence
shows that she was not dependent upon her son during that time.
Furthermore, there was no evidence before the Probate Court that
the allowances thereafter made by it were insufficient or that she
needed more than was allowed by it, when these previous allow-
[Vol. 18
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ances were made. In fact, the evidence is the other way: namely,
that she had sufficient means not only for her own support but
enough to contribute to the support of other children. We must,
therefore, hold that the evidence before the Probate Court was
insufficient to support this additional retroactive allowance."
Williams v. Vaughrn 2 holds that where a guardian of an insane ward,
without express court approval, borrowed money which was then paid out
for lawful purposes, the lenders were entitled to recover from the estate of
the insane ward who had since died the amount of the loans, saying:
"We do not understand that the appellant contends that the
above enumerated items are not proper charges against the estate
but that her main contention is that the loans made by respondent
First National Bank of Carrollton and respondent Williams are ille-
gal because under the statute the only way for a guardian to bor-
row money is to mortgage the available real estate belonging to the
ward. Chapter 458, R. S. Mo. 1949, V.A.M.S., does authorize a
guardian to mortgage his ward's real estate under certain condi-
tions. However, there is nothing in this chapter that prohibits a
guardian from borrowing money needed for the ward's support
and maintenance without giving a mortgage on the ward's real
estate."
In re Thomson's Estate3 rules that a probate court could not say as a
matter of law, without hearing evidence, that twelve years' delay in seeking
a refund of partial distributions theretofore made out of an estate was un-
reasonable delay which would bar such a refund under the terms of Settion
465.400.4 The more important question of general application is the ruling
that laches would bar such right to a refund and that such defense might
be passed on by the probate court. The opinion first discusses critically the
dogma that laches cannot be asserted as a defense in an action at law, and
then continues:
"We have, perhaps unnecessarily, expressed these views with
reference to the soundness of the rule that laches may not be inter-
posed as an equitable defense to a legal action to suggest that no
apparent illogical or disastrous results would flow from an opposite
rule. Because of the fact, however, that the rule is so well settled
in this state, as shown by the cases heretofore cited and legion other
cases to the same effect, we confine our ruling to the specific limited
proposition here involved.
2. 253 S.W. 2d 111, 113 (Mo. 1952).
3. 362 Mo. 1043, 1053, 246 S.W. 2d 791, 797 (1952).
4. References to statutes are to Mo. Rzv. STAT. (1949), unless otherwise
indicated. 77
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"When an executor or administrator files an application for re-
fund under the provisions of Sec. 465.400, he is proceeding under
one of the provisions of our probate code providing a method by
which assets may be caused to be returned to an estate for the pur-
pose of paying debts. The provisions for the application are purely
statutory. It is unnecessary and meaningless to classify an applica-
tion under this statute as being a legal proceeding or as being an
equitable proceeding. It is an application under a statute which has
been enacted to supersede certain machinery of the common law,
viz., the doctrine of marshalling assets in equity for the payment
of debts. Titterington v. Hooker, 58 Mo. 593, 597, 598.
'The probate court has been given jurisdiction of the special-
ized function of supervising the administration of estates. We have
often held that in determining matters within its jurisdiction a pro-
bate court may apply equitable principles. In re Jamison's Estate,
Mo. Sup., 202 S.W. 2d 879, 883. And in probate proceedings one
may avail himself of an equitable defense so long as it is asserted
purely defensively and does not involve the granting of affirmative
equitable relief. Wilcox v. Powers, 6 Mo. 145; Evans v. York, Mo.
App., 216 S.W. 2d 124, 127. We perceive no reason why, if the
probate court in a proceeding under Sec. 465.400 may apply the de-
fense of equitable estoppel (recognized in this state as an available
equitable defense to an action at law), it may not also apply the
equitable defense of laches.
"We hold therefore that at a hearing on an administrator's ap-
plication for refund under the provisions of Sec. 465.400 the probate
court and the circuit court on appeal may consider and apply any
legal or equitable defense which may be asserted to defeat the right
of the administrator, including laches of the administration."
Muencl. v. Soutk Side National BankG involved a claim by a grand-niece
for value of her services rendered over a period of approximately seventeen
years to the deceased, based on the failure of the deceased to perform his
promise to compensate her for her services by leaving his property to her.
It was held that the relationship of grand-niece was not such a family
relationship as would give rise to a presumption that the services were in-
tended to be gratuitous.
Bemington v. McClintock" was a suit for specific performance between
plaintiff's mother and stepfather to dispose of their property by a joint or
mutual will whereby the property was to be devised to plaintiff upon the
death of the survivor thereof. The court holds that on the evidence plaintiff
5. 251 S.W. 2d 1 (Mo. 1952).
6. 253 S.W. 2d 132 (Mo. 1952).
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was entitled to recover and that the evidence met the high standard of proof
required in such cases.
In In re Franz' Estate7 the court reaffirms its familiar rule that a de-
mand filed in a probate court is not to be judged by the strict rules of
pleading applicable to a petition in the circuit court.8 The court distinguished
the earlier case of Howard's Estate v. Howe9 (wherein a contingent claim
was held not to be provable in the probate court), saying:
"In the case of Howard's Estate v. Howe, supra, 344 Mo. 1245,
131 S.W. 2d 517, 519, it is said: 'A contingent claim is one where
the liability depends upon some future event, which may or may
not happen, and therefore makes it now wholly uncertain whether
there will ever be a liability. The contingency does not relate to
the amount which may be recovered, but to the uncertainty wheth-
er any amount will ever be recovered. A claim not absolute or cer-
tain is not enforcible in the probate court against an estate.' The
definition does not apply here, where a claim for absolute liability
is stated, and where there is only a statement that petitioners have
another remedy from which collection may or may not be made. In
the Howard case the demand was expressly based upon an interlo-
cutory decree of another court which was not final and might never
become so. 131 S.W. 2d 517, 519. It was uncertain whether liability
would ever be absolute or ever be established. It was held, 'There
being no absolute liability now existing on the part of the company,
it follows that there can be none on the part of the committee or of
the estate.' 131 S.W. 2d 517, 519. This and the other cases re-
lied on have no application under the facts here.
"The demand stated a valid claim already accrued against the
estate of the deceased. It purported to be a matured claim, due
and payable, on which liability was absolute. The claim covered
services rendered between March 5, 1924 and April 14, 1930. It
was verified by affidavit on May 1, 1931, the date it was 'exhibited
and presented' to the executor of the estate. There was nothing
conditional or contingent about the estate's liability for the entire
claim, only the extent of offsets and credits to which the estate
might be entitled by reason of sums which might be ordered paid
to claimants from another source was contingent and uncertain.
The recital that claimants were pursuing on additional remedy
against other property and persons did not make the claim contin-
gent.: While claimants were entitled to only one satisfaction they
could pursue as many consistent remedies and as many obligors as
7. 245 S.W. 2d 1, 7 (Mo. 1952).
8. In re Thomosson's Estate, 346 Mo. 911, 144 S.W. 2d 79 (1940).
9. 344 Mo. 1245, 131 S.W. 2d 517 (1939). 79
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were available to them. Mann v. Bank of Greenfield, 323 Mo.
1000, 20 S.W. 2d 502, 508; Kansas City v. Forsee, 168 Mo. App.
213, 153 S.W. 572."
Tkompson v. St. Louis Union Trust Company0 was a suit for specific
performance of an antenuptial oral contract between plaintiff and her de-
ceased husband wherein he agreed to leave all of his property to her if she
would marry him and give up her employment of twentyseven years,
thereby losing pension rights to which she would be entitled if she worked
for three more years. It was held that the making of the promise was
proved in accordance with the high standard of proof required in such cases
and that marriage was a sufficient consideration for such an agreement.
Valentine v. St. Louis Union Trust Company"' was a replevin action
brought to recover property taken possession of by co-executors who had
found the same in the safe-deposit box of the deceased. As to certain Gov-
ernment Series G Bonds, the court follows the Treasury Regulations with
respect to co-ownership creating a joint tenancy with right of survivorship.
As to certain of the shares of stock which were in the name of the claimant,
the court rules, in accordance with long established authority, that the
certificates of stock were muniments of title and sufficient evidence of the
ownership thereof. As to the currency and bearer bonds, it was ruled that
the plaintiff had made a sufficient case by proof of declarations of the de-
ceased and the fact that they were contained in sealed envelopes in the
safe-deposit box marked "property of Gertrude Valentine."
II. CONSTRUCTION OF WILLS AND TRUSTS
As is, of course, usual, each case on contruction of a will or trust de-
pends upon the facts in the particular instance and, in general, the language
used in a particular case is not of the greatest significance1 2 There were,
however, two cases involving situations which arise with considerable fre-
quency. The first of these is the case of First National Bank of Kansas City
v. University of Kansas City,13 which deals with the problem arising where
a will has been supplemented by a subsequently executed codicil. With
reference to the construction of such a codicil, the court rules that for all
practical purposes it is to be construed merely as though it were a subsequent
10. 253 S.W. 2d 116 (Mo. 1952).
11. 250 S.W. 2d 167 (Mo. 1952).
12. See for example Taylor v. Hughes, 251 S.W. 2d 94 (Mo. 1952).
13. 245 S.W. 2d 124 (Mo. 1952). 80
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clause of the will; that it is not a new will; and that it does not change the
meaning of clear, plain and unequivocal.
In Gent v. Thomas,1- the supreme court reiterated its earlier ruling's
that where property is left to one person for life, with a provision that "at
her death whatever shall remain thereof" shall pass to another person, then
the life tenant does not have an absolute power of disposition but, on the
contrary, may only encroach upon and consume the corpus for her personal
care and support, if such encroachment becomes necessary for such purpose.
The case of Mickelberry Products Co. v. Haeussermamnz6 illustrates the
difficulties which may arise where insurance trusts have been set up to
finance the purchase of stock in a closely held corporation and the corpora-
tion's stock is then sold to a third party, without the negotiations clearly
determining the relative rights of the old and new stockholders.
III. WILL CONTESTS
Davis v. Davislr involved a case where testatrix's sole surviving heir-at-
law was granted leave to become a party to a will contest suit and to attack
therein by cross-petition the will being contested and also a prior will. The
heir died while the suit was pending. The supreme court held that the right
to contest the will was personal and died with her. Admittedly, this had
been the construction of the prior statute.1 s With reference to the present
statute the court said:
"But appellant's counsel also say the abatement statute, Sec-
tion 507.100, subd. 1 (1), R. S. Mo. 1949, V.A.M.S.; Laws Mo.
1943, p. 364, sec. 22(a) (1), in force when Henry Davis was ap-
pointed administrator of Mrs. Young's estate, is different from sec.
1042, R. S. 1939, Mo. R.S.A., in force when the Braeuel and Camp-
bell cases were decided. The former now reads (emphasis appell-
ant's): 'If a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished,
the court shall on motion order substitution of the proper parties.
* * *' The latter previously provided: 'No action shall abate by
the death, marriage or other disability of party, if the cause of
action survives or continue. [Emphasis the court's.]
"Appellant's counsel assert: 'The language of the two statutes
is clearly distinguishable. The old statute referred specifically to
14. 252 S.W. 2d 345 (Mo. 1952).
15. Palmisciano v. Staltari, 175 S.W. 2d 793 (Mo. 1943).
16. 247 S.W. 2d 731 (Mo. 1952).
17. 252 S.W. 2d 521, 523 (Mo. 19$2).
18. Braeuel v. Reutter, 270 Mo. 603, 193, S.W. 283 (1917); Campbell v.
St. Louis Union Trust Co., 346 Mo. 200, 139 S.W. 2d 935 (1940). 81
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the survival of the "cause of action," whereas the new statute states
that if "the claim is not extinguished" the Court shall order a sub-
stitution of the proper parties.' On that point appellant cites
Wormington v. City of Monett, 356 Mo. 875, 880, 204 S.W. 2d 264,
266 (1). But there was no such question in the Wormington case,
and the cause of action there did.survive. We san see no substan-
tial difference between the two statutes. The substitution of the
word 'claim' in the new for the words 'cause of action' in the old
makes no difference, at least under the facts here. The present
statute was discussed in the monograph written by Judges Hyde
and Douglas of this court and published in 2 Carr, Missouri Civil
Procedure, p. 539. It pointed out that there was no practical differ-
ence in the word 'claim' and the 'controversial' words 'cause of
action' appearing in the former statute, and that the latter express-
ionwas 'shunned throughout' the new code."
Wrigkt v. Stevens'9 was a will contest on the grounds of mental inca-
pacity and undue influence. The court reiterated the familiar rule that a
lay witness is not competent to testify that a person is of unsound mind
without first reciting the facts upon which such an opinion is based. The
court held here that it was not enough to show that the testator could not
carry on a coherent conversation "very well," was drowsy, nervous, shaky
and sick, and that "he would be talking about one thing and then he would
go off onto another thing." It was likewise held not to be sufficient evidence
of undue influence that the testator's brother, at the testator's request,
caused a certain lawyer to come to see the testator (without the brother),
the lawyer drew the will and subsequent to the testator's death the lawyer
was paid by the brother who was executor of the will, it not appearing
whether payment was out of the brother's funds or the estate.
In Snell v. Seek20 a will contest was brought on the ground that the
defendant, who had been the second husband of testatrix, had unduly in-
fluenced the making of the will by testatrix, who was contestant's foster
mother by her first marriage. The court held that it was not sufficient to
show that he handled matters of business for her concerning a joint bank
account and farm. The court then continued:
"But even if we assume the existence of a 'fiduciary relation-
ship,' were there other facts and circumstances in evidence from
which it could be reasonably inferred that the will in question was
in fact the result of undue influence on the part of defendant Seek?
19. 246 S.W. 2d 817 (Mo. 1952).
20. 250 S.W. 2d 336, 344 (Mo. 1952).
[Vol. 18
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We again consider the physical and mental condition of testatrix,
the fact of the husband-wife relationship, and all circumstances
shown in evidence from which any fair inference of undue influence
may be made. Seek took handwritten notes to an attorney, ar-
ranged for the presence of witnesses, and was present himself at the
time his wife executed the will. But the evidence shows that Mrs.
Seek was unable to journey to the lawyer's office; that she request-
ed her husband to take these notes to the lawyer and ask that the
will be drawn. Contestants adduced no evidence that the notes
were in the handwriting of defendant Seek. The only evidence in
the record is the testimony of defendant Seek that they were in the
writing of testatrix. There was evidence that Mrs. Seek, up to the
time of her death, wrote frequent letters to her children; that she
had a will prior to the one in question, and it is a fair inference that
she was familiar with and had available a copy of the will of her
former husband, John Summers. In view of this evidence, it would
be unreasonable to infer that the notes were in the handwriting of
Seek.
"As heretofore noted, the evidence does not indicate that test-
atrix was in such condition as to be especially susceptible to in-
fluence. True, testatrix had been ill. No medical evidence was of-
fered by contestants as to the nature of the illness or of any effect
its particular nature might have upon her mental faculties. Propo-
nent's evidence does not aid contestants but, to the contrary, indi-
cated physical disabilities unconnected with mental conditions. No
physical disability was shown from which a natural inference would
arise that testatrix was so weakened as to be totally reliant upon
others. Testatrix was elderly, comparatively old, but there was no
substantial evidence to indicate that she was not capable of dis-
posing of her property in accord with her own desires based upon
the exercise by her of an independent judgment and free agency.
Larkin v. Larkin, supra, 119 S.W. 2d 357 (5-7), 358 (13); Hahn
v. Brueseke, supra, 155 S.W. 2d 106 (7)."
Wipfler v. Basler21 was a will contest based on the contention that the
testator was of unsound mind. The will was upheld in the court below and
this was affirmed on appeal. A number* of questions were determined with
reference to evidentiary matters, but, aside from these, the case follows the
general trend of will contest cases based on alleged mental incapacity.
Brownfield v. Brownfi0ld22 was a will contest suit in which the seriously
litigated issue was whether or not the will offered for probate had been re-
21. 250 S.W. 2d 982 (Mo. 1952).
22. 249 S.W. 2d 389 (Mo. 1952). 83
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yoked by a subsequent will. There was no proof that the alleged subsequent
will had been signed by two witnesses. It was held that such a purported
instrument could not act as an instrument of revocation.
IV. CONSTRUCTIVE AND RESULTING TRUSTS
During the year 1952 the court decided a number of cases involving
constructive and resulting trusts, largely involving cases wherein there was
a family or other fiduciary relationship. The cases necessarily depend upon
their particular facts but are of general interest in that they illustrate the
tendency of the Supreme Court of Missouri to use the doctrine of construc-
tive and resulting trusts as a means of striking down conduct which in-
volves an element of breach of confidence or, in the alternative, an element
of obvious unjust enrichment.
Basma" v. Frank23 was a suit to set aside deeds to real property which
plaintiff had allegedly conveyed to defendant without consideration and
which defendant had in turn conveyed to his co-defendant who was not a
purchaser for value. The court held that there was a constructive trust,
saying:
"Certainly there was a confidential relation here between
Frank and plaintiff. Frank not only provided a home for plaintiff
apparently making him feel that he would be treated and cared
for like a member of the family, but also took charge of all of his
money, giving him only small amounts therefrom from time to time
for spending money. There was never any accounting for the
money and apparently plaintiff had such confidence in Frank that
he never asked for one while he was living there. Plaintiff went
from the hospital to Frank's home after a serious operation and was
in the hospital again on three separate occasions (two of them for
more than a month) during the next year before the deed was
made. Obviously, plaintiff was not able to look after his rental
property himself. Plaintiff trusted Frank and executed the deed to
him (just as he had turned over his money to him) prepared by
Frank's own lawyer without seeking any independent advice from
anyone. This left plaintiff completely dependent upon Frank for
the custody, control and management of everything he owned.
Frank had plaintiff's money in his own bank accounts and plain-
tiff's real estate in his own name on the deed records. Defendants
contend that the mere opportunity to unduly influence, unsupport-
ed by other evidence showing its actual existence, does not raise a
presumption of undue influence even though a confidential relation-
23. 250 S.W. 2d 989, 993 (Mo. 1952).
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ship is shown, citing Lastofka v. Lastofka, 339 Mo. 770, 99 S.W. 2d
46 and Hahn v. Brueseke, 348 Mo. 708, 155 S.W. 2d 98. However,
those were cases in which the transaction sought to beset aside was
intended to be a gift. There is no such claim here. The issue here
is not undue influence but whether there was a valid sale to defend-
ants, or whether there was a transfer intended for the transfer-
or's own benefit, induced by fraud, misrepresentation or because of
a confidential relationship, requiring the finding of a constructive
trust."
In Schroer v. Schroer,24 the court said:
"The dissolution of a partnership may be granted by a court
of equity in favor of an innocent partner who has been excluded
by his copartner from participation in the conduct of the business,
or where such copartner has refused an accounting, repeatedly
breached the partnership agreement, appropriated partnership
property to his own use, but guilty of other fraud in the partner-
ship affairs, or committed other gross misconduct. Schneider v.
Schneider, 347 Mo. 102. 146 S.W. 2d 584: Beller v. Murphy, 139
Mo. App. 663, 123 S.W. 1029; Annotation, 118 A.L.R. 1422; 40 Am.
Jur., Partnership, §§ 245, 246, pp. 300, 301. (See section 358.320
R. S. Mo. 1949, V.A.M.S., for the stated grounds for dissolution by
decree of court under the presently effective 'Uniform Partnership
Law,' enacted by the 65th General Assembly, L. 1949, §§ 1-44, pp.
506-521.) The relationship inter sese of partners is a fiduciary one.
Where certain of the partners wrongfully exclude another from its
business and take unto themselves the assets of the partnership
they become, as to the excluded partner, trustees ex maleficio,
Schneider v. Schneider, supra; Filburn v. Ivers, 92 Mo. 388, 4 S.W.
674 and are to be held accountable to the excluded partner for his
share of the subsequently earned profits. Schneider v. Schneider,
supra."
In Cross v. Cross25 the evidence showed that the deceased trustee had
wrongfully commingled a trust fund with his individual funds and with
such commingled funds had purchased property in the name of himself and
his wife as tenants by the entirety. It was shown in the particular case that
the wife knew during her husband's lifetime of the fact that he had com-
hningled the trust fund with his own. The court held that she took the
property subject to an equitable lien on it for the amount of the trust fund
and that she was personally liable for such trust fund so commingled.
24. 248 S.W. 2d 617, 619 (Mo. 1952).
25. 362 Mo. 1098, 246 S.W. 2d 801 (1952). 85
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Darrow v. Darrow26 involved litigation between a former husband and
wife with reference to ownership of property acquired by them as tenants
by the entirety prior to the divorce, which property had been acquired
largely out of proceeds of the settlement of a law suit brought by the hus-
band and wife for injuries to the wife and damages to the husband arising
therefrom. The wife claimed a resulting trust in the money. The court held
that the evidence was not sufficient to show such a resulting trust, saying:
"We understand defendant does not question the contentions
made by plaintiff: that moneys received by the wife for any viola-
tion of her personal rights are her separate property, R. S. 1949,
sec. 451.250, V.A.M.S.; 41 C.J.S., Husband and Wife, p. 744, sec.
262; that the record does not establish a written assent contem-
plated by sec. 451.250 of plaintiff to reduce plaintiff's separate
property to his possession, Herzog v. Ross, 358 Mo. 177, 213 S.W.
2d 921, loc. cit. 929, 930; Messenbaugh v. Goll, 198 Mo. App. 698,
202 S.W. 265(4); that presumptions arising from deposits in joint
bank accounts with the right of survivorship may be rebutted,
Clevidence-v. Mercantile Home Bk. & Trust Co., 355 Mo. 904, 199
S.W. 2d 1, 6(5); Thieman v. Thieman, Mo. Sup., 218 S.W. 2d
580, 583(4, 5); and that a resulting trust arises in favor of the
wife where the husband has reduced her separate property to his
possession without her written assent, Sanders v. Sanders, 357 Mo.
881, 211 S.W. 2d 468, 470 (1, 3) and cases cited; Moss v. Ardrey,
260 Mo. 595, 611, 169 S.W. 6, 10; Thieman v. Thieman, supra.
"The record indicates that plaintiff is an intelligent woman.
Her testimony shows that she and defendant established a joint
bank account, with right of survivorship, in 1944; that they took
title to several pieces of real estate and their automobiles as estates
by the entirety; that she participated in the negotiations leading
up to the purchase of the property involved and executed the notes
and deeds of trust with defendant to secure the unpaid purchase
price and did not question the deed conveying the property as an
estate by the entirety. Plaintiff testified she was not able to do
typing after her injury. Quite a number of deposits were made in
their Munsey Trust Company joint account while plaintiff was hos-
pitalized, some being for several hundred dollars and several in
excess of $1,000, and payments were made therefrom for expenses
incurred on account of plaintiff's injuries prior to the settlement of
the litigation. The joint bank account refutes plaintiff's contention
(whether otherwise legally sound or not) that only her separate
funds were used in the purchase of the property involved. For in-
stance: On the date of the contract of purchase, May 27, 1948,
26. 245 S.W. 2d 834, 837 (Mo. 1952).
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the balance in their joint account exceeded $24,000. The $11,500
unpaid purchase money was borrowed and loaned on the credit of
plaintiff and defendant. Plaintiff was a femme sole with power 'to
carry on and transact business on her own account, to contract and
be contracted with' et cetera with respect to her separate property
and to do with it as she pleased. R. S. 1949, sec. 451.290, V.A.M.S.
The rights of plaintiff and defendant in their joint bank deposits in
this state, with the right of survivorship, as evidenced by the signa-
ture card executed by plaintiff and defendant covering their joint
deposit in the Commerce Trust Company conforms to the statu-
tory recognized rights of such depositors. See R. S. 1949, sec.
362.470, V.A.M.S.; Murphy v. Wolfe, 329 Mo. 545, 45 S.W. 2d 1079.
Cash payments at the time of purchase were made out of said joint
deposits.
"This is not a case, as are the plaintiff's cases, of a husband
taking funds entrusted to him by his wife to purchase property in
her name and his taking title in his name or by the entirety, of a
case involving merely the blank endorsement by the wife of a check
or note due her and delivery of the instrument to the husband as
was the situation in Messenbauch v. Goll, 198 Mo. App. 698
202 S.W. 265 S.W. 265 (4), and cases there cited."
In Lehr v. MoI27 proceedings were brought to set aside a deed of trust
in the amount of $9000. Admittedly no consideration had been given for
the deed of trust but it was urged that a resulting trust for the benefit of
the husband was created when he took title in the name of himself and his
wife. The court denied this saying:
"We agree with appellants that the law in this state is that
where a husband purchases real estate with his own funds and the
grantees in the deed are the husband and wife, then they become
tenants by the entireties, and it will be presumed that the husband
intended the conveyance as a provision for his wife and a resulting
trust will not arise. However, the presumption that the purchase
was an intended settlement upon his wife is rebuttable. Bender v.
Bender, 281 Mo. 473, 220 S.W. 929; State ex rel. Roll v. Ellison,
290 Mo. 28, 233 S.W. 1065; Thierry v. Thferry, 298 Mo. 25, 249
S.W. 946; Fulbright v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 329 Mo. 207, 44 S.W. 2d
115; Hiatt v. Hiatt, Mo. Sup., 168 S.W. 2d 1087.
"Since the presumption that -the purchase was an intended
settlement on his wife is rebuttable, it becomes necessary to inquire
under what circumstances the presumption may be rebutted.
"'A resulting trust must arise, if at all, at the instant the deed
is taken. Unless the transaction is such that the moment the title
27. 247 S.W. 2d 686, 688 (Mo. 1952). 87
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passes the trust results from the transaction itself, then no trust
results. It cannot be created by subsequent occurrences. 1 Perry
on Trusts, § 133; Barrett v. Foote, Mo. Sup., 187 S.W. (67) loc.
cit. 69; Stevenson v. Haynes, 220 Mo. (199) loc. cit. 206, 119 S.W.
346; Kelly v. Johnson, 28 Mo. loc. cit. 249; Richardson v. Cham-
pion, 143 Mo. (538) loc. cit. 544, 45 S.W. 280.' Bender v. Bender,
supra, 220 S.W. loc. cit. 930.
"The facts in the case at bar show that the deed had been de-
livered and the seller had been paid and, in fact, had left Oster-
kamp's office before the deceased even mentioned the mortgage;
therefore, the facts relied upon by appellants to create a resulting
trust had not taken place 'at the instant the deed was taken.' It
was subsequent events that appellants rely upon to create the re-
sulting trust. Moreover, under the terms of the trust agreement
signed by Moll and deceased, these notes were not to be delivered
until after Lehr's death, which did not happen until about three
years later.
"The facts in this case come within the rule announced in the
case of Fulbright v. Phoenix Insurance Co., supra, 44 S.W. 2d loc.
cit. 118, wherein we said: 'But in all the cases that have been call-
ed to our attention in which a resulting trust was declared in favor
of the husband who had furnished the purchase money it was shown
that he did not intend to vest any title or interest in the wife.
No case has been cited nor have we found any in which such trust
was held to arise where, as here, the husband furnished the purchase
money and purposely caused the deed to be made to his wife or to
himself and wife, intending thereby to convey an estate to her,
but seeking to limit that estate and the scope and effect of the deed,
contrary to its terms, by his mere intention that the deed should
not have the full effect the law affixes to it.'
"So at the time the deed from Mrs. Gross was delivered to
deceased there were no facts from which a resulting trust could be
established."
James v. James28 is another case involving an alleged resulting trust
arising out of transactions between husband and wife. The fact situation
under which the property was conveyed by the wife to the husband is
stated as follows:
"When plaintiff and defendant were married, defendant had
no regular job. Within a few months, defendant asked plaintiff 'to
sign the property over to him so he could sign bigger bonds. He
wanted to make some money, because he had no regular job. * * *
He said you can always get it back.' The purpose of deeding the
28. 248 S.W. 2d 623, 624 (Mo. 1952).
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property to defendant was 'To sign bonds * * * so he could sign
bonds.' She transferred the property to defendant on May 9, 1938."
The court rules that there was a resulting trust in favor of his wife.
"'A resulting trust, as distinguished from an express trust,
is one implied by law from the acts and conduct of the parties and
the facts and circumstances which at the time exist and attend the
transaction out of which it arises.' Little v. Mettee, 338 Mo. 1223,
93 S.W. 2d 1000, 1009(8, 9). The applicable law with reference to
resulting trusts is well reviewed in Jankowski v. Delfert, 356 Mo.
184, 201 S.W. 2d 331, 334, and need not be further reviewed here.
"In this case the facts and circumstances show no consideration
for the transfer of title from plaintiff to defendant and that no gift of
the property was intended at the time of the transfer to defendant.
A trust resulted in favor of plaintiff. Clark v. Clark, 322 Mo. 1219,
18 S.W. 2d 77, 81; Mays v. Jackson, supra; Jankowski v. Delfert,
supra."
V. CASES INVOLVING ArrORNEYS' FEES
In re Schields Estate 9 involved a situation wherein the Probate Court
of the City of St. Louis ruled that an attorney, who had admittedly acted as
attorney for the executor and had satisfactorily performed his duties as
such attorney, was not entitled to receive a reasonable fee for his services,
because paying him such a fee would violate the principle of undivided
loyalty to the client laid down in Rule 4.06 of the Canon of Ethics of the
Missouri Supreme Court, where the attorney had (1) at the widow's re-
quest prepared an application for a year's support, and (2) was named as
co-trustee of the residuary estate although he was not a co-executor of the
probate estate. The Missouri Supreme Court squarely upheld the conduct
of the attorney and ruled that he was not disqualified from acting as attor-
ney for the estate by such possible conflicting interest where there was no
evidence of any actual conflicting interest, saying:
"We have found no case dealing with the right of an attorney
who has been named as a testamentary trustee to act as an attor-
ney for the estate in the administration thereof. But it would seem
clear, by analogy, that if an executor may lawfully act in the dual
capacity as a testamentary trustee, and all the authorities we have
found hold he may, then it follows that an attorney for an executor,
whose duties are but to advise the executor as to his legal rights
and whose services are honestly and efficiently performed, may also
so act to the same extent.
29. 250 S.W. 2d 151, 158 (Mo. 1952). 89
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"The law is well settled that the office of executor and testa-
mentary trustee are separate and do not merge though they may be
conferred upon and exercised by the same person. In re Shelton's Es-
tate, 338 Mo. 1000, 93 S.W. 2d 684; Williams v. Hund, 302 Mo.
451, 258 S.W. 703; 21 Am. Jr. § 217, p. 493. 'Where it becomes im-
portant to ascertain whether a person occupying the dual status of
executor and trustee was acting in the one or the other capacity,
it is ordinarily held that an executor does not change his status to
that of a trustee until there has been a legal ascertainment and sep-
aration of the trust fund from the general funds of the estate, or
until the administration has been completed, or distribution made.'
State ex rel. Richards v. Fidelity and Casualty Company of New
York, Mo. App., 82 S.W. 2d 123, 127. See also: West v. Bailey,
196 Mo. 517, 94 S.W. 273; In re Holmes' Estate, 328 Mo. 143, 40
S.W. 2d 616, 618; Selleck v. Hawley, 331 Mo. 1038, 56 S.W. 2d
387, 397.
"At the time Baron performed the services herein complained
of, there had been no ascertainment or separation of the trust fund
from the general fund. There had been no violation or Rule 4.06.
"The cases cited by appellant, In re Buder, 358 Mo. 796, 217
S.W. 2d 563, 574; In re Parker's Estate, 200 Cal. 132, 251 P. 907,
49 A.L.R. 1025; and Moffett Bros. Partnership Estate v. Moffett,
345 Mo. 741, 137 S.W. 2d 507, are readily distinguishable on
the facts.
"The fact that in accepting employment as attorney for the
estate and in the performance of such services a conflict might have
arisen, or might yet arise on final settlement, with Baron's duties
as trustee is beside the point. Attorneys would be circumscribed be-
yond the bounds of reason if they could not represent clients whose
interest might at some future time conflict with the interests of
other clients. It is only when the situation arises that it becomes
the duty of the attorney either to withdraw from the service of any
or both clients or to make full disclosure to both clients and obtain
their joint consent to his continuing to serve one or both of them,
as the circumstances may require."
Tracy v. Marti. ° was a proceeding in which the guardian ad litem for
a minor defendant in a suit brought to set aside a trust indenture as having
been executed due to undue influence and while the grantor was incompe-
tent, sought the allowance of a fee for his services in unsuccessfully defend-
ing the validity of the trust indenture. The trust indenture itself had been
held invalid., Evidence in this proceeding showed that the guardian ad litem
30. 249 S.W. 2d 321 (Mo. 19.2).
31. See Tracy v. Sluggett, 360 Mo. 1120, 232 S.W. 2d 926 (1950).
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had no other source of obtaining his fee since the minor was insolvent. It
was held that under these circumstances a fee could be allowed to the
guardian ad litem and taxed as cost against the prevailing parties.
In re Ballard's Estate32 was a proceeding in which a lawyer named as
executor in a will sought reimbursement for expenses and attorney's fees
incurred by him in attempting to have probated an executed carbon copy of
the will, the original not being available. The attempt at having it pro-
bated was unsuccessful.83 The court holds that the real parties in interest in
a will contest are the devisees claiming under the will and the heirs. The
court follows In re Soulard's Estate34 in ruling that where a will has been
rejected in the probate court the executor is not required to contest this
rejection and hence is not entitled to an allowance of such attorney's fees.
32. 247 S.W. 2d 683 (Mo. 1952).
33. Menzi v. White, 360 Mo. 319, 228 S.W. 2d 700 (1950).
34. 141 Mo. 642, 43 S.W. 617 (1897). 91
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THE NEW GENERAL CODE FOR CIVIL PROCEDURE AND
SUPREME COURT RULES INTEPRETED
CARL C. WHEATON*
OBJECrIVES OF CODE
The primary purpose of the code is to do justice
PARTIES
a. Real Party in Interest
The party prosecuting an action must be the real party in interest, and
this requirement is as fully applicable to a declaratory judgment action as
to any other.2
b. Joinder of Tort-feasors
A plaintiff need not sue all joint tort-feasors, but he may sue as many
of them as he may think proper, for some may be sued without affecting
the others.3
c. Ordering Parties Joined or Dropped
Section 507.030, subdivision 2, of the Missouri Revised Statutes, 1949,
which provides that when a complete determination of the controversy can-
not be had without the presence of other parties, the court may order them
to be brought in by an amendment of the petition, or by a supplemental
petition and a new summons, and Section 507.050, subdivision 1, of those
statutes, which states that parties may be dropped or added by order of the
court on motion of any party or of its own initiative at any stage of the
action and on such terms as are just, should be construed so that each will
be given some meaning. The only way that this may be accomplished is to
hold that Section 507.030, subdivision 2, was intended to apply to the addi-
tion of necessary or indispensable parties and that Section 507.050, subdivi-
sion 1, provided the procedure for adding proper parties.4
Though a motion to add a party under Section 507.050 should properly
be in writing, where the trial court upon oral motion permitted the addition
*Professor of Law, University of Missouri. A.B. 1911, Leland Stanford Junior
University, LL.B. 1915, Harvard University. Draftsman for the Missouri Supreme
Court Committee on Civil Practice and Procedure.
1. Leslie v. Mathewson, 257 S.W. 2d 394 (Mo. App. 1953).
2. Contracting Plumbers Association of St. Louis v. City of St. Louis, 249
S.W. 2d 502 (Mo. App. 19,2).
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of a party, there was not such an irregularity as would require a subsequent
default judgment against the defendants to be set aside.5
d. Permissive Joinder
A single contract whereby theatre operators agreed to pay the plaintiff
stated, weekly sums, which were different for each operator, for his delivery
of films to them, was held not to create against the operators a liability
permiting their joinder as defendants by him, since their liability was said
not to have arisen out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series thereof
and it was further held that no common question of fact or law common
to all of the operators was involved. The action was for reformation of the
contract to provide an option on the plaintiff's part to extend the contract
for a second year and for damages. 6
The writer doubts the correctness of this decision. Was there not a
single contract transaction? Were there not the common facts of the exis-
tence of the contract and of the alleged improper drafting thereof?
e. Interpleader
An action of interpleader really involves two actions or litigations, one
between the plaintiff and all the defendants as to whether they shall be re-
quired to interplead for the fund, and the other an action between the de-
fendants, if the plaintiff's petition to require them to interplead is sustained.
The objects of these two litigations are wholly separate and distinct, and
therefore require separate and distinct allegations and proofs.
In a true interpleader, if it appears by pleading and proof that a bill
of interpleader is properly filed, a decree should be made dismissing the
plaintiff with costs, upon the depositing by him of the fund or thing in
dispute into court, and ordering the defendants to interplead. When this
decree is obtained, the plaintiff is altogether out of the suit, leaving the inter-
pleading defendants alone to contest their conflicting claims. After the with-
drawal of the plaintiff from the case, the controversy is then solely and ex-
clusively carried on between the interpleaders claiming the fund.
For a true stakeholder, seeking only to be immediately relieved of lia-
bility, an attitude of perfect disinterestedness, excluding even an indirect in-
terest on the part of the plaintiff is indispensable to the maintenance of the
5. Ibid.
6. Tanner v. Gamer, 255 S.W. 2d 158 (Mo. App. 1953). 93
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bill, and his position must be one of continuous impartiality, except for his
wish that the thing in his possession shall be awarded to the right party.7
PLEADINGS
a. Meaning of Claim for Relief
There is no practical difference between the new "claim for relief" as
used in the new Code of Civil Procedure and the old "cause of action.""
"Cause of action," when considered in a procedural sense with reference
to pleadings, has been defined as the facts giving rise to the action; the fact
or combination of facts which give rise to or entitle a party to sustain an
action; the existence of those facts which give a right to judicial interfer-
ence or relief in his behalf; the entire set or state of facts that give rise to
an enforceable claim. A cause of action consists of those facts, as between
at least two parties, entitling one of them to a judicial remedy of some sort
against the other for the redress of a wrong. A cause of action is the cavie
for action, i.e., the underlying facts combined with the law giving the party
a right to a remedy of one form or another based thereon.
A cause of action to contest a will consists of all of those facts availa-
ble to a contestant which, if established, legally entitle the contestant to a
judgment setting aside the will. The ultimate issue in all will contests is
fixed by statute, i.e., whether the paper writing produced be the will of the
testator or not. The gist of the cause of action is the invalidity of the willY
b. Stating Claim for Relief
1. Liberal Construction
In determining whether or not a petition states a claim or cause of
action, the averments of the petition are to be given a liberal construction,
according the averments their reasonable and fair intendment which should
be indulged from the facts stated. So considered, a petition should be held
sufficient if its averments invoke substantive principles of law which entitle
the plaintiff to relief. A petition is not to be held insufficient merely because
of a lack of definiteness or certainty in allegation or because of informality
in the statement of an essential fact.1°
7. Heinrich v. South Side National Bank in St. Louis, 250 SAV. 2d 345 (Mo.
1952).
8. &Spra note 3.
9. Miller v. Munzer, 251 S.W. 2d 966 (Mo. App. 1952).
10. Downey v. United Waterproofing, Inc., 253 S.W. 2d 976 (Mo. 1953),
Zuber v. Clarkson Construction Company, 251 S.W. 2d 52 (Mo. 1952). 94
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2. What Considered
In determining the cause of action intended to be pleaded under the
new code, the facts pleaded and relief sought may be considered.1'
3. Affirmative Defenses not to be Pleaded.
Contributory negligence is purely a defensive matter which the plain-
tiff is not required to negative in his petition.1
2
c. Singleness of Cause
A cause of action to contest a will is single no matter how many
grounds of contest there may be. The various grounds constitute, in the ag-
gregate, but one cause of action; they are incidents of the cause of action but
are not causes of action in and of themselves. The grounds are merely the
evidentiary supports of, or modes of proving, the cause of action, and, al-
though they may vary (fraud, forgery, undue influence, improper execu-
tion, lack of testamentary capacity, revocation, etc.), the cause of action
remains one and the same. Each such separate ground must be alleged,
if evidence thereof is to be admitted at the trial, so that there may be many
separate issues within the one all-embracing issue. While the evidence
necessary to support the various grounds alleged may be quite different,
these separate issues are but facets of the one cause of action, and do not
constitute separate and independent causes of action.13
d. Joinder of Causes
With respect to the joinder of claims, or causes of action, Section 509.060
is permissive, and a plaintiff is not required to join his several causes of
action, even though they arise out of the same transaction. 4
One may not set forth inconsistent causes of action in a single count.
Therefore, in a single count, he cannot seek relief on the grounds that a
contract is fraudulent and void and that it is valid.'5
e. Affirmative Defenses
The defenses of contributory negligence and of the statute of frauds 7
are affirmative defenses and should be pleaded affimatively.
11. Kemp v. Woods, 251 S.W. 2d 684 (Mo. 1952).
12. Carter v. Skelly Oil Co., 252 S.W. 2d 306 (Mo. 1952).
13. Miller v. Munzer, supra note 9.
14. Stoops v. Stoops, 256 S.W. 2d 799 (Mo. 19S3).
15. Kemp v. Woods, supra note 11.
16. Spencer v. Kansas City Public Service Co., 250 S.W. 2d 187 (Mo. App.
1952).
17. Kansas City Stock Yards Co. v. A. Reich & Sons, 250 S.W. 2d 692 (Mo.
1952). 95
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f Failure to Present Defenses
A judgment for the plaintiff is proper where the defendant's answer
admits every material averment in the petition and fails to set up any de-
fense which, if established, would defeat the plaintiff's claim.18
g. Counterclaims
1. Compulsory
Under the compulsory counterclaim statute, failure of a school teacher
to interpose a counterclaim for salary in a suit by the school district to
enjoin the school teacher from teaching or attempting to teach school for
the year in question precluded the teacher from thereafter maintaining an
action for salary for that year, for the two causes arose out of the same
transaction."
For the same reason, in an action of replevin by an owner who had
allegedly agreed to pay the defendant one half of the value of calves born
to the cows involved in said action in return for the defendants caring for
them, any claim of the defendant for breach of the contract referred to
above involved a compulsory counterclaim which the defendant would be




Supreme Court Rule 3.16, supplementing Section 509.069 of the Re-
vised Statutes, provides that a counterclaim may be filed even though it
does not arise out of the subject matter of the adverse party's claim. Conse-
quently, a defendant may properly file as counterclaims any matured claims
he has against plaintiffs at the time of the filing of the defendant's first
required pleading.21
h. Amendments to Pleadings
1. Liberality
Under both the spirit and the letter of our code, great liberality is to
be indulged in the amendment of pleadings at any stage of a proceeding.22
18. Leggett v. General Indemnity Exchange, 250 S.W. 2d 710 (Mo. 1952).
Likewise it was held in Ray v. Nethery, 2.55 S.W. 2d 817 (Mo. 1953) that a failure
to raise a claim of defect of parties by a proper pleading waived that defect, and,
in Leslie v. Mathewson, 257 S.W. 2d 394 (Mo. App. 1953), there was a similar hold-
ing as to the defense of the plaintiff's lack of legal capacity to sue.
19. Brinkmann v. Common School District No. 27 of Gasconade County, 255
S.W. 2d 770 (Mo. 1953).
20. Shepherd v. Wommack, 257 S.W. 2d 172 (Mo. App. 1953).
21. Richardson v. Kuhlmyer, 250 S.W. 2d 355 (Mo. 1952).
22. Hughes v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 251 S.W. 2d 360 (Mo. App. 1952). 96
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2. Issues not Pleaded
A petition, although alleging fraud in the procurement of both a note
and a deed of trust, asked only for cancellation of the deed of trust. This
was clearly an oversight. The record showed that both parties tried the
case on the theory that cancellation of both was sought. The decree ex-
pressly cancelled both, and the appellant did not question it on that ground.
Hence, the petition was considered as amended to include a prayer for can-
cellation of the note, since the issue of the validity of the note was tried
with the consent of the parties.23
3. Departure
It has been held that, under the new code, the rule of departure has
been entirely abolished and that there is now no limitation on the scope
of an amendment to a petition.24
4. Statutes of Limitation
In a case in which the respondent claimed that it was fatal to the
plaintiff's case that he waited until after the expiration of the one-year
limitation period before amending his petition to allege his interest in the
probate of a will, and to change the basis of his objection to the will from
undue influence to revocation of the will, the court disagreed with him. It
held that the failure of the original petition to allege the plaintiff's interest
did not render it a nullity. It was merely an imperfect and incomplete state-
ment of a cause of action. The amendment after the expiration of the
statutory period was proper, in so far as its timeliness was concerned.
It stated further that, considering the peculiar nature of a will contest,
the amended petition introduced no new cause of action.
The court reasoned that, though inevitably a new ground of contest calls
for different evidence, a new ground of contest is not a new cause of action,
for the reason that there is but one cause of action in a will contest, no mat-
ter how many grounds of impeachment exist.
. The court stated that the amendment adding a new ground for recovery
was merely an attempt to support the cause of action already alleged upon
a new ground. 25
23. Howell v. Reynolds, 249 S.W. 2d 381 (Mo. 1952).
24. O'Neal v. Mavrakos Candy Co., 255 S.W. 2d 138 (Mo. App. 1952).
25. Miller v. Munzer, 251 S.W. 2d 966 (Mo. App. 1952). 97
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'MOTIONS TO MAKE MORE DEFINITE
In a recent case involving damage by fire, the appellant complained that
the trial court erred in "sustaining defendant's motion to make plaintiff's
original and first amended petitions more definite and certain" as to the
allegations of negligence, thereby refusing to allow the plaintiff to proceed
under the theory of res ipsa loquitur.
The supreme court held that a motion to make a petition more definite
and certain is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, whose
ruling thereon will not be disturbed provided a sound legal discretion was
exercised. It further stated that the rule of res ipsa loquit'ur is infrequently
applied to cases involving fires, since the cause of a fire is generally un-
known and fires commonly occur where due care has been exercised as well
as where due care was wanting. Where a fire originates on a defendants'
premises, that alone is not evidence that it was started by the defendant,
nor that the fire was caused by any negligence on its part. Hence, the
supreme court decided that the trial court had exercised a sound legal dis-
cretion in this instance.26
MOTIONS FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
On June 21, 1951, the plaintiff filed his "First Amended Petition." On
July 2, 1951, the defendant filed a motion "To Strike Out All of Count III
of Plaintiff's Amended Petition." This motion was sustained on August 28,
1951. On September 4, 1951, the defendant filed his "First Amended Answer
to Plaintiff's First Amended Petition." The cause came on regularly for
trial on October 10, 1951, and the plaintiff, after the jury had been selected
for trial, orally moved for judgment on the pleadings, offering to make
proof of his damages, on the ground that the defendant was in default as
to said counts, the only counts remaining for trial. The appellate court held
that the trial court properly overruled the motion, since the plaintiff's
motion was not timely.27
It has been decided that motions for judgment on pleadings admit only
facts well pleaded by opposing parties.28 This probably refers to relevant
facts.
The supreme court has held that where an answer, after admitting the
26. Kansas City Stock Yards Co. v. A. Reich & Sons, 250 S.W. 2d 692 (Mo.
1952).
27. Parks v. Thompson, 253 S.W. 2d 796 (Mo. 1952).
28. Leggett v. General Indemnity Exchange, supra note 18. 98
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factual allegations of a petition, sets up an affirmative defense to the plain-
tiff's claim, the plaintiff's motion for judgment on the pleadings cannot be
sustained if the answer's new matter constitutes a valid defense, and the
defendant's like motion should be sustained only if that defense is sufficient
in law.29 The suggestion is that, if the defendant's defense is valid in the
second instance, he will win on his motion, but what if the plaintiff's is
also valid?
PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS
Section 510.030 of the Revised Statutes does not authorize an order
for the production of any of the documents or things mentioned in said
section, unless they "constitute or contain evidence material" to some matter
involved in the action.80
It is equally true that good cause must be shown for the production
of relevant and material documents; and that privileged documents may
not be ordered to be produced.8'
The applicant for such an order has the burden of satisfying the trial
judge as to their relevancy and materaility, and of showing that they were
not privileged and that there was good cause for their production, since he
is the moving party.32
NOTICE
Where a stipulation of the parties as to the facts was filed, there was no
occasion for notice to any party of the filing of a new petition setting forth
transactions, occasions, or events which had happened since the date of
the pleading sought to be supplemented, where they were covered by the
stipulation.3
Interpreted literally, the phrase "new or additional claims for relief" as
used in Section 506.100 of the Revised Statutes, relating to the method of
serving papers and to the need for serving them on parties in default, would
cause that statute to be construed to mean that no pleadings subsequent
to the original petition need be served on parties in default for failure to
appear unless it contained a prayer for an additional amount of money or
29. Ibid.
30. State ex rel. Terminal R.R. Ass'n. of St. Louis v. Flynn, 257 S.W. 2d 69(Mo. 1953).
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid.
33. General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Vanausdall, 249 S.W. 2d 1003 (Mo.
App. 1952). 99
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some other new or additional relief.3 4 However, "claim for relief" is the
equivalent of the old "cause of action." It has been said that, in determin-
ing under this statute whether a new cause of action is alleged in an amended
petition, the rule is firmly established that, as long as the plaintiff continues
to seek recovery for the same injuries, a change in or addition to allega-
tions of negligence causing injuries does not brand the amendment as intro-
ducing or substituting a new cause of action. 5 Hence, the test as to whether
a new or additional claim is stated does not depend on a demand for more
relief or the lack of such a request, but on whether the plaintiff in his state-
ment seeks recovery for new injuries.
CONTINUANCE
It is the settled law that the granting of a continuance rests within
the sound discretion of the trial courts but it is not an absolute or arbitrary
discretion; it is one that is subject to review if the discretion has been un-
soundly exercised. 87
MOTION FoR DIsMISSAL
Jurisdiction to dismiss for failure to comply with an order of the court,
whether by inherent power or by authority conferred by Section 510.140 of
the Revised Statutes, presupposes an order lawfully made, one which was
within the judicial power of the court to enter.38
Section 510.140 of the Revised Statuntes authorizes a motion to dismiss
at the close of the plaintiff's evidence in nonjury cases. If such a motion is
filed in an equity case, a trial court has the right to weigh the evidence and
to decide the case against the plaintiff.39
In an action by a partnership against a bank to recover the amount of
checks which the bank had cashed, and which had been drawn on the
partnership's bank account by a former partner who was allegedly not au-
thorized to draw on the account, the court properly denied the bank's mo-
tion to dismiss, which bore the signatures of the former partner and of a
34. Miltenberger v. Center West Enterprises, supra note 3.
35. Ibid.
36. Van Fleet v. Van Fleet, 253 S.W. 2d 508 (Mo. App. 1952); Nelson v.
Dorste, 250 S.W. 2d 726 (Mo. App. 1952). For cases in which the court's rulings
on continuances were sustained, see Nelson v. Dorste (above in this note) and
Commercial National Bank of Kansas City, Kan. v. White, 254 S.W. 2d 605 (Mo.
1953).
37. Nelson v. Dorste, supra note 36.
38. Healer v. Kansas City Public Service Co., 251 S.W. 2d 66 (Mo. 1952).
39. Rigg v. Hart, 255 S.W. 2d 778 (Mo. 1953).
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third person, who was never shown to have been a member of the partner-
ship and which claimed that the suit was filed without their consent.40
I MOTIONS FOR DIRECTED VERDICTS
It is the settled rule that a motion for a directed verdict can be sus-
tained only when the facts in evidence and the legitimate inferences there-
from are so strongly against the verdict as to leave no room for reasonable
minds to differ.41
In viewing the propriety of directing a verdict for one of the parties, the
evidence of the adverse party must be taken as true, and considered in
light of the evidence most favorable to him.
4 2
A defendant waives an alleged error in overruling his motion for a
directed verdict at the close of the plaintiff's evidence by thereafter introduc-
ing evidence on the merits of the case without previously objecting to the
ruling.41
VERDICTS
A verdict which disposes of the issues under the law and the facts of
a case is proper, though it does not follow the form of the verdict instruc-
tion, when no objection is made to the failure to follow the instruction."
CASES TRIED WITHOUT A JURY
a. Opinion
In a recent case, the defendant complained that the trial court refused
to make findings on controverted issues of fact and contended that that fact
was a proper ground for reversal. Before final submission of the case the de-
fendant made a general request, "That the court prepare and file a brief
opinion containing a statement of the grounds for the court's decision and
the method of determining any damages that may be awarded plaintiff."
This was held to be a proper request which clearly followed the provisions
of Section 510.310 of the Revised Statutes. The court at the time of enter-
ing judgment filed an opinion which included its findings upon all principal
fact issues raised by the pleadings and supported by evidence. This opinion
40. George W. Brown Construction Co. v. People's Bank of Branson, 254
S.W. 2d 29 (Mo. App. 1953).
41. Barger v. Green, 255 S.W. 2d 127 (Mo. App. 1953); Davenport v. Arm-
stead, 255 S.W. 2d 132 (Mo. App. 1952).
42. Doelling v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 258 S.W. 2d 244 (Mo. App.
1953); Scott County Milling Co. v. Thompson, 255 S.W. 2d 121 (Mo. App. 1953).
43. Doelling v. St. Louis Public Service Co., supra note 42; Hieber v. Thomp-
son, 252 S.W. 2d 116 (Mo. App. 1952).
44. Commercial National Bank of Kansas City, Kan. v. White, sUpra note 36;
Villmer v. Household Plastics Co., 250 S.W. 2d 964 (Mo. 1952). 101
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was said fully to have complied with the aforesaid request of the defendant's
counsel with the mandate of the statutory provision. °The defendant, how-
ever, in addition to the aforementioned general request, filed a written
instrument asking that findings be made on eight specific questions of fact
and on ten additional declarations of fact. The court construed this as a
request for findings and declarations favorable to the defendant. The opinion
therefore recited that, since the court had found for the plaintiff, "The find-
ings of controverted fact tendered in writing by defendant are denied." This
formed the basis of the defendant's complaint.
It was decided that a court is not required specifically to answer every
interrogatory submitted by a litigant. The court may determine its relevancy
and whether the request involves a principal fact issue and may then prepare
the opinion in such form and language as may best express its views and
findings. It was said that the legislature clearly contemplated that findings
would not be made upon every fact issue, as it included in the statute a
provision that, "All fact issues upon which no specific findings are made
shall be deemed found in accordance with the result reached." Hence, it
was held that the opinion in question sufficiently complied with the request
of the defendant.'"
b. Appeal
1. Sufficiency of Evidence
According to Section 510.310, subdivision 2, of the Revised Statutes,
when a case is tried without a jury, the defendant may raise on appeal the
question of the sufficiency of the evidence to support a judgment for the
plaintiff even though he did not object on that ground at the trial .4
In cases tried before the court, the appellate court must review the
case both upon the law and the evidence. The judgment shall not be set
aside unless clearly erroneous and due regard shall be given to the oppor-
tunity of the trial court to judge of the credibility of the witnesses.4 T How-
ever, the appellate court should make independent findings of fact and
reach its own conclusions on the weight of the evidence.4
45. Dubinsky v. Lindburg Cadillac Co., 250 S.W. 2d 830 (Mo. 1952).
46. O'Neal v. Mavrakos Candy Co., supra note 24.
47. Shreve v. Zuvekas, 254 S.W. 2d 254 (Mo. App. 1953).
48. Davidson v. Fisher, 258 S.W. 2d 297 (Mo. App. 1953). For other cases
supporting the last two points generally, see Lowtrip v. Green, 252 S.W. 2d 524 (Mo.
1952); Basman v. Frank, 250 S.W. 2d 989 (Mo. 1952); Dubinsky v. Lindburg,
supra note 45; Shortridge v. Ghio, 255 S.W. 2d 838 (Mo. App. 1952); Faire v. Burke,
252 S.W. 2d 289 (Mo. 1952); Billings v. Independent Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 251
S.W. 2d 393 (Mo. App. 1952).
[Vol. 18
102
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 4 [1953], Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol18/iss4/1
1953] WORK OF MISSOURI SUPREME COURT FOR 1952 433
This law has, during the period covered by this article, been applied to
equity cases, 49 to actions at law,50 and to divorce"l and separate mainten-
ance52 proceedings.
But it has been held that the rule that the trial court is in a better
position to judge the credibility of a witness than the appellate court does
not apply where the evidence is taken by deposition. 3
NEw TRIALs
a. Time for Making Motions for
In an action, where the defendant, after a verdict had been returned
for the plaintiff, filed a petition for removal, which was granted by a federal
court, and then filed a motion for a new trial in the state circuit court, and
thereafter the plaintiff's motion to remand was sustained by the federal court,
the fact that the motion for a new trial was filed after the case had been
removed to the federal court did not invalidate the filing.5
b. Grounds for
The exclusion of proper evidence is ground for a new trial, especially
where the excluded evidence goes to the very root of the matter in contro-
versy. That there was other evidence of the same general character, or
even that the rejected evidence was cumulative may not render the error
harmless. "
49. Rigg v. Hart, supra note 39; State ex rel. Taylor, Attorney General v.
Anderson, 254 S.W. 2d 609 (Mo. 1953); Oliver L. Taetz, Inc. v. Groff, 253 S.W. 2d
824 (Mo. 1953); Schellhardt v. Schellhardt, 253 S.W. 2d 181 (Mo. 1952); Tweed v.
Timmons, 253 S.W. 2d 176 (Mo. 1952); Bennington v. McClintick, 253 S.W. 2d
132 (Mo. 1952); Howell v. Reynolds, 249 S.W. 381 (Mo. 1952); Jones v. Jones,
254 S.W. 2d 260 (Mo. App. 1953); Sellers v. Swehla, 253 S.W. 847 (Mo. App. 1952);
Hughes v. Hughes, 253 S.W. 2d 500 (Mo. App. 1952); Amitin v. Izard, 252 S.W. 2d
635 (Mo. App. 1952); Burnett v. Sladek, 251 S.W. 2d 397 (Mo. App. 1952).
50. Boyle v. Crimm, 253 S.W. 2d 149 (Mo. 1952); City of Kirksville v.
Young, 252 S.W. 2d 286 (Mo. 1952); Baker v. Kansas City Terminal Ry. Co. 250
S.W. 2d 999 (Mo. 1952); Roper v. Clanton, 258 S.W. 2d 283 (Mo. App. 1953);
Brixey v. Luna, 254 S.W. 2d 23 (Mo. App. 1953); Truck Leasing Corp. v. Esquire
Laundry & Dry Cleaning Co., 252 S.W. 2d 108 (Mo. App. 1952).
51. Fago v. Fago, 250 S.W. 2d 837 (Mo. 1952); Dunlap v. Dunlap, 255 S.W.
2d 441 (Mo. App. 1953); Pipkin v. Pipkin, 255 S.W. 2d 66 (Mo. App. 1953);
Davis v. Davis, 254 S.W. 2d 270 (Mo. App. 1953); Holmes v. Holmes, 251 S.W.
2d 390 (Mo. App. 1952); Jourdan v. Jourdan, 251 S.W. 2d 380 (Mo. App. 1952);
Hawkins v. Hawkins, 250 S.W. 2d 817 (Mo. App. 1952).
52. Kendrick v. Kendrick, 251 S.W. 2d 329 (Mo. App. 1952).
53. Schoen v. Lange, 256 S.W. 2d 277 (Mo. App. 1953).
54. Waldron v. Skelly Oil Co., 257 S.W. 2d 615 (Mo. 1953).
55. Dor v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 250 S.W. 2d 859 (Mo. App. 1952). 103
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One should notice, however, that a trial court is never justified in set-
ting aside a verdict except for error prejudicial to the losing party."'
c. Form of Motion
In a recent case the defendant's specific objection at the trial was, and
its complaint in the supreme court was, that a deposition was not admissi-
ble because the witness was "subject to the jurisdiction of the court," had
not been supoenaed and "was permitted to leave voluntarily." The only
assignment in the defendant's new trial motion which could possibly relate to
the admission of the deposition was this generality: "Because the court
erred in admitting, over the objections and exceptions of defendant, incom
petent, irrelevant and prejudicial evidence offered by plaintiff."
It was held that there is a material difference between an objection to
evidence as in competent and an objection as to the competency of a witness
to testify, and that the allegation in the motion for a new trial was not
sufficient to present for review an objection to the competency of the witness
to give the testimony.57
d. Discretion of Court
Trial courts have wide discretion in passing on motions for a new trial
where there is error in the record, " and may even grant a new trial irrespec-
tive of the grounds assigned in a motion for a new trial. 9
But, despite this wide latitude allowed the trial court in such matters,
it must not arbitrarily exercise its discretion, but must have some good and
compelling reason or reasons to sustain its action. A trial court is never
justified in setting aside a verdict except for error prejudicial to the losing
party.60
Moreover, the power of a trial court to grant a new trial is discretionary
only as to questions of fact and matters affecting the determination of issues
of fact. There is no discretion in the law of a case, nor can there be an
56. Phillips v. Vroornan, 251 S.W. 2d 626 (Mo. 1952).
57. Romandel v. Kansas City Public Service Co., 254 S.W. 2d 585 (Mo. 1953).
58. Cooper v. 804 Grand Building Corp., 257 S.W. 2d 649 (Mo. 1953); Rob-
bins v. Brown-Strauss Corp. 257 S.W. 2d 643 (Mo. 1953); Gray v. St. Louis-San
Francisco Ry., 254 S.W. 2d 577 (Mo. 1953); Heggeman v. St. Louis Public Service
Co., 255 S.W. 2d 99 (Mo. App. 1953); Harrison v. St. Louis Public Service Co.,
251 S.W. 2d 348 (Mo. App. 1952).
59. Cooper v. 804 Grand Building Corp., supra note 58; Robbins v. Brown-
Strauss Corp., supra note 58.
60. Heggeman v. St. Louis Public Service Co., supra note 58.
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exercise of sound discretion as to the law of a case.6 1 Thus, it was recently
decided that discretion could not be used in determining whether or not a
hospital record was admissible, since that was a question of law.62
e. Stating Reasons for Granting Motion
It is the established rule in this state that, though the order granting
a new trial cannot be sustained upon the ground specified by the trial court,
a respondent is entitled to have the other assignments of error in his motion
reviewed and the order granting a new trial affirmed if it can be upheld upon
such other grounds.63
It is further held that, where no discretionary ground was specified in
an order granting a new trial, the supreme court will not presume that a trial
court acted on discretionary grounds.64
OBJECTIONS To TRIAL ERRORS
a. Time for
It is fundamental in the concept of appellate practice that, save for
certain recognized exceptions, questions of error not raised and properly pre-
served in the trial court will not be considered on appeal. This is in a fair-
ness to both the lower court and to the opposing party so that each may
have the opportunity of promptly remedying the error, if it in fact amounts
to error and is of a character to be subject to correction. It is to this end
that our code and rules provide that, if a party is to be in a position to
complain of some action of the court, he must not only make known to the
court the action which he desires it to take, or his objection to the action
which it takes against him, but at the conclusion of the trial he must once
again call all such matters to the court's attention in his motion for a new
trial as a condition to his right of appellate review.
However, as an ultimate safeguard against a situation where some great
wrong might be rendered incurable because of a mere procedural omission,
provision is made that plain errors affecting substantial rights may be con-
sidered on appeal in the discretion of the court, though neither raised nor
preserved in the trial court, when the court deems that manifest injustice
or a miscarriage of justice has resulted therefrom.6 5
61. Cooper v. 804 Grand Building Corp., supra note 58; Gray v. St. Louis
San Francisco Ry. Co., supra note 58.
62. Gray v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., supra note 58.
63. Cantwell v. Zook, 250 S.W. 2d 980 (Mo. 1952); White v. St. Louis Public
Service Co., 249 S.W. 2d 498 (Mo. App. 1952).
64. Cooper v. 804 Grand Building Corp., supra note 58.
65. Harrison v. St. Louis Public Service Co., supra note 58. 105
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During the past twelve-month period there have been several cases
which have held that one waived the right to object on appeal to an
error of a court by failing to object to that error both at the trial and in a
motion for a new trial.s The same result has been reached when parties
have been said to have abandoned objections made at the trial by failing
to make them in a motion for a new trial.67 Likewise, failure to make objec-
tions to alleged erroneous rulings of judges at trials has been said to bar
consideration of those rulings on appeal.,, The same result was reached
when there was a failure to attend a taking of a deposition with a conse-
quent lack of objection to a question put to the deponent.60
On the other hand, it has been held that failure to make either a suffi-
cient or a timely objection at a trial does not prevent a trial court from sus-
taining a new trial motion for any trial error called to the court's attention
in such motion; and that, where an appellate court sustains the new trial
order on such a ground specified by the trial court, the absence of a sufficient
and timely objection at the trial is not fatal.70
To the writer, this seems correct, for Section 510.210 of the ReAred
Statutes does not seem clearly to require an objection at the trial. It merely
requires that an objection to trial court's ruling be made to that court in
order to save most of that court's alleged erroneous rulings for consideration
on appeal.
b. Nature of
An objection to the admissibility of evidence must be specific and must
contain a proper ground for its exclusion, if the trial court is to be con-
victed of error in overruling the objection, except that, if it is apparent that
66. Pierce v. New York Central R.R., 257 S.W. 2d 84 (Mo. 1953); Block v.
Rackers, 256 S.W. 2d 760 (Mo. 1953); Blevins v. Thompson, 255 S.W. 2d 787 (Mo.
1953); Hoffman v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 255 S.W. 2d 736 (Mo. 1953); Moore
v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 251 S.W. 2d 38 (Mo. 1952); Villmer v. Household
Plastics Co., supra note 44; State ex rel. Kirks v. Allen, 250 S.W. 2d 348 (Mo.
1952); Baker v. Atkins, 258 S.W. 2d 16 (Mo. App. 1953); Smith v. G.F.C. Corp.,
255 S.W. 2d 69 (Mo. App. 1953); Morrison v. State, 252 S.W. 2d 97 (Mo. App.
1952); General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Vanausdal, 249 S.W. 2d 1003 (Mo.
App. 1952); Veal v. Leimkuehler, 249 S.W. 2d 491 (Mo. App. 1952).
67. Pierce v. New York Central R.R., supra note 66; Phillips Pipe Line Co.
v. Brandstetter, 254 S.W. 2d 636 (Mo. 1953); Williamson v. St. Louis Public Serv-
ice Co., 252 S.W. 2d 295 (Mo. 1952); Baker v. Atkins, supra note 66.
68. Anderson v. Woodward Implement Co., 256 S.W. 2d 819 (Mo. 1953)-
Dixon v. Burtrum, 258 S.W. 2d 24 (Mo. App. 1953); State ex rel. Consolidated
School Dist. C4 of Caldwell County v. Blackwell, 254 S.W. 2d 243 (Mo. App.
1953); Banks v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 249 S.W. 2d 481 (Mo. App. 1952).
69. J. R. Watkins Co. v. Lankford, 250 S.W. 2d 798 (Mo. App. 1952).
7 Phillips v. Vrooman, 251 S.W. 2d 626 (Mo. 1952).
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the evidence is self-evidently wholly incompetent for any purpose, or that
it is obviously unjustly inflammatory and prejudicial and can serve no pur-
pose whatever in the case, overruling of a general objection may be reversible
error. A mere description of testimony as inflammatory, prejudicial, self-serv-
ing, and inadmissible is generally construed to be merely hypothetical in
nature and insufficient to present anything for review.7 1
Where the plaintiff admitted at the time a hospital record was read
into evidence that it was the record of the hospital kept in regular course of
business, but objected to the admission of parts of the record on the ground
of hearsay, the plaintiff did not thereby question the reliability of the
records and could not contend for the first time on appeal that the entries
objected to were wholly inadmissible in the absence of evidence as to the
mode or method of preparation of the hospital records, the time the record
entries were made, and the sources of information.72
Though our law, which requires that the grounds of a motion for a
directed verdict must be made known to the court, had not been complied
with, where an examination of the record indicated that the trial court must
have known the grounds urged by the defendant in support of its motion for
a directed verdict, consideration by the-court of appeals of the question as to
whether or not the motion should have been sustained was not foreclosed.7"
It has been held that an objection to an instruction that it is confusing
and misleading, without stating wherein it is confusing and misleading, is
wholly without merit and must be denied. 74
It has been decided that, where counsel, in objection to the argument
of the opposing attorney, merely said "now, if Your Honor please, that is
highly improper," that statement was not such an objection and a request
for action on the part of the court as to compel a review of the trial court's
discretion in passing upon the incident.71
It has also been held that, where paragraph three of a second amended
answer was very similar to paragraph two of the amended answer of the
defendant to the plaintiff's third amended petition, the supreme court would
consider as properly raised the question as to whether the trial court had
erred in overruling the plaintiff's motion to strike paragraph three of the
71. Hoffman v. St. Louis Public Service Co., supra note 66.
72. Melton v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 251 S.W. 2d 663 (Mo. 1952).
73. Meyer v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 253 S.W. 2d 525 (Mo. App. 1952).
74. Anderson v. Woodward Implement Co., uipra note 68.
75. Williams v. Thompson, 251 S.W. 2d 89 (Mo. 1952).
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defendant's second amended answer, notwithstanding the fact that the only
motion filed had been one to strike paragraph two of "defendant's amended
answer to plaintiff's third amended petition. '76
APPEAL
a. Right Statutory
It is fundamental that the right of appeal exists only as provided by
statute;77 and, while appeals are favored, and statutes granting the right of
appeal are to be liberally construed, there is no room for indulging liber-
ality unless there is some reasonable statutory basis for the exercise of the
right which is being claimed in the particular case.78
b. Final Judgment
For the purposes of an appeal a judgment must usually be a final judg-
ment and it must ordinarily dispose of all the parties and of all the issues
in the case.70
However, it has been held that, construing together Sections 510.330
and 512.020, of the Revised Statutes, which provide for new trials and for
appeals respectively, a trial court may, by an appropriate order, make a
judgment final as to any party as to whom, or on any issue on which, no
new trial is ordered; and that any party aggrieved by such a final judgment
is entitled to appeal therefrom.80
Section 510.180(2) of the Revised Statutes provides that a court may
order separate trials of claims by various parties, and Supreme Court Rule
3.29 states that a final judgment may be rendered in connection with any
of the claims separately tried.81
A judgment granting a motion to dismiss count one and denying a
motion to dismiss separate counts two and three of a petition was not final
76. Kansas City Stock Yards Co. v. A. Reich & Sons, supra note 17.
77. Tucker v. Miller, 253 S.W. 2d 821 (Mo. 1953); Stith v. St. Louis Public
Service Co., 251 S.W. 2d 693 (Mo. 1952); Samuel C. Stoff Co. v. Inter-City Mfg.
Co., 251 S.W. 2d 978 (Mo. App. 1952).
78. Samuel C. Stott Co. v. Inter-City Mfg. Co., supra note 77. Notice also
that the error must not be harmless. Harrison v. St. Louis Public Service Co., supra
note 58, decides that seating one objectionable juror is not a harmless error, though
nine jurors may render a verdict.
79. Weir v. Brune, 256 S.W. 2d 810 (Mo. 1953); Tucker v. Miller, supra note
77; Stith v. St. Louis Public Service Co., supra note 77; Ash Grove School Dist.
R-4 v. Callison, 252 S.W. 2d 96 (Mo. App. 1952); Samuel C. Stott Co. v. Inter-City
Mfg. Co., supra note 77.
80. Stith v. St. Louis Public Service Co., supra note 77.
81. Amitin v. Izard, supra note 49.
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in the appellate sense on any theory that counts two and three were separa-
ble or that separate trials had been ordered, where the trial court did not
order, and the plaintiffs did not seek, a separate trial of counts two and
three.8 2
Where there were originally four counts in a petition, but one count was
abandoned and a separate trial was ordered as to another count, a judgment
dismissing the remaining two counts for failure to state a cause of action was
a final judgment.8 3
It has also been decided that, even though a judgment of dismissal
recited that "Thereupon comes plaintiff, by attorney, and upon oral mo-
tion" the action is dismissed, that fact did not make the order one based
on the voluntary act of the plaintiffs so that the judgment was a dismissal
without prejudice and not appealable. The judgment was a dismissal with-
out prejudice and not appealable. The judgment of dismissal was final for
the purpose of appeal, since the dismissal was based on the failure of the
petition to state a cause of action."-
On the other hand, it has been held that an order quashing service for
lack of venue is not a final appealable judgment8 5
It has also been determined that there can be no final judgment at the
interpleader stage of a case, unless the interpleader as a stakeholder pays
the money into court and is discharged from the case, leaving the inter-
pleaders to litigate for it between themselves.8 6
A judgment directing appraisal of homestead and dower interests and
indicating the distribution to be made between a widow and her step-child
was not a "final and appealable judgment," since much remained to be done
before the issues were all determined as to all the parties81
The entry of a judgment is to be made as of the day of the verdict, or
the day of its rendition by the court in trials without a jury. The judgment
is not then a final determination of the rights of the parties. The statutes
permit a motion for a new trial to be filed not later than ten days after the
entry of the judgment, and, if timely filed, "the judgment is not final until
82. Weir v. Brune, supra note 79.
83. Lightfoot v. Jennings, 254 S.W. 2d 596 (Mo. 1953). Also see Frank
v. Sinclair Refining Co., 256 S.W. 2d 793 (Mo. 1953) which holds that the dis-
missal of a petition for failure to state a cause of action is a final judgment.
84. Frank v. Sinclair Refining Co., supra note 83.
85. mId.
86. Heinrich v. South Side National Bank in St. Louis, supra note 7.
87. Osborn v. Osborn, 252 S.W. 2d 837 (Mo. App. 1952). 109
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disposition of the motion," and, if "not passed on within ninety days after
the motion is filed, it is deemed denied for all purposes," So long as the
motion for a new trial is pending undetermined, the judgment is not final
and appealable.,,
c. New Trial Granted
A defendant may appeal from a judgment entered on a jury's verdict
for tke plaintiff, if his new trial motion is overruled in its entirety.8'
Also, where a defendant, after verdict moved for a new trial, but the
court granted a new trial as to the issue of damages and overruled the mo-
tion as to all other particulars, the new trial ordered was one for which the
defendant had not asked in its motion and one which the plaintiff did not
seek and was, thus, on the court's own motion, and its order constituted
an order granting a new trial from which both the plaintiff and the de-
fendant, as aggrieved parties, could appeal.90
d. Order Refusing Motion for Judgment in Accordance
with Motion for Directed Verdict
It is held that an order overruling a defendant's after-trial motion to
set aside a verdict and judgment and for judgment in accordance with the
defendant's trial motion for a directed verdict is not appealable, since there is
no statutory provision for an appeal from such an order.91
e. Court's Duty as to Right to Appeal
Though neither party raises the question, it is the duty of an appellate
court to determine of its own volition whether a judgment appealed from
is a final judgment from which an appeal may be taken.92 This means that
it must, on its own motion determine whether or not it has jurisdiction.
f. Designation of Parties
The parties on appeal are placed in the same position as they were in
the petition.93
88. Tucker v. Miller, supra note 77.
89. Stith v. St. Louis Public Service Co., supra note 77.
90. Ibid.
91. Ibid.
92. Osborn v. Osborn, supra note 87.
93. Campbell v. Sheraton Corp. of America, 253 S.W. 2d 106 (Mo. 1952). 110
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g. How Taken
1. Notice of Appeal
(a) Necessity for
The timely filing of a notice of appeal is the statutory "vital step" for
perfecting an appeal and is jurisdictional9 4
(b) Time for filing
It is mandatory requirement that a notice of appeal be filed with the
clerk of the trial court "not later than ten days after the judgment or order
appealed from becomes final," except where the ten days have expired, and
the filing of a notice of appeal within six months from the date of final
judgment has been permitted by special order of the appropriate appellate
court."9
This allows six months after a judgment becomes final and appealable
in which to investigate and to procure the special order.96
A notice of appeal is prematurely filed, and ineffective, if it is filed after
a motion for a new trial has been filed and before the judgment involved has
thereafter become final, either by the expiration of ninety days after the
filing of the motion or by the court's passing on the motion at an ear-
lier date. 7
A notice of appeal is not considered filed with a clerk of court until he
has knowledge of its filing.98
(c) Multiple Notices
The filing, and transmitting to an appellate court, of two notices of
appeal by separate defendants does not mean that there are two cases pend-
ing in this court, each of which is to be disposed of separately, but, instead,
there is only the single case, just as there was in the court below.99
2. Transcript
(a) Agreed Statement of Case
Section 512.120 of the Revised Statutes requires that the "statement
94. Byers v. Zuspann, 257 S.W. 2d 384 (Mo. App. 1953).
95. Byers v. Zuspann, supra note 94; Tucker v. Miller, supra note 77.
96. Tucker v. Miller, supra note 77.
97. Ibid.
98. Byers v. Zuspann, sutpra note 94.
99. Hughes v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 251 S.W. 2d 360 (Mo. App. 1952). 111
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of case" must contain the facts essential to a decision of the questions sought
to be presented. 100
(b) Abandoned Pleadings
When one amends a petition by filing a new amended pleading, he
abandons his initial petition and it should not appear in the appellate
transcript."'
3. Brief
(a) Supreme Court Rule 1.08
1. To Be complied with
The clear, specific, and simple provisions of Supreme Court Rule 1.08
should be fully complied with in the preparation of briefs.102
2. Purpose
It was adopted for the purpose not only of aiding the court in its work
but also for the purpose of guarding against the disturbance of judgments
except upon a full and fair presentation of the whole record necessary to a
determination of properly presented errors. 00
(b) Statement of Facts
The purpose of the statement of facts is primarily to afford an immed-
iate, accurate, complete, and unbiased understanding of the facts of the
case, and one which does not fairly present the facts is pernicious to the
extent it conveys in the first instance a false, distorted, or imperfect im-
pression of the facts.104
A statement which presents the contestants' view of the facts and does
not cover the facts favorable to the proponents is incorrectly drafted.10
(c) Points and Authorities
Supreme Court Rule 1.08(a)(3) contemplates a particularization in
the statement of the points relied upon and the citation of authorities to
the specific points to which they apply.00
Points relied on in a brief should not be abstract in nature and they
100. Communication Workers of America Local No. 632$ v. Brown, 252 S.W. 2d
103 (Mo. App. 1952).
101. Weir v. Brune, sip'a note 79.
102. Fuchs v. Reorganized School Dist. No. 2, Gasconade County, 251 S.W.
2d 677 (Mo. 1952).
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should not require an appellate court to speculate as to the specific matters
constituting alleged errors.10
Grounds for recovery pleaded in a petition, but not referred to in one's
points in his brief, are deemed abandoned. 0
Also where the appellant cited no authorities in support of a contention,
and failed to develop and explain it, that contention, for the purpose of
appeal, was deemed to have been abandoned.' °
Merely stating that the trial court erred in giving certain instructions
does not comply with Supreme Court Rule 1.08(a)(3) since it is not stated
wherein the instructions are improper."0
(d) Argument
References in a brief to page numbers in a transcript should point out
specifically what material is referred to. An appellate court is not required
to search out the record and speculate as to just what particular matter
counsel had in mind in making such references."'
Though a point is stated in one's points and authorities and is support-
ed by authorities, if it is not argued, it is considered abandoned. 112
h. Changing Theories on Appeal
It is a well-settled principle of law, long established and applied in many
cases, that parties will be bound on appeal by the positions they have taken
in the trial court. 13
This doctrine has been applied recently to an attempt to change the
ground of objection to the introduction of evidence."14 It has also been held
that one can not claim at a trial that a particular issue is one of fact to be
decided by a jury and, on appeal, assert that it is an issue of law to be
decided by the court."
107. Ibid.
108. Brownfield v. Brownfield, 249 S.W. 2d 389 (Mo. 1952); Baker v. Atkins,
supra note 66.
109. Baker v. Atkins, supra note 66; Scott County Milling Co. v. Thompson,
supra note 42.
110. Pierce v. New York Central R.R., supra note 66.
111. Wiffler v. Basler, supra note 103; Anderson v. Woodward Implement Co.,
supra note 68.
112. Leslie v. Mathewson, 257 S.W. 2d 394 (Mo. App. 1953).
113. Williams v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 253 S.W. 2d 97 (Mo. 1952);
Heuer v. John R. Thompson Co., 251 S.W. 2d 980 (Mo. App. 1952).
114. Williams v. St. Louis Public Service Co., supra note 113.
115. Thornburgh v. Hunkler, 255 S.W. 2d 975 (Mo. 1953).
113
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i. Matters Considered on Appeal
It is fundamental in the concept of appellate practice that, save for
certain recognized exceptions, questions of error not raised and properly pre-
served in the trial court will not be considered on appeal.llG
It has, however, been held that a fact admitted in the appellant's brief
may be assumed to be true in determining the appellant's rights though it
was not in evidence before the trial court.117
Further, it has been decided that the supreme court may consider a
contention that the record shows that the judgment attacked is void, even
though that contention is raised for the first time on appeal.118 A void
judgment based on lack of a judge's authority to deal with the subject
matter covered by the judgment may always be attacked.
It has likewise been determined that whether or not a submissible case
is made is inherent in every case that comes to an appellate court. 10
One must also remember that Supreme Court Rule 3.27 provides, as
an ultimate safeguard against a situation where some great wrong might
otherwise be rendered incurable because of a mere procedural omission, that
plain errors affecting substantial rights may be considered on appeal, though
they were neither raised nor preserved in the trial court, when an appellate
court believes that manifest injustice or a miscarriage of justice has resulted
therefrom.120 In fact, it has been stated that it would be an abuse of dis-
cretion on the part of an appellate court to refuse to act under this rule.12'
For instance, it has been held that, for a court to substitute its judg-
ment for the verdict of the jury, thus depriving the parties of a jury trial
of the issues in the case, without any authority of law so to do, was a plain
error, substantially affecting the rights of the parties and working a manifest
injustice if allowed to stand. The court said, further, that it was its duty,
under Supreme Court Rule 3.27, to consider that point' even though the
plaintiff took no steps, if any were then available, to preserve the point in
the trial court.122
On the other hand, the conduct of a trial judge in questioning a witness
116. Harrison v. St. Louis Public Service Co., supra note 58. See also Veatch
v. Black, 250 2d 501 (Mo. 1952) and Jones v. Giannola, 252 S.W. 2d 660 (Mo.
App. 1952).
117. Politte v. Wall, 256 S.W. 2d 283 (Mo. App. 1953).
118. Healer v. Kansas City Public Service Co., supra note 38.
119. Adair County-v. Urban, 250 S.W. 2d 493 (Mo. 1952).
120. Harrison v. St. Louis Public Service Co., supra note 58.
121. Leslie v. Mathewson, supra note 112.
122. Jaeger v. Agnew, 252 S.W. 2d 847 (Mo. 1952).
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was held not to call for a review of that conduct under Supreme Court
Rule 3.27. 12S
j. Duty of Appellate Courts
1. In General
It should again be noticed that an appellate court has the duty to
determine whether a final appealable judgment has been entered in a cause,
though that issue has not been raised by the parties.12 4
Such a court also has a duty to dispose of a case on appeal, if possible,
so that litigation may not be unreasonably prolonged. With this in mind,
the Kansas City Court of Appeals recently reversed outright a judgment
for a plaintiff on the ground that the evidence showed that the plaintiff was
guilty of contributory negligence which the defendants pleaded, though they
had not assigned as error the overruling of their motion for a directed verdict
and their after-trial motion for judgment. The appellate court had determin-
ed that the plaintiff had not made a case on the issues submitted.- 5
In compliance with the provision in Section 512.160(3) of the Revised
Statutes to the effect that an appellate court shall examine the transcript
on appeal and give such judgments as the trial court ought to have given, as
to the appellate court shall seem agreeable to law, the supreme court lately
modified a judgment to dispose of a counterclaim which had been covered
by the verdict in the case, but which the judgment therein had failed to
mention.128
2. As to Matters Involving Discretion of Court
It is a rule which has long been established and applied in many
decisions of our court, that an appellate court should not interfere with the
findings and conclusions of the trial judge, unless, there has been a manifest
abuse of judicial discretion by the trial judge.127
For example, the competency of a juror is a question of fact and the
finding of the circuit court as to it will not be disturbed unless dearly
against the evidence.1 28
Also, the trial court's exercise of discretion in regard to the scope and
123. Baker v. Atkins, supra note 66.
124. Ash Grove School Dist. R-4 v. Callison, supra note 79.
125. Thomas v. Aines Farm Dairy, 257 S.W. 2d 228 (Mo. App. 1953).
126. Commercial National Bank of Kansas City, Kan. v. White, supra note 36.
127. Jourdan v. Jourdan, supra note 51.
128. Hieber v. Thompson, supra note 43; Harrison v. St. Louis Public Service
Co., s.upra note 58. 115
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extent of re-direct examination will not be disturbed by an appellate court,
unless an abuse of discretion is clearly shown. 129
3. Weighing Evidence
It is within the province of the jury to weigh the testimony. By their
verdict on that issue, an appellate court is bound.180 Also, an assignment
that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence is a matter to be de-
cided solely by the trial court. 8,
k. Tests Applied in Reaching Judgmn-nt as to Whether
Sdtbmissible Case Has Been Made
1. Substantial Evidence
It has been held that the law governing the sufficiency of evidence
which appellate courts should apply is that it is no answer to say that the
jury's verdict involved speculation and conjecture. Whenever facts are in
dispute or the evidence is such that fair-minded men may draw different
inferences, a measure of speculation and conjecture is required on the part
of those whose duty it is to settle the dispute by choosing what seems to
them to be the most reasonable inference. Only when there is a complete
absence of probative facts to support the conclusion reached does a reversi-
ble error appear." 2 Where there is an evidentiary basis for the jury's ver-
dict, the jury is free to discard or disbelieve whatever facts are inconsistent
with its conclusion. And the appellate court's function is exhausted when
that basis becomes apparent, it being immaterial that the court might draw
a contrary inference or feel that another conclusion is more reasonable.""
2. Evidence Considered and Attitudes Toward It
It is a well-established rule that, in passing on the question as to
whether a party has made a case for the jury on an issue pleaded, an appel-
129. Eickmann v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 253 S.W. 2d 122 (Mo. 1952).
130. McCaffery v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 252 S.W. 2d 361 (Mo. 1952);
Kangas City'Stock Yards Co. v. A. Reich & Sons, Inc., supra note 17; Papen v.
Friedmeyer, 255 S.W. 2d 841 (Mo. App. 1953); Young v. Kansas City Public
Service Co., 255 S.W. 2d 113 (Mo. App. 1952).
131. Romandel v. Kansas City Public Service Co., supra note 57; Stith v. St.
Louis Public Service Co., supra note 77; Davidson v. Fisher, supra note 48.
132. Fyock v. Riales, 251 S.W. 2d 102 (Mo. App. 1953). See, in accord, Hat-
field v. Thompson, 252 S.W. 2d 534 (Mo. 1952); White v. Barkovitz, 254 S.W. 2d
291 (Mo. App. 1953); Finley v. Illinois Central R.R., 251 S.W. 2d 713 (Mo. App.
1952).
133. Fyock v. Riales, uplta note 132. In accord, see Winters v. Terminal R. R.
Ass'n. of St. Louis, 252 S.W. 2d 380 (Mo. 1952). The same idea has been expressed,
in Wann v. Gruner, 251 S.W. 2d 57 (Mo. 1952), in which it was said that findings
and a decree which are based upon substantial evidence should not be disturbed on
appeal. 116
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late court must accept as true all evidence favorable to the plaintiff's case."3'
Another way that this idea has been expressed is to state that the appellate
court must consider the evidence most favorable to the respondent.13 5 Yet
another expression that has been used to indicate the same idea is to the
effect that an appellate court must view the evidence in the light most fa-
vorable to the respondent. 3
In this connection it has also been decided that the appellant's evidence
should be disregarded except as it aids the respondent'31
Finally, it has been stated that, in determining whether or not the re-
spondent has made a case, he should be given the benefit of all reasonable
inferences which can be drawn from the evidence which is favorable to him.98s
1. Appeals on Grounds of Excessive or Inadequate
Verdicts or Judgm-ents
1. In General
In passing upon the point of the size of a verdict, an appellate court
is only concerned with the legal aspects of the question. It may determine
whether a verdict was either inadequate as a matter of law or excessive as
134. Anderson v. Woodward Implement Co., supra note 68; Douglas v. Douglas,
255 S.W. 2d 756 (Mo. 1953); Miles v. Ozark Bowl, 250 S.W. 2d 849 (Mo. 1952);
Snell v. Seek, 250 S.W. 2d 336 (Mo. 1952); Barton v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 255
S.W. 2d 451 (Mo. App. 1953); Scott County Milling Co. v. Thompson, supra note
42; Stanley v. Stanley, 251 S.W. 2d 365 (Mo. App. 1952); Fyock v. Riales, supra
note 132; Amos-James Grocery Co. v. Canners Exchange, Inc., 250 S.W. 2d 171
(Mo, App. 1952).
135. Lee v. Holland, 258 S.W. 2d 30 (Mo. App. 1953); Baker v. Atkins, supra
note 66; Finley v. Illinois Central R.R., 251 S.W. 2d 713 (Mo. App. 1952); Bumpus
v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 251 S.W. 2d 371 (Mo. App. 1952); DeVoto v. St.
Louis Public Service Co., 251 S.W. 2d 355 (Mo. App. 1952).
136. Wofford v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 252 S.W. 2d 529 (Mo. 1952);
MoCaffery v. St. Louis Public Service Co., supra note 130; Turbett v. Thompson,
252 S.W. 2d 319 (Mo. 1952); Williamson v. St. Louis Public Service Co., supra
note 67; Thomas v. Aines Farm Dairy, supra note 125; Long v. Mississippi Lime
Co. of Missouri, 257 S.W. 2d 167 (Mo. App. 1953); White v. Barkovitz, supra note
132; Burke v. Renick, 249 S.W. 2d 513 (Mo. App. 1952).
137. Douglas v. Douglas, supra note 134; Wofford v. St. Louis Public Service
Co., supra note 136; Williamson v. St. Louis Public Service Co., supra note 67; Miles
v. Ozark Bowl, supra note 134; Snell v. Seek, supra note 134; Lee v. Holland, supra
note 135; Baker v. Atkins, supra note 66; Barton v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, supra
note 134; Fyock v. Riales, supra note 132.
138. Anderson v. Woodward Implement Co., supra note 68; Douglas v. Douglas,
supra note 134; Wofford v. St. Louis Public Service Co., supra note 136; Miles v.
Ozark Bowl, supra note 134; Snell v. Seek, supra note 134; Lee v. Holland, supra
note 135; Baker v. Atkins, supra note 66; Barton v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, supra
note 134; Scott County Milling Co. v. Thompson, supra note 42; Bumpus v. St.
Louis Public Service Co., supra note 135; Stanley v. Stanley, supra note 134;
Fyock v. Riales, supra note 132; Amos-James Grocery Co. v. Canners Exchange, Inc.,
2upra note 134. 1 117
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a matter of law, but between these two extremes the finding of the jury is
conclusive save only as it is subject to the approval or disapproval of the
trial judge, who has the power to weigh the evidence. Even though an
award approaches the maximum allowable for the injuries sustained, if it
represents the calm and considered judgment of the jury when acting within
its special function, there is no occasion for appellate interference.2" 9
It is well settled that each case must be considered upon its own facts,
and that the court should not interfere with the discretion of the jury in
fixing the amount of an award unless the verdict shocks the judicial con-
science. An appellate court must also be mindful of the changed economic
conditions of the present time and of the reduced purchasing power of the
dollar.140
2. Evidence Considered
In determining the issue as to whether or not a verdict is excessive, an
appellate court should not weigh all of the evidence, but should consider only
the evidence and inferences most favorable to the plaintiff and to the jury's
verdict which has had the approval of the trial court .14
The same idea was expressed in a somewhat different way, when the
supreme court said that, in determining the excessiveness of an award, it
considered the evidence of the nature and extent of plaintiff's injury from a
standpoint favorable to plaintiff. 4 2
3. Abuse of Discretion
Finally, the supreme court has held that, in determining whether or
not a new trial had been properly granted because of the excessiveness of a
verdict, it would proceed on the theory that the trial court's ruling was
correct, unless the evidence showed the contrary clearly enough to establish
an abuse of discretion on the part of said court. 48
m. Judgment of Appellate Court
1. Dismissal
(a) For Failure to Proceed with Appeal
Where an appellant failed to do anything toward appealing his case
except to file a notice of appeal, his appeal was dismissed.'"
139. Harrison v. St. Louis Public Service Co., sapra note 58.
140. Young v. Kansas City Public Service Co., supra note 130.
141. Pierce v. New York Central R.R., supra note 66; Parks v. Thompson,
stupra note 27.
142. Meade v. Kansas City Public Service Co., 250 S.W. 2d 513 (Mo. 1952).
143. Parks v. Thompson, supra note 27.
144. Hughes v. St. Louis Public Service Co., supra note 22.
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(b) For Noncompliance with Rules of Court
Recently an appeal was dismissed because the statement of facts in the
appellant's brief did not fairly set forth the relevant evidence and failed to
include the facts upon which the defense rested and because the brief con-
tained no assignments of error.. 45
The appeal in another case was dismissed because it was impossible to
ascertain from the brief the questions which the appellant wished to pre-
sent for determination.. 46
On the other hand, the supreme court refrained from dismissing an ap-
peal in which the brief contained a statement of the facts which was unfair
in that it stated the evidence in favor of the appellant more favorably than
the record justified, and omitted the evidence favorable to the respondent.
It did this because it saw from the plaintiffs' (appellants') brief that their
attorneys were under the impression that, when a defendant in an equity
case files a motion to dismiss at the close of plaintiff's case and the motion
is sustained, on appeal the evidence must be considered in its most favorable
light to the plaintiff.147
2. Judgment Reversed
Where an appellant should have had a directed verdict, as the facts in
evidence and the legitimate inferences therefrom were so strongly against
the verdict as to leave no room for reasonable minds to differ, the judgment
should be reversed.148
However, a case will not be reversed: because of an error not affecting
the merits of the case.'149
3. Remanding upon Reversal
It has been held that the furtherance of justice requires that a case
should not be reversed without remanding unless the appellate court is con-
vinced that the facts are such that a recovery cannot be had; and, even
though the plaintiff fails to substantiate the theory upon which his case was
tried, if he nevertheless shows a state of facts which might entitle him to a
recovery if his case were brought upon a proper theory, the judgment will not
be reversed outright, but, instead, in the exercise of a sound judicial discre-
tion, the case will be remanded to give him the opportunity to amend his
145. Shreve v. Zuvekas, supra note 47.
146. Williamson v. Glessner, 249 S.W. 2d 871 (Mo. App. 1952).
147. Rigg v. Hart, supra note 39.
148. Stone v. Farmington Aviation Corp., 253 S.W. 2d 810 (Mo. 1953);
149. Papen v. Friedmeyer, 255 S.W. 2d 841 (Mo. App. 1952). 119
Stubbs: Stubbs: Work of the Supreme Court 1952
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1953
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
petition, if so advised, so as to state a case upon the theory which his
evidence discloses.15"
However, where the plaintiff at a trial developed all of his evidence on
various available theories on which he might recover and where he then de-
liberately chose to restrict the submission of his case to one theory, the su-
preme court has reversed without remanding the case for a new trial.",
Also, where newly discovered evidence concerning the extent of injuries
to the plaintiff would be sharply disputed in the event of a retrial, and the
question raised by the newly-discovered evidence had been litigated at the
trial, the supreme court, on appeal, refused to remand the case for a retrial
on the question of the extent of the injuries.1-2
On the other hand, where the plaintiff consistently and erroneously ad-
hered at the trial to an attempt to recover under the humanitarian rule,
rather than to stress the defendant's wilful or reckless conduct, the supreme
court remanded the case to permit a retrial on the theory of wilful or reck-
less conduct, because the court thought that its decisions prior to this case
may have been equivocal upon the question of the applicability of the
humanitarian rule to claims supported by evidence like that introduced in
the instant case, which evidence it thought did not support the submission
of a defendant's responsibility for negligence under that rule.',
A remand may be merely for a retrial of an issue of liability'1 4 or of
damages,1'r when the error below deals only with one of these issues.
4. Penalty for Vexatious Appeal
Where a judgment for the plaintiff in a personal injury action was
reversed and the cause was remanded for a new trial, the plaintiff was held
not to be entitled to an assessment of damages under the statute relating
to vexatious appeals, since that statute provides for such damages only upon
the affirmance of a judgment or order, or upon the dismissal of a case.156
n. Rehearing
If the opinion of an appellate court on its face is in fact incomplete
without a remanding of the cause for further proceedings on counterclaims,
150. Stone v. Farmington Aviation Co., supra note 148; Smith v. St. Louis
Public Service Co., 252 S.W. 2d 83 (Mo. 1952); O'Neal v. Mavrakos Candy Co.,
siapra note 24.
151. Stone v. Farmington Aviation Co., sup at note 148.
152. Gurley v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 256 S.W. 2d 755 (Mo. 1953).
153. McClanahan v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 251 S.W. 2d 704 (Mo. 1953).
154. Stith v. St. Louis Public Service Co., supra note 77.
155. Doelling v. St. Louis Public Service Co., supra note 42.
156. Shepherd v. Wommack, stpra note 20.
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it is the duty of the defendant by a timely motion for a rehearing, or to
modify, or by some other proper means, to call to the court's attention the
necessity of such a correction.157
o. T'ansfer
When a case is properly transferred to the supreme court from a court
of appeals, the supreme court proceeds as though the cause had come to it on
an original appeal.1"1 Hence, though the supreme court approves the opinion
of the court of appeals, it has the duty to determine the appeal anew.u °
157. Dorn v. St. Louis Public Service Co., supra note 55.
158. Hayes v. Hayes, 252 S.W. 2d 323 (Mo. 1952).
159. Beetschen v. Shell Pipe Line Corporation, 253 S.W. 2d 785 (Mo. 1952). 121
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